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Abstract 
The Western Australian Payment of Members Act 1900 was promulgated upon two tenets, namely, that 
Members of Parliament should be compensated for their services to society and that other Australian 
colonies were already receiving some form of compensation. The premise stipulated that all people, 
regardless of economic background should be given an opportunity to fulfil the honourable duty of a 
Representative. 
Remuneration in this thesis covers the minimalist advent of Parliamentary Remuneration whereby MPs 
were compensated by way of a basic salary to the current multifaceted Parliamentary Remuneration 
which encompasses various structures, processes and is often overarched by complicated determinative 
methodologies. Remuneration was the original term given for the payment of services rendered. The 
contemporary understanding of Remuneration extends to salary, superannuation and an additional raft of 
entitlements. 
Since the form of Parliamentary Remuneration has evolved, so too has public disputation grown over the 
various entitlements that MPs receive. Parliamentary Remuneration has become a highly contentious 
issue. However, despite the nature of the topic there is a surprising absence of research on the topic. This 
study is the only known historical and analytical account of Parliamentary Remuneration that has been 
written apart from reports prepared by Governmental agencies or Parliamentary Remuneration tribunals. 
The Quest for a Formula will review the historical remunerative determinations that have occurred within 
Western Australia since the tum of the 20th Century, contrasting the findings of this study against 
historical experiences that can be drawn from other democratic-Commonwealth countries such as Britain 
and Canada. For comparison the thesis will also investigate how various enterprises, both public and 
private, remunerate their employees in accordance to various performance management indicators. 
This study suggests that the methods that have been at use within Western Australia, and various other 
Commonwealth-based jurisdictions, may require an overhaul. However, given the unique nature of 
parliamentary duties, attempts to provide a set of performance criteria have proven difficult to establish. 
Nonetheless this thesis proposes a systematic determinative process that is more transparent than current 
procedures. The thesis has found the determinative process in Western Australia to be redundant as it 
appears to be overlapped by the Federal Remuneration Tribunal. 
Many types of determinative processes have been employed by various Governments; this study 
illustrates the equitable methodologies compared to inequitable methods. This thesis also proposes that 
the general standing of an MP within Australian society may be raised through the development of a more 
transparent system of determination that encourages public input. 
Aside from this, a remunerative determination should take into consideration an MP's experience along 
with the size, demographics of their electorate. Parliament should also frequently employ private 
management consultants that can individually assess each MP's workload, consequently producing an 
impartial recommendation on the state of MP remuneration. This thesis proposes that the employment of 
such consultants may allow for MPs to communicate numerous ways that they could be more efficient 
and could also generate 'work plans' to assist them in achieving their everyday goals. 
This study will also find that, while a new more transparent system of determination is required within 
both Western Australia and Australia, the possibility of implementing a performance management system 
to consequently remunerate MP is highly unlikely. Finally, a recommendation of this thesis will propose 
new structures, processes and mathematical formule in determining an MP's overall worth. 
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Chapter One: 
Introduction 
1.1 - Background 
-Philosophical Viewpoints on Remuneration 
-1¥hat is Remuneration? 
- Contemporary Remuneration 
1.2 - Thesis Aims 
1.3 - Ethical Considerations 
1.4 - Thesis Layout 
1.5 - Thesis Limitations 
1.1 - Background: 
Philosophical Viewpoints 
It could be argued, based solely on anecdotal evidence and a glance across the letters 
pages of most Australian newspapers over a given period of time, that within 
contemporary Australian Politics, there is an ever-growing amount of skepticism in 
relation to Parliamentarians and the reported motives and justifications for the decisions 
that are taken. Notwithstanding the general cynicism that, in recent surveys, has ranked 
the profession of politician on a par with the oft' maligned used car salesman, the 
electorate's attitudes towards politician's pay has often been cynical or at least 
ambiguous, even in earlier times, prior to the present-day problems and paradigms, as it 
shall be seen. 
Chapter One: Introduction 
· The West Australian newspaper recently completed a survey which summarised the 
community's general feelings towards various positions, and the people who hold such 
positions. The survey looked at the esteem held by the community towards such positions 
as the used car salesman, lawyers, journalists, politicians along with various other 
professions. The findings published in The West stated: "only 12 per cent of people rate 
MPs as honest and ethical," which was nevertheless higher ''than the 7 per cent rating for 
newspaper journalists."' 
This disgruntled voters' notion of self-interested parliamentarians, who work for their 
own gain has existed, in documented form, for over two thousand years. Socrates, in reply 
to Glaucon's question in The Republic regarding the payment of Governors states: 
" ... money and honour have no attraction for them; good men do not wish to be openly 
demanding payment for goveming."2 Socrates speaks of the true artistry of governance 
and of the Representative who governs for the superior good and not the selfs good. The 
somewhat altruistic notion of an MP working for nothing except the reward of serving the 
'superior good' has some rather romantic connotations that would undoubtedly be 
rejected by most modem theorists. 
Renowned conservative thinker, Edmund Burke has also spoken of the 'good' that can be 
found in the delight of simply representing someone in Parliament. Although Burke 
makes no explicit mention of remuneration, his speech to the voters of Bristol had 
1 The West Australian, April 30 2001, Pg12 
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implications for Parliamentary Remuneration: "To deliver an opinion is the right of all 
men; that of constituents is a weighty and respectable opinion, which a Representative 
ought always to rejoice to hear, and which he ought always most seriously to consider."3 
From these two statements, it could be supposed that both Burke and Plato, who both had 
strong ideals regarding the position of the Representative, also felt that the position 
required some amount of giving. However, some would argue that many people, as good 
as their intentions may have been, are corrupted by power and may even become selfish at 
its sight: 
The moment a man, or a class of men, find themselves with 
power in their hands, the man's individual interest, or the 
class' separate interests, acquire an entirely new degree of 
importance in their eyes. Finding themselves worshipped by 
others, they become worshippers of themselves, and think 
themselves to be counted at a hundred times the value of other 
people.4 
One would suppose that this view, held by John Stuart Mill, is a more cynical, yet 
accurate, reflection of the constituencies' general feeling about contemporary 
parliamentarians and their remunerative status. A member of an elected parliament is the 
voice of many, Mill suggests that it is this fact that leads a person in a position of power 
to count themselves worthier than others. The power and position that a Representative 
holds is indeed many ways incomparable to all other workplace positions that exist within 
modem society. It is unique in many ways since one person may represent a vast area or a 
large number of people. 
2 PLATO, The Republic, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html, Pg.18 
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This does not help answer the conundrum regarding what or how parliamentarians should 
be paid, but rather, casts light on the dichotomy surrounding Parliamentary 
Remuneration. As it shall be illustrated, many parliamentarians themselves have been 
unsure about which philosophical and practical avenue to choose. 
Jeremy Bentham, although not making specific reference to MP's remuneration, speaks of 
the need to keep public salaries as low as possible. According to Bentham, this was due to 
the fact that such positions were honorific services. Guy Peters, who studied Benthamite 
philosophy in his book, which focussed upon rewards for top office holders, stated: 
"Bentham placed pay and reward at the centre of his utilitarian philosophy of government, 
paying particular attention to honorific service and methods of keeping public salaries as 
low as possible."5 However, such an argument only compounds the dichotomous nature 
of the issue of Parliamentary Remuneration. 
This dichotomy is particularly prevalent at the tum of the 20th Century where some 
parliamentarians echoed the sentiments of Burke and Plato. The first premier of W estem 
Australia, Sir John Forrest subscribed to the idealistic proclamation of Edmund Burke. 
During the second reading of the Payment of Members' Act on the 7th of November 1900, 
Sir John Forrest stated that he was philosophically, or "in tlie abstract, opposed to the 
3 BURKE. E, Edmund Burke on Government, P o/itics and Society, Harvester Press, Sussex, 1975, Pg.157 
4 MILL. J.S, Three Essays, Horace Hart Printer to the University, Oxford, year unknown, Pg.243 
5 Ed. PETERS G. Rewards at the Top; A Comparative Study of High Public Office, SAGE Publications, 
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payment of Members." However, Forrest recognised the practicalities of the situation he 
was faced with stating: " ... but I thoroughly recognise, in a colony like this, where people 
are not overburdened with wealth, there are practical difficulties in the way."6 
Sir John Forrest's leaning became clearer when he proved his subscription to the 
idealistic principles of Plato by making a lengthy statement on the position of an MP and 
how it has been 'degraded' over time: 
There were many services in those ancient days which were 
honorary, and performed by distinguished citizens without fee 
or reward; duties which were reserved for those more influential 
and learned. Many things were done in olden times which are 
now done by persons for reward, and by persons who are less 
learned than the persons I refer to. It has become fashion in this 
colony, and perhaps throughout Australasia, not perhaps to such 
a large extent in the mother country, for every man, whatever 
may be his qualifications or learning, to think he is fitted to be a 
Member of Parliament, a law maker at any rate. It has also 
become the fashion amongst a large number of people to think 
that those who make the laws in Parliament of the country 
should be paid. 
In Sir John Forrest's opening comments he states that in days past, representative services 
were carried out by 'distinguished and learned citizens.' It is well known that 
distinguished and learned citizens in Plato's era mainly belonged to a wealthy class of 
people. Similarly in Forrest's time, representational duties were only available to those 
who could afford to sustain themselves without the support of remuneration. This, as it 
London, 1994, Pg.2 
6 Parliamentary Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 7 November 1900, p 1521-2 
5 
Chapter One: Introduction 
will be noted further into this study, would form the crux of the argument for the payment 
of Members in Western Australia 
Nonetheless, Forrest understood the nature of parliamentary remuneration as a method of 
compensation and seemed quite divided by the circumstances, as he did not want 
monetary influences depreciating the reward of serving the voice of the constituents. As 
he states above, the payment of Members was a 'fashionable' thing of the time. He saw it 
fit for a man to occupy public office without any reward in a remunerative form, but also 
recognised the difficulties involved in holding the position and trying to uphold a secure 
lifestyle at the same time. Sir John Forrest thought it honourable to represent the State as 
an elected Member of Parliament and that holding such a position would be payment in 
itself. Ultimately, the issue of payment of Members could be reduced to understanding the 
semantic nature of the term 'remuneration.' 
What is Remuneration? 
The term 'Remuneration' has been defined in several ways. Some would maintain that 
remuneration is purely a manner through which employees could be compensated for 
leaving their usual place of employment. Whereas others would argue that it is simply a 
term for payment of services. Today, Employment Position advertisements within 
newspapers are also using the term 'Remuneration Package,' a term that was once privy 
to parliamentarians' salaries. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the verb, 
6 
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remunerate as: "reward, pay for service rendered" and as "compensation for toil."7 
Whereas the online Cambridge Dictionary defines remuneration as: "(to) payment for 
services."8 
One of the earliest documented forms of the payment of members within the Westminster 
System stems from the Middle Ages. Constituents were held 'liable' for some expenses 
that may have been incurred by their representatives.9 From this primordial evidence, it 
could be gathered that the rudimental meaning of Remuneration stemmed from a tenet 
that representatives needed to be 'reimbursed' for some of the expenses that they would 
incur fulfilling their everyday duties. As it shall become evident, some elements of this 
definition still exist today. Within Britain, this legal liability has not been removed from 
the law, as it remains a conventional power, in the sense that it is no longer observed.10 
The act of reimbursing or compensating Members of Parliament, or representatives, for 
their services to the constituency was an ideal that would ultimately bring forth the advent 
of Remuneration into Australian politics, as it shall be seen in Chapter Two. 
Remuneration was then known as a method of compensating persons elected to 
government who would have to leave their employment to serve the community. The 
contemporary meaning of remuneration has evolved into a three-tiered definition: Salary, 
Superannuation and Allowances. Although these three components of Parliamentary 
7 The Concise Oxford Dictionary (5th Ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1964, Pg. 1051 
8 http://dictionary.cambridge.org 
9 PRYNNE, 4'h Register, 53, 493, 4 Co. Inst. 46. Hallam, Mid Ages, iii, 114, n 
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Remuneration will be examined further in the following chapters, it is necessary to briefly 
visit each component. 
Salary: 
Today, the salary component of an MP's remunerative package represents the portion of 
funds allotted towards their personal living circumstances. It is a fiscal payment for the 
daily services and work that a Member of Parliament carries out. The salary of an MP is 
much the same as any other workplace's salary as it is simply payment for work rendered. 
It ensures that they are able to uphold a secure lifestyle. It is not intended to represent an 
amount that will assist the actual electoral and departmental mechanisms. 
Superannuation: 
Similarly, the section of the remunerative package that deals with an MP's 
Superannuation makes provisions for the MP to live securely in retirement. As in most 
other workplaces, the employee, in this case being the MP, makes a personal contribution 
to a savings fund whilst their employer also makes a contribution to either match or 
enlarge the savings load. On retirement, or dismissal via electoral defeat, an MP can 
claim a lump-sum payment of their Superannuation savings or can be paid a rate over the 
duration of their lifetime; which is annually adjustable. It is a benefit that is not widely 
enjoyed by the electorate, but is intended to be a safeguard and security device for the 
MPs who could find themselves out of employment at any given election. 
10 Ibid. 
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Allowances: 
The allowances provided to MPs ensure that they are able to carry out their daily duties 
without personal financial loss. This has not always been the case, and as it shall be seen 
in Chapter Two, MPs would often find themselves paying to travel to their own electorate 
along with an array of other expenses to be covered from their own pockets. Postage 
allowances, telephone allowances, staff allowance, travel allowances and many other 
allowances are intended to assist the MP, and their staff, carry out their everyday duties at 
both a Parliamentary and Electoral levels. 
The above additional allowances that Members of Parliament receive are often considered 
by the public to be 'added extras' or the 'perks' of holding office. Nonetheless, it has to 
be stated that in any workplace, a salary or wage of some description is endowed upon 
employees, and yet subsequently, employees are not subjected to pay for the postage, 
travel, mileage, accommodation or other expenses, incurred by the company that they are 
working for. 
Contemporary Remuneration: 
But what are the determinations governing the setting of such remuneration packages? As 
it shall be illustrated, there are many factors, but this question remains somewhat 
unanswerable, even to those at the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal who have set and 
determined what the salaries and allowances of the Members of Parliament should receive 
9 
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for the last 29 years. 11 As shall be discussed later, the Tribunal has tried various types of 
arrangements in determining the salary of an MP. But to date, there seems to be no real, 
perpetual measure upon which the salaries and allowances have been determined (See 
Appendices 1 and 2). 
Various working committees, boards, government inquiries, independent inquiries and 
tribunals have been established in an attempt to devise a remunerative system that would 
be considered by the constituents to be fair, transparent and independent. Moreover, a 
method that will help eliminate the public controversy surrounding the remuneration issue 
needs to be implemented. To date, there has been no apparent success as the methods in 
which the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal are making determinations are still being 
brought into question. 
Performance Management: 
Within the modem-day workforce, an increasing number of businesses are using 
performance management systems to pay and reward their workers appropriately. 
Employees are given set standards and outcomes that need to be achieved so that they 
may receive the salary, or bonus, to which they are entitled. It could be argued that the 
parliamentary system in Australia also has a 'performance management system' and that 
such a system is the general-term election. However, elections, being more a method of 
measuring popularity, do not always reflect accurately upon an individual MP's 
11 MOORE. B, The Remuneration of Members of the Western Australian Parliament 1888-1999, Perth, 
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performance or workload. It is thus necessary to evaluate the use of a performance 
management system that will remunerate individual MPs accordingly, or otherwise, to 
discover another workable method of making such determinations. 
The pivotal point, around which these issues revolve, is one's question of how much a 
parliamentarian is worth. Placing a value on such an incomparable position is not such an 
easy task. Often, it comes down to the subject's personal stance; some argue that they 
should be paid a lot more than their current amount, whereas others would argue that they 
do not deserve the amount they receive for the 'little' that they do. 
There are many groups and individuals within Australian society who would believe that 
MPs should not be remunerated for their services as their services are not at all beneficial 
to the greater community. As far fetched as this idea may seem, this perception of MP 
remuneration is fuelled by some constituents discontented notion of a failed democratic 
system. Others might say that the problem of MP remuneration is one of a 'tall poppy 
syndrome' that is endemic within Australian society. However, after noting international 
comparisons, a lack of acquiesce towards such remuneration is also evident overseas. 
It could be said, without much equivocation, that community perceptions towards MP 
remuneration are very negative. In 1993, the Sunday Age decided to report upon some of 
2000 (Unpublished) 
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the realities of being an MP. Poignantly, the Editorial noted that few people have become 
rich from an MP's pay: 
The commonly held view that being a politician is a piece of cake is not 
supported by the realities. The hours are endless, the travel grueling and the 
disruption to family life often costly. MPs are constantly at the mercy of 
constituents, pressure groups and assorted special pleaders. In a profession 
where the need for accuracy and concentration is relentless, the secretarial 
and research assistance provided to Australian MPs is minimal .... few, if any 
people, have become rich on an MP's pay. 12 
Within Western Australia, there are many varying arguments as to what should be done 
in regards to the levels of remuneration received by MPs. Some are outlandish and 
irrational, some are reasonable and well thought. Nonetheless, from this brief background 
on the issue of Parliamentary Remuneration, it could be calculated that the issue is not 
quite as clear-cut as it seems. 
Thus, the purpose and position of the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal of Western 
Australia will be brought into focus when the history of Parliamentary Remuneration in 
Western Australia from its origins in 1900 is viewed. Similarly will the other institutions 
and methods that have been employed to determine remunerative amounts be analysed in 
Chapter Two. 
12 The Age and The Sunday Age, I 993, Pg. I 7 
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1.2 - Thesis Aims: 
Before moving onto the focus questions that this study is attempting to answer, several 
pertinent points need to be made. Parliamentary Remuneration is an issue that is charged 
with subjectivism, misinformation and the opportunism of the media and political 
opponents; it often becomes the pivotal point around which malcontent voters can air 
their grievances about the parliamentarians of the day. Many disgruntled voters believe it 
is self-interest that drives people to become Members of Parliament so that they may 
receive some of the benefits that office enjoys. Not all citizens carry this belief, but 
Remuneration remains the causa prima of many disenfranchised voter's beliefs. 
Parliamentary Remuneration is not an issue that can be surmised in a page or in a brief 
editorial, because its current state stems from a long and convoluted history where the 
philosophical and practical origins need to be discovered. The cost of remuneration is not 
only fiscal, but also impinges upon the general perceptions held by the community at 
large towards their representatives. 
This thesis will examine the history of parliamentarian remuneration in Western 
Australia, including reference to other jurisdictions. It will look at the present processes 
of determination which are managed by the Salaries And Allowances Tribunal of W estem 
Australia and the inconsistencies that exist between Australian jurisdictions. Finally, it 
will canvass a proposal for the implementation of a performance based management 
system, as used in commercial enterprises, for measuring the outputs of political 
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representatives and ensuring that salary and entitlement increases are linked to 
appropriate measures and probity. 
The thesis does not suggest a priori a populist view that politicians are overpaid, indeed a 
thorough and fair performance management system might lead to increases in 
remuneration from present levels. 
There has already been a great deal of research and policy development into remunerative 
rates to be paid to Members of Parliament. However, very few, if any indeed, have been 
the work of non-governmental agencies. To this study's knowledge, this is the first 
wholly academic and objective study of its kind. Various committees, tribunals, 
governmental bodies and tendered consultants have looked into the issue of 'finding the 
method' for determining parliamentary remuneration. However, this study argues that the 
public condemnation towards Parliamentary Remuneration has been caused by the lack of 
a transparent, workable and understandable method of determination that eliminates the 
possible appearance of prevarication. Therefore the following questions, overleaf, will 
need to be addressed. 
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1.1 What decisions, to date, have affected the way in which MPs get remunerated and 
have these decisions been adequately addressed given the circumstances in which 
they were made? 
This thesis will endeavour to look at the present, historical and philosophical viewpoints 
governing contemporary Parliamentary Remuneration. It will look at the events 
surrounding remunerative determinations and why they were made. This will provide a 
clear picture of the methodologies that have been used in the past in determining 
parliamentary salaries. Once these events and methodologies have been defined, it will be 
necessary to critique the determinations in an objective fashion so that it may be seen 
whether the correct steps were taken. 
1.2 What are the major responsibilities and tasks of an MP? How does this correlate 
with their overall remunerative status? 
This question has two parts: Firstly, what roles govern the amount of remuneration 
received by an MP today and secondly, are there any specific roles that should be taken 
into account when developing a performance management system for them to adhere to? 
Once again, it will be necessary to look at the historical role of an MP to see how their 
roles have changed over the last 100 years and to consequently develop a reasonable 
method, according to which, they can be paid. 
This thesis will look at how the issue of Parliamentary Remuneration has come to 
Western Australia from Mother Parliament in Britain in the 18th Century. It will also look 
at the paths that Britain and Canada have taken when determining Parliamentary Salaries. 
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Similarly, this thesis will look at how the Members of Parliaments' roles have changed 
over history and whether the greater responsibility associated with their roles have 
effected their remuneration. 
1.3 How does this compare to an MP's position in another Westminster based system? 
The information provided from international and historical forces will cast light on how 
remuneration has been governed elsewhere and how this could effect Western Australian 
Determinations in the future. It will be necessary to view government literature and 
various other literary sources that define the roles of MPs. From this, we can 
consequently determine a responsibility framework that illustrates the roles of an MP. 
Various bodies, such as The Remuneration Tribunal of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal of Western Australia and the Top Body Salaries 
Commission for both Canada and Britain, will have the justifications of their 
determinations reviewed. Whether these remunerative determinations were equitable or 
not will be covered. When dealing with these governmental bodies, the study will look at 
the issue of transparency within such organisations. 
1.4 Is it/air to compare an MP's position to the general workforce? 
Once a general understanding of the roles of management in private enterprise and how 
their salaries and allowances are determined has been reviewed, it will be necessary to 
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make fair and equitable judgements on the similarities and differences between 
management in private enterprise and the Member of Parliament. 
It will also be necessary to review various literature sources that identify award rates, 
shareholders and performance management systems (such as the Hay Methodology) to 
see whether any of these types of methods could be implemented into Parliament. 
1.5 ls it possible to measure the execution of these activities? How? 
The final question that this study asks will assist in the formulation of a recommendation 
for Question 1.6 below as this point is at the crux of the whole study. It will be necessary 
to be objective, clear and fair when drawing conclusions about measuring the execution 
of an MP' s activities. 
1.6 Given the answers of the above questions, is it possible to devise a performance 
management system that determines accordingly what amount of remuneration mps 
should receive/or the achieved outcomes? 
This final question is more a matter of Recommendation as it will provide a synthesis of 
information compiled from the study into one multi-faceted Chapter which will 
encompass all of the relevant data into an overall finding. 
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1.5 - Thesis Layout: 
This thesis will be divided into eight chapters. Most of the questions noted above will be 
delegated an individual chapter so that it can be adequately addressed. Chapter One, as it 
has been viewed, has focused on the meaning of Remuneration and has illustrated both 
the contemporary, historical and philosophical sides of Parliamentary Remuneration. 
Chapter Two will look at the various remunerative determinations that have occurred 
over the last century within Western Australian politics and will take particular 
consideration in dealing with the Western Australian debate on Parliamentary 
Remuneration during 1888-1900. Chapter Three will anaylse the various components of 
a Western Australian Member of Parliament's Superannuation Scheme and will look at 
its fairness and comparability to those of other constituents. 
It is also necessary for this study to review what is happening within other jurisdictions 
both within and outside of Australia. This may be helpful in finding a remunerative-
determination formula for MPs within Western Australia. Therefore, Chapter Four will 
encompass the Australian Federal Parliament's total remunerative package within one 
chapter. Chapter Five will review the Canadian MP's remunerative status whilst 
documenting a largely, in-depth, private review of Parliamentary Remuneration m 
Canada. Chapter Six will review the British systems of Parliamentary Remuneration. 
Chapter Seven will take into consideration the various private methodologies that 
determine how 'non-parliamentary' companies remunerate their employees and finally, 
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Chapter Eight will provide some insights on how the future of Parliamentary 
Remuneration could be envisaged. 
1.6 - Thesis Limitations: 
This thesis will examine a remuneration of a sample of MPs from the Western Australian 
Parliament. Bringing into account the varying hierarchical levels of Ministers and Senior 
Ministers alongside Backbenchers and Councilors would require a much larger 
quantitative study. Therefore this study intends to develop a performance management 
system for Backbenchers. In this regard, it may be possible to transpose certain elements 
of the system upwardly to include other MPs. 
Finally, the approach discussed does not necessarily ensure that a viably useful system of 
determining Parliamentary Remuneration will be created. The implications of the created 
system will be discussed but this thesis remains an exercise of theoretical proportions. 
This thesis takes into account the fact that it may be impossible to place a performance 
management system into a parliamentary structure. If this is the finding of this thesis, it in 
no way detracts from the study' s importance for both domestic and international, 
Westminster based governments as it will clearly illustrate all the options that have been 
taken and why such a system is not possible. This study also remains a contribution to 
further educating people regarding the history, philosophy and politics behind 
parliamentary remuneration. 
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Chapter Two: 
Parliamentary Remuneration in Western Australia (A History) 
2.1 - Western Australia (1888-1900) 
2.2 - 100 Years of Remuneration 
2.3 - 1975: The Salaries and Allowances Tribunal 
2.4 - The 1990 Determination 
2.5-Parliamentary Allowances and Entitlements 
There have been many remunerative determinations over the last century. The thought 
of covering all sixty-five determinations is not feasible. Therefore, the more 
significant determinations will take the focus. They will consequently require more 
scrutiny so that an understanding can be conveyed. At the crux of the matter is the 
discovery of both how and why such determinations were made so they may be 
evaluated for future reference. This will allow the study to produce realistic and 
tangible recommendations that are not based on flaws within the remunerative 
framework that have already been uncovered through past experiences. 
2.1- Western Australia (1888-1900): Case Study 
At the end of the 19th Century, Western Australian politics found itself to be passing 
through an experience of historical tumult. Questions of Federation, the Constitution 
and whether Western Australia would join a Federation of Australia were all pertinent 
questions at the time that would determine the future of Western Australia's history. 
During the debate on the Constitution Act in 1888, Mr Hensman, Member for 
Greenough, stated his thoughts with some reluctance: "I know there will be many 
members who are shocked at the idea, but ... l am in favour of payment ofmembers."13 
13 Western Australian Parliamentary Debates (WAPD), 2 November 1888, Pg.201 
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Financially compensating MPs for the costs that they would incur whilst carrying out 
their duties was unheard of in Western Australia and Mr Hensman broached the 
remunerative subject with the greatest amount of caution as it was an issue that had 
not been discussed before. No action was taken upon Mr Hensman's request and the 
topic did not appear in Parliamentary Hansard for another eight years. 
In 1896, the issue was once again raised with caution as Mr Moran, Member for 
Yilgran, stated: "I come now to a question which is perhaps the most unpopular and 
obnoxious." Mr Moran was referring to Parliamentary Remuneration for the MPs of 
the W estem Australian Parliament. He went on to make particular reference to the 
expenses that he would incur whilst travelling to visit his electorate and that he was 
unable to bear the financial burden alone.14 
It was not long after 1896 that MPs began to discuss the ideal of Remuneration and 
how it related to specific democratic virtues. Various MPs began to refer to a 
statement made in the British Parliament which stated that the election of a citizen to 
parliament should not be impeded by matters of financial health or lack thereof: "No 
bar should stand in the way of any man's ambition to serve his country in 
Parliament. "15 
In W estem Australia, the debate on Parliamentary Remuneration did not focus on the 
various amounts that MPs should receive or how they should receive the funds. 
Instead, it focussed upon whether MPs should receive funds at all and moved to look 
14 WAPD, 29 July 1896, Pg.191 
15 WAPD, 24 November 1897, Pg.551 
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at why Parliamentarians should receive remuneration. This was a strong debate in 
which quasi-socialistic values about working class Australians were aired with much 
conviction. The practical question of how a man without financial aid could 
wholeheartedly represent his constituents was at the forefront of this debate. The crux 
of the remunerative argument focussed around Mr Kingsmill's (Member for Pilbara) 
comments in Parliament: 
... are we to subscribe to the doctrine that one class 
alone is to represent the people in Parliament? Are 
we to take it for granted that the masses of the people 
who, I contend, are not akin to theirs, And in some 
cases may not understand the wishes and aspirations 
of those masses? I think not ... 16 
Mr K.ingsmill' s egalitarian perspective towards his fellow constituents who may have 
aspirations of entering Parliament would eventually seal the meaning of Remuneration 
into the belief that it was solely intended for the purposes of compensation. 
Parliament had to be open to any person who had the desire to stand; financial 
considerations should not dominate whether someone is suitable for governance. 
In a debate in 1900, Mr Illington, Member for Murchinson gave support to Mr. 
Kingmill' s comments from three years earlier saying: " ... payment of members opens 
the door to every man who has ability to come into this House and represent his 
fellows." 17 But as we can see, not every man has the ability or the experience 
necessary to come into the House and represent his fellows. Certainly, they may fit the 
constitutional criteria of being able to stand for public office, but they may not 
16 WAPD, 24 November 1897, pg.555 
11 WAPD, 7 November 1900, pg.1529-30 
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necessarily be able to lead, let alone represent. But this cannot mean that those without 
the experience have no right to serve as a Member. 
However, there was one counter argument that was raised against Mr Kingmill's ideal 
of Remuneration. One could suppose that Mr Kingsmill took the egalitarian view 
believing that Parliament was open to all and should remunerate fairly so that all may 
have the opportunity to serve if they so wished. What could be supposed as the 
contrary view was that such remuneration would be no compensation whatsoever to 
men who were proficient in greater professions. "The salary is not real remuneration 
to men who are prominent in law or medicine ... they still have to make a sacrifice if 
they would serve the country" stated an article written for the Australasian 
newspaper.18 
One view espoused was that there needed to be adequate remuneration packages so 
that all whom desired, may stand for Parliament. The opposing view held that such an 
approach would only attract 'money seekers,' not 'political thinkers' and would not 
attract the necessary calibre of people. 
The Australasian, a national newspaper of the time, reported that the state of 
Parliamentary Remuneration in Victoria was in a 'squalid' state because 
representatives were money seekers, and consequently, were not 'political thinkers.' 
The Australasian made specific reference to Western Australia's remunerative debate 
and urged MPs not to pass an bill ensuring the payment of Members. However, in less 
than one month, the first Payment of Members bill was passed, ensuring remunerative 
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packages to be paid to Western Australian MPs.19 Consequently, over the following 
one hundred years, parliamentarians found themselves to be the benefactors of many 
other additional allowances. 
2.2 - 100 Years of Remuneration 
1900: 
When the salaries of Western Australian Parliamentarians were set at $400 per annum 
in 1900 through the Payment of Members Act, the quantum was based upon the mean 
of all Australian states. Among the highest paid in the country, at $600 p.a, were the 
Parliamentarians from New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria. The lowest paid 
Parliamentarians were Tasmanian. At the time, the Commonwealth Parliamentary 
salaries were to be set at $800 p.a and the New Zealand Parliamentary salaries of $480 
p.a were also taken into consideration when determining the salary of Western 
Australian Parliamentarians. 20 
The method of determining a Western Australian MP' s Remuneration according to the 
mean of the other Australian States is a somewhat questionable methodology to 
follow since the demographics, duties and responsibilities would vary from electorate 
to electorate, and more importantly, state to state. However, one would suspect, that 
given the fact that it was the first Remunerative Determination for Western Australian 
MPs, meant that there was no base figure or standard other than the mean through 
which a reasonable determination could be made. 
18 The Australasian, 3 November 1900, pp 985-6, (Courtesy Battye Library) 
19 The Australasian, 3 November 1900, pp 985-6, (Courtesy Battye Library) 
20 WAPD, 7 November 1900, p 1521-2 
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Generally, most literature relating to Parliamentary Remuneration that appeared 
within hansard around the turn of the 20th Century related to whether MPs should 
receive remuneration or not. However, the Member for Guilford, Mr Johnson, was 
already looking into possible methods and means that could be used in easing the 
political implications of parliamentary pay rises. On 7 September 1907, Mr Johnson 
stated: "I have no desire to increase my salary without first going to the people who 
sent me here." Mr Johnson had possibly foreseen the criticism that would come about 
as a consequence of salary increments and searched for a method that would overcome 
such a difficulty: 
The only way to get over that difficulty is by affirming the 
principle towards the end of one Parliament, as is the position 
of this Parliament today, and then going before the electors and 
placing on them the onus of saying whether the increase is 
justifiable or otherwise.21 
Although Mr Johnson could be commended for his foresight and idealistic notions of 
governance, his suggestion could be considered too idealistic for the pragmatic 
parliamentarian. Nonetheless, some elements of his theory, even though nearly one 
hundred years old, will be taken into consideration in determining the 
recommendations of this study. 
1930-1931: 
The Determinations made by the Western Australian Government in 1930 and 1931 
were the only determinations that ever saw a reduction in remunerative rates. Largely 
due to the Great Depression's effect on the economy and falling average salary rates in 
the constituencies, it was determined that MPs receive an overall 30% reduction in 
21 WAPD, 11 September 1907, p 1894 
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their remuneration. Consequently bringing their annual income down from $1200 p.a. 
to $960 p.a. This amount was fully restored in 1944. 
By lowering their remunerative status during a period of economic depression, the 
Government of Western Australia demonstrated a sense of empathy towards its 
constituents who were suffering the burden of a depressed economy. MPs were not 
obliged to reduce their remuneration and there was no committee or tribunal present to 
make such a recommendation. In retrospect, this determination could be seen as an 
admirable gesture of communion and sympathy towards a financially distraught 
electorate. 
This historical event also highlights the first time within Western Australia that a 
Government would determine its remunerative status according to average earnings. 
Although it is not explicitly stated that this was the reason, it is evident in the 
historical facts. This methodology of looking at average community salaries, so that 
Parliamentary Salaries may be determined fairly, within the state would become a 
future formula for deciding what MPs would be paid. 
MPs, as elected representatives of a body of people, are fully aware of the 
repercussions that an increase in their remuneration could have and, in the modem 
world, have become wary of large increases. Voter backlash can occur for many 
reasons, Parliamentary Remuneration can be seen as one of those possible causes and 
MPs do not want to commit 'political suicide' by voting on substantial pay increases. 
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The fact that Parliamentary Salaries were lowered during the Great Depression 
because societal earnings had also dropped could be considered the creation of an 
accidental methodology for determining remunerative amounts. This methodology has 
become more prevalent in Western Australia over the last twenty or so years as there 
seems to have been more need for a justification of the amounts received by MPs in 
their remunerative packages. 
1944 - Basic Wage Variations as a method: 
The year 1944 provides a specific example of when the Western Australian Parliament 
itself altered the "Parliamentary Allowances Act to provide that salaries be adjusted in 
accordance with basic wage variations."22 This was the first time that the Western 
Australian Parliament formally acknowledged outside forces, such as the basic wage 
variations, in determining future parliamentary remuneration packages. Although it 
may not have been known at the time, certain elements of this methodology would 
still be in use in over sixty years time. 
1947 - First Parliamentary Salaries Tribunal: 
Historically reflecting once again, 1947 could be considered the 'revolution' of 
Parliamentary Salaries and Allowances as it was a very interesting and eventful year 
insofar as Parliamentary Remuneration was concerned. This was mainly because 
Parliamentary Salaries had fallen desperately behind societal standards.23 In 1947 it 
was decided that a temporary parliamentary salaries tribunal of some description 
should be established to review and determine the salaries of Parliamentarians. 
22 WAPD, 16 November 1967, p2188 
23MOORE. B, The Remuneration of Members of the Western Australian Parliament 1888-1999, Perth, 
2000 (Unpublished) Pg.14 
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The findings of this Tribunal were significant in determining what was to come out of 
the 1947 experience. Consequently, the Tribunal concluded: ''their (Parliamentarians') 
salaries should be substantially increased" due to the "greatly augmented 
governmental activities, the quadrupling of State revenues and the additional 
responsibility cast out upon them."24 Interestingly, the Tribunal established that the 
making of comparisons between the allowances of Parliamentarians and commercial 
organisations as impossible.25 As it will be demonstrated later in this chapter, the 
more recent Salaries and Allowances Tribunal have often used commercial 
organisations as an indicator of comparison. 
Besides the increase in governmental activities and the additional responsibility placed 
on MPs, the quadrupling of State revenues seems to be an interesting justification for 
an increment in parliamentary remuneration. This statement by the independent 
tribunal implies a methodological approach that would not be looked kindly upon by 
most constituents. It presupposes that when the Government is earning more money, 
that MPs should be consequently paid more since they can simply because there is 
more revenue. 
In the 1947 Tribunal report, Parliamentary Remuneration was justified through a 
statement of duties and obligations of the Member of Parliament. Although it had no 
apparent effect on the actual determined amount, it may have been included to provide 
justification for the increase in salary. The duties stated were as follows: 
24 Ibid. Pg.15 
25 Ibid. 
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-Attend sittings of Parliament 
-Constant reading 
-Study and research 
-Possessing a detailed knowledge of acts, regulations and procedure 
-Preparing authoritative materials for speeches in and out of parliament 
-Preparing Bills for presentation to Parliament 
-Intensive research into Bills 
-Personal calls from constituents 
-Consequent attention to constituents' private and public problems 
-Answering telephonic queries 
-Attending to correspondence 
-Acting as town agents for local governing bodies 
-Interviewing ministers 
-Arranging and leading deputation 
-Carrying out inspections 
-Participating actively in the work of public organizations 
-Attending functions 
-Entertaining visitors 
-Keeping personal contact with all parts of their electorate 
-Travelling to various parts of the state and finally; 
-Electioneering as a prelude to the next term of office."26 
Ultimately, it was found that Parliamentarians had very little time for themselves. 
1948 - Parliamentary Superannuation: 
Very significant legislation was passed in 1948 with Superannuation now becoming a 
component of MP remuneration. The Parliamentary Superannuation Act was 
introduced by the Western Australian Parliament in order to give MP's and their 
dependants a pension or other benefit for serving as an MP. 27 Ninety eight dollars per 
year were deducted from a Members salary which was looked after by the Trustees 
Body; consisting of the Treasurer and his Deputy along with two members from each 
of the Houses. Although it was not known at the time, Parliamentary Superannuation 
would later become the key component of the MPs remunerative package that would 
come under great scrutiny. 
26 Ibid. Pg.17 
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1950-1965: Temporary Tribunals 
It could be said that the establishment of a permanent tribunal that would determine 
remunerative amounts was prefigured by the events that occurred between 1950 and 
1965. Four separate, and temporary ad hoc, tribunals were established in 1950, 1953, 
1962 and 1965 to make determinations on MP's remuneration.28 As noted, none of 
them were established as permanent features of the determinative process, however, 
this history provided for the establishment of the Parliamentary Salaries Tribunal. 
In 1965, remunerative debate mainly focused around the suggestion that a permanent 
committee should be established to review parliamentary remuneration. Newspaper 
reports in The West Australian and Daily News newspapers received the news with 
some satisfaction. Evidence of this can be seen in a report by The West Australian in 
July 1965 when it reported: 
Politicians should be adequately paid. But voters have been 
suspicious in the way in which their representatives have from 
time to time arbitrarily decided their own salary rates. The 
State Government's proposal to appoint an independent three-
man committee to inquire into parliamentary salaries and 
conditions will therefore be received with wide satisfaction.29 
However, when the Wolff Committee recommended large increases in Parliametary 
Salaries in November 1965, "some citizens wrote abusive letters to Members, while 
others voiced their protest in the newspapers. "30 
21 Parliamentary Superannuation, The Statutes of Western Australia, GEO-VI, W Wyatt (Govt 
Printer), Perth, 1948 
28 Ibid. 
29 The West Australian, 31 July 1965, Editorial 
30 BLACK D. House on the Hill: A History of the Parliament of Western Australia 1932-1990, 
Parliament of Western Australia, Perth, 1990, Pg. 191 
30 
Chapter Two: History of Parliamentary Remuneration in Western Australia 
An editorial that appeared in The West Australian in November 1965 produced a 
scathing attack on Parliamentarians and their 'startling' new pay scale. The editorial 
stated that there was no real method or reasons as to why MPs received such an 
increase: "What is not clear; and arouses misgivings, is how and why the committee 
settled on a basic salary ... "31 
1965-1967: 
In 1967 it was finally determined that a permanent committee should be established to 
review Parliamentary Salaries and Allowances. This was called the Parliamentary 
Salaries Tribunal, which in effect, was a similar institution to that of the Salaries and 
Allowances Tribunal of Western Australia that was later created in 1975. It was 
decided that Parliamentary Salaries and Allowances should not be reviewed from 
"time to time," but instead such determinations should be made at "intervals no 
greater than twelve months." Both tribunals consisted of three people, all of whom 
were appointed by the Governor. 
Mr. Tonkin, the Labor Leader of the Opposition at the time summed up the general 
feeling of the MPs when he gave his address on the 1967 Determination saying: 
I believe that the proposal will have the effect of lifting the increasing 
of salaries of members of Parliament out of the realms of controversy. It 
will always be found that there are some people in the community who 
believe that everybody else's salaries and wages should be increased 
except those of members of Parliament. Those people are in the 
minority my experience is that people generally take a reasonable view 
if they feel that the determination is being made on a fair and honest 
basis and the recipients of the increases have no part to play in the 
actual adjudication. 32 
31 The West Australian, 18 November 1965, Editorial 
32 WAPD, 16 November 1967, p. 2188 
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Mr. Tonkin, ideally, felt that people would understand the parliamentarians' position 
and would also be reasonable in accepting various remunerative increases that needed 
to occur. This fact, according to Mr. Tonkin, would be further assisted by the creation 
of a permanent independent body who would determine such amounts outside of the 
parliament. 
However, a report by the newly established tribunal found that public dissatisfaction 
relating to parliamentary remuneration may not have been quelled by its institution as 
an autonomous body. A review, conducted in 1968, called for public submissions of 
interest towards the tribunal's review. However, no responses were received and the 
tribunal argued that this "may indicate disinterest or apathy or a confidence in the 
tribunal which we hope is not misplaced."33 
2.3 - 1975: A Brief Analyses of the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal 
By 1975, it was felt that the permanent tribunal, established to review parliamentary 
remuneration, had not been well received by the general public. The Honourable Mr 
Neil McNeill (MLC Lower West) stated that the initial establishment of the 
Parliamentary Salaries had been well received, however, he stated "the Press still 
becomes vocal even when our salaries are fixed by the committee. "34 
The Premier of Western Australia, Sir Charles Court, recommended that an 
autonomous tribunal be created to determine, not only MP' s salaries, but the 
33 Report of the Parliamentary Salaries Tribunal 1968, 6 September 1968, Pg. 3 
34 WAPD of the Legislative Council, 1 May 1975, p. 1376 
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remuneration packages for Chief Executive Officers within the Western Australian 
Public Service and the packages received by Magistrates. It was felt that one tribunal 
could culminate all of these activities and that it would also provide for better 
comparisons between various public positions. 35 
The Salaries and the Allowances Tribunal of Western Australia was set up as an 
autonomous body to govern and determine the remuneration received by Members of 
Parliament. It was felt that if an independent body were to determine such amounts 
that the controversy surrounding such determinations would be quelled. It is clearly 
noted in the parliamentary Hansard that the main aim of the Salaries and Allowances 
Tribunal was to quell the criticism surrounding parliamentary remuneration. 
This fact is illustrated in a statement made by Mr. Neil McNeil who seriously believed 
that someone from The Western Australian Newspaper should be appointed to join the 
tribunal to see the duties that MPs perform daily.36 The Honorable N.E. Barter and the 
Honorable R. Thompson, felt that those at The West Australian would then finally see 
the amount of work that Parliamentarians put into their duties, also echoed this 
sentiment. They stated that even Parliamentarians' wives, who 'work heavily' for their 
MP husbands are "not on the payroll!"37 
Editorial criticism aside, the establishment of the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal 
has raised questions that need to be addressed. Some would question the apparent 
'autonomous' nature of the tribunal as it still has Governor appointed employees and 
still remains, structurally speaking, under the umbrella of the Department of the 
35 WAPD, 8 April 1975, p.581 
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Premier and the Cabinet. This may seem like an ill-conceived hypothesis, however, if 
the tribunal was initiated to quell public criticism over parliamentary remuneration, 
surely it would have been a totally independent body with no connections whatsoever 
to a body of governance. Nonetheless, it has to be said that there is a need for some 
responsible body to oversee the tribunal's matters. 
Similarly, the Tribunal's determinations are presented to Parliament for approval 
through the passage of both houses. Therefore the decisions of the independent 
Tribunal are 'at the mercy' of Parliament as not all determinations may be agreed to 
by Parliament for various reasons. One particular motivation behind a Western 
Australian Parliament rejecting a positive remunerative increment may be for political 
reasons, namely, an upcoming election. 
To question whether the creation of the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal has been a 
positive move or not may not be clear cut as it seems. The tribunal has probably done 
more work over the last 28 years on finding a fair and equitable formula for 
parliamentary remuneration than ever was done before in Western Australia. To the 
tribunal's credit, it has been researching and trying to find new, and more effective, 
ways of determining the remunerative amounts. The 1990 Determination shows the 
initiative that the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal was capable of and gives example 
of the Tribunal finding new strategies to use in determining parliamentary salaries. 
36 WAPDoftheLegislativeCouncil, 1 May 1975,p.1376 
37 Ibid. 
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2.4 - The 1990 Determination 
Various Salary and Superannuation Benefit increases occurred between 1975 and 
1990. But it was in 1990 that the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal made the 
interesting decision to hire private consultants to review the Remuneration of MPs. 
Other than the 1988 Federal Determination, in which private consultants were used, 
the 1990 determination was the first review of its kind in Western Australia. It was the 
Tribunal's decision to "obtain the services of a consultancy firm to perform a work 
value review of all positions within its jurisdiction."38 
The work performed and the objectives set by the private consultants Noble-Lowndes-
Cullen-Eagen-Dell seemed like the first genuine attempt by the Tribunal to ascertain 
the work value of MPs. However, it may only appear this way because of the lack of 
resources stating 'why' and 'what' had guided the Tribunals determinations in the 
past. As it has been seen through various examples, the Salaries and Allowances 
Tribunal, and previously the Parliamentary Salaries Tribunal and Parliament itself, 
usually made determinations based upon what other states were earning and never 
previously endeavoured to find the actuality of Remuneration in their reviews. 
Insofar as Remuneration Management is concerned, the private consultants stated that 
there are four key elements that one has to look at when determining the amount to be 
paid to an individual. They are (I) The work value of the position (II) The market rate 
of pay for a position of similar work value (III) The performance of the individual (IV) 
The employing organisation's capacity to pay, its strategic circumstances, and its 
38 MOORE. B, The Remuneration of Members of the Western Australian Parliament 1888-1999, Perth, 
2000 (Unpublished) Pg. 152 
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dependence on hwnan resources.39 If one were to solely take points I, II or ill into 
consideration, it could be argued that parliamentarians are grossly underpaid for the 
amount of work that they do and for the positions of responsibility that they take upon 
themselves. However, point N makes clear the reminder that MPs are working in an 
organisation with limited financial resources. 
From the outset, the consultants acknowledged that the bases upon which salaries and 
allowances of MPs had been set were "well established.',4o It was decided that in order 
to "provide a sound basis for comparing the equity of MPs against the wider 
community" that "a mechanism for comparing jobs in terms of the demands, 
complexities and responsibilities of the work undertaken" was needed.41 It was also 
noted that, although the private consultants did not particularly agree with integrating 
a performance management strategy in the determination of MP' s Remuneration, that 
excessive hours within the community were often rewarded with bonuses.42 
The work value findings showed that the basic role of an MP has not been taken into 
account as they have to commit a lot of their time, they are dislocated from their lives 
and there is a lack of security in the position. These were seen as the features of the 
average MP's position.43 The roles of an MP fell into three streams: Long sitting 
hours, travel between Parliament and the Constituency (particularly for country 
members), the pressure to be available to the Constituency during weekends.',44 
39 Ibid. Pg. 158 
40 Ibid. Pg. 154 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. Pg. 158 
43 Ibid. Pg. 154 
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The review found the fact of dislocation and long working hours away from family to 
be quite valid, and something that is relatively uncommon in other work places. 
However, the lack of security in a parliamentary position was not seen as peculiarity 
of an MP' s tenure as there can be a lack of security in any place of employment within 
the private sector.45 At 1990, the private consultants stated what could be considered a 
'job description' for the position of MP: 
In our judgement, the position of MP requires considerable 
experience and understanding of the workings of the 
community, and an appreciation of the impact the bureaucracy 
has upon the lives of people in the community. The MP must 
also be more cognisant of the importance of government 
legislation and regulation in making the State more prosperous 
while protecting the interests of the community ... MPs need to 
have a thorough appreciation of party policy, as well as the 
working brief of the parliamentary committees in which they 
participate. 46 
The fact that MPs come from a range of backgrounds and that, constitutionally 
speaking, anyone who fits the three 'guidelines' of the standing for public office is 
entitled to become an MP is an important note with little relation to remunerative 
rates. This report states in tangible terms that a person willing to enter the political 
realm should have a substantial amount of experience in order for them to function 
adequately. But, as it has been seen, not all MPs come from such backgrounds and 
therefore this report is partially flawed, as it may account for many MPs, yet it will 
not encompass those from 'non-professional' backgrounds. Similarly, not all MPs 
need to have an 'appreciation of party policy' as not all MPs are instituted in party 
politics. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. Pg. 155 
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Likewise, there is a similar problem to face when dealing with MPs coming from 
different educational backgrounds. The 1990 report states that this is an education 
that needs to be had in order to represent: 
Deal with a diverse range of tasks... contribute to the 
identification and clarity of objectives and the establishment of 
public policy ... operate in a complex and specialised 
environment. .. thorough understanding of the underlying 
rationale of Party policies and platforms ... versatility and 
innovation in adapting or modifying standards approaches, or 
in the application of new techniques or criteria to resolving. 
matters of public importance, public policy, or legislative 
direction.47 
One of the problems that arises when looking at any roles that MPs have can be 
attributed to the individual circumstances of those MPs. Those who find themselves 
in government may find themselves with more roles to fulfil rather than someone who 
is not in government. The example being the Ministry through which most time, cost 
and energy is spent. Secondly, there are some MPs who do not belong to parties and 
would not have to worry about policy platforms as much as a governmental member 
would; except that Independents need to work hard to be informed on a wide range of 
issues. Thirdly, it would be interesting to look at the differing roles of the Members of 
the Legislative Council and Members of the Legislative Assembly to see whether 
there are any discrepancies between their workloads and work-values. 
This report was a substantive piece of work for the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal 
of Western Australia as it suggested many additional methodologies that may assist in 
determining Parliamentary Remuneration. This report, and other resources will again 
be examined when discussing the possible advantages and disadvantages of a 
performance management system within parliamentary circles. 
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Before concluding the review of the history of Parliamentary Salaries, it is necessary 
to view the two major ways that MP salaries may be illustrated over the last sixty to 
seventy years. From what has been discovered within this chapter, one may believe 
that MP Salaries have been more upwardly mobile in recent years. According to 
information obtained from the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal and other 
Governmental Acts, MP Salary Rates have been exponentially booming since 
approximately 1975. The graph below clearly illustrates the dollar amount that MPs 
have been receiving since 1940. According to this graph, the view held by many that 
MP Salaries are spiraling out of control could be considered quite rational. 48 
MP Pay Since 1940 
I-Amount I 
-~ ~ $150,000.00 
~ $100,000.00 
...., § $50,000.00 
~ $-
<( 
Although, this graph seems to tell the whole truth about MP Salaries since 1940, it 
does not give us an entirely accurate picture as it does not take into account factors 
such as the Consumer Price Index and the Average Weekly Earnings. There are two 
47 Ibid. Pg. 156 
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steps that need to be taken so that a true illustration, without equivocation, may be 
formed. Firstly, one should drop the 'actual dollar amount' received by MPs since 
1940 and should look at all the determinations over five year periods since 1940. 
From this one is able to average out a percentage increase or decrease of MP Pay over 
those five years. This percentage would be consequently juxtaposed against the five 
year average of the Consumer Price Index percentage and the Average Weekly 
Earnings. The results can be seen overleaf: 
48MOORE. B, The Remuneration of Members of the Western Australian Parliament 1888-1999, Perth, 
2000 (Unpublished) 
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CP,, AWE & MP Pay Percentage Increments -
·· Five Year Periods 
Year 
LMP (%) 1 AWE(%) ---i CPI (%) I 
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The above graph may still show MP Pay-Percentage increments reaching well above 
the general CPI and A WE, however, it is a more realistic and accurate picture of MP 
Remuneration rates since 1940. It can be said safely that MP salary increments have 
not been spiraling out of control and that there has been no set mechanism for 
determining an MP's pay on a regular basis. In actual fact, it illustrates a vitally 
important factor, namely, that the most restraint in salary increments seems to have 
been within the last twenty-three years. 
The most likely cause for which being the creation of the Salaries and Allowances 
Tribunal. Ultimately, two questions, which will require further examination within 
this study, remain: Why is there no set mechanism for determining MPs' pay? And 
were these 'restrained' increments in Parliamentary Salaries insufficient, extravagant 
or equitable and how could a future formula be developed? 
It was noted earlier in this thesis that determinations on Parliamentary Salaries are 
ultimately 'at the mercy' of the Western Australian Legislature and may be rejected 
for political means. Would a Government be more or less likely to reject a 
remunerative determination of any description if an election on the horizon? One 
possible way of discovering the truthfulness, or lack thereof, in this statement is to 
note both the determinative dates alongside the dates of general election.49 
49 It is only possible to perform this exercise since 1965 as in Western Australia, elections were held at 
separate times depending on the province or electorate that was polling. By 1965 both Houses and all 
electorates and provinces held elections conjointly. 
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The table below, gathered from Mr. Brian Moore's (Salaries and Allowances retired 
Executive Officer) historical graph on the determinative dates and the Western 
Australian Parliamentary Handbook 2002 illustrates the relationship between the dates 
of election and determination: 
•Number ofmonths:a · eNumber,of mcmths a · ,, 
:. :,,: ~' . ' 
< • ' ; ,' • t,,;, < .,'/· <,-:·,,. 
determinaµoJ1 was made Election Date . .detennmationwas,made 
BEFORE election ., ' AFIER:~lection .. • .. 
·. 
....•. ·.· \< 
24 Months 20Feb 1965 5 Months 
34 Months 23 Mar 1968 7 Months 
6 Months* 20 Feb 1971 8 Months 
10 Months* 30Mar 1974 4Months 
3 Months 19 Feb 1977 5 Months 
1 Month 23 Feb 1980 5 Months 
5 Months* 19 Feb 1983 8 Months 
4 Months 8 Feb 1986 6 Months 
5 Months 4 Feb 1989 3 Months 
23 Months* 6 Feb 1993 6 Months 
24 Months 14 Dec 1996 7Months 
13 Months* 10 Feb 2001 5 Months 
Average: 10 Months Average: 6 Months after 
before election election 
* Denotes a loss of re-election by the incumbent Government 
The above table, through the measuring of 13 bicameral, general elections shows that 
previous Western Australian Governments have been inclined to accept, review or 
include remunerative legislation shortly after an election rather than just before one. 
Although there is an example from 1980 whereby the Government of the day granted 
a remunerative increase 1 month prior to the election, on the whole, the averages 
illustrate a Parliamentary leaning towards increases well before elections arise. 
Nonetheless, Parliamentary Salaries are not the only facet of an MP's remunerative 
package that attracts a great deal of criticism. Parliamentarians are entitled to many 
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allowances and entitlements that will now need to be reviewed so that the whole 
parliamentary remuneration package, excepting Parliamentary Superannuation which 
will be reviewed in the following chapter, may have been analysed. Travel 
Allowances, among other parliamentary entitlements will only be briefly visited as the 
major focus of this study is at the two major components of Parliamentary 
Remuneration: Salary and Superannuation. This study takes the approach that such 
allowances, with the exception of some parts of the Travel Allowance, assist the 
normal function of an MP. 
2.5 - Parliamentary Allowances and Entitlements (A Brief History) 
This study does not intend to dwell on the actual dollar amounts received by Western 
Australian MPs throughout the last one hundred years, however, it does intend to note 
the junctures at which interesting points regarding Parliamentary Remuneration have 
been made. 
Parliamentary Allowances have had differing faces over the past century as it 
continues the evolution today. We have seen various additional allowances being 
totalled into a remunerative scheme for parliamentarians. Such additional allowances 
have grown over the last century and have encompassed a greater majority of 
Members. 
1911: Informal Expense Allowance 
Western Australian Members of Parliament were granted their first allowances in 
1911. Such allowances were not specifically tailored for various expenses that an MP 
would incur, but rather, an amount of $600 p.a. was available for claim if MPs needed 
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to be reimbursed for any expenses. so There is no historical data which suggests a 
receipt-system or structure was in place to verify such reimbursements. This 
allowance was increased again to cover MPs more sufficiently over the following 
years. 
1947: Additional Allowances 
By 1947 the total allowance rate for MPs was $1400 p.a. Those MPs who had been 
incurring greater expenditure because of the distance of vastness of their electorate 
were duly recompensed with a special allowance. This 'special' allowance provided 
country MPs with an additional $100 p.a. allowance and North West MPs with a $200 
p.a. allowance. 
The Honourable Mr. Rodoreda, in replying to the Premier's opposition to the need for 
a dislocation allowance stated: "I believe (Mr. Coverly) has been away travelling for 
five months this year - travelling by motorcar, packhorse, camel, donkey, lighter, 
lugger .... we are under continual expense when visiting our electorates."51 It had 
taken some years to convince Parliament of accepting such an allowance as Mr. 
Rodoreda first raised this debate in 1935. 
1953: Reimbursement Allowances 
It was then in 1953 when the Members of Parliament, Reimbursement Expenses Act 
was introduced. Under this Act, each Member of Parliament was "entitled, as 
reimbursement of expenses incurred in discharging Parliamentary duties, in addition 
so WAPD, 2 February 1911, p 3679 
si WAPD, 24 September 1935, p 777 
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to any other allowance to which he is entitled."52 1953 also saw the creation of 
various 'provinces' within Western Australia. Each provinces' grading would be 
characterised by its distance from Perth. Five provinces were established, stretching 
from central 'metropolitan Perth' to the 'Gascoyne' province. Each individual 
province was allotted a "maximum rate per annum of reimbursement. "53 
New electorates or 'provinces' that were created after this introduction of the 
Reimbursement Expenses Act would have to ask to Governor to print in the Gazette as 
to its provincial geography so that it could receive the entitlements. 
1965: Other Allowances 
It was in 1965 that an ad hoc committee, created to look at the various facets of 
Parliamentary Remuneration decided to look at Parliamentary Allowances from a 
different angle. They commented upon the different types of allowance that could be 
received by MPs. They noted six areas where MPs could be reimbursed: Motor car, 
Away from Home Expenses or Hotel Accommodation Expenses, Telephone calls, 
Telegrams and postal charge, allowance for donations, entertainment expense.54 
The committee also noted the following areas in which MPs should be asking for 
reimbursements: Free railway travel, limited interstate travel, travelling expenses for 
select committee members, election expenses and office expenses. 55 In response to 
some editorial criticism that appeared in The West Australian newspaper on the 4th of 
52 Parliamentary Superannuation, The Statutes of Western Australia, GEO-VI, W Wyatt (Govt 
Printer), Perth, 1948, Pg. 33 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 WAPD of the Legislative Council, 26 November 1965, p3044 
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August 1965, Mr Bickerton stated that Mr Macartney, the managing director of The 
West Australian should see what its like paying for his companies' bills out of his own 
pocket.56 
Before concluding this review on the history of remuneration in Western Australia, it 
is necessary to briefly note the types of allowances that Western Australian MPs have 
continued to receive recently; as a consequence of the historical precedence that has 
just been reviewed. 
In 1971, allowances were paid to Members through a determination issued by the 
newly formed Parliamentary Salaries Tribunal. It provided allowance for travelling 
and postage along with a reimbursement clause for other expenses. Telephone rental 
received funds to assist 75% of the rental cost and all telephonic calls from an MPs 
private residence were covered fully by public funds. 57 
1974: Sitting Allowances Rejected 
Due to an increase in the sitting hours that MPs were engaging in, Western Australian 
MPs called for the implementation of a 'Sitting Fees' allowance. However, the 
Parliamentary Salaries Tribunal denied the request stating that some Members would 
be more advantaged than others.58 
56 Ibid. p 2944 
57 Report of the Parliamentary Salaries Tribunal 1971, Government Gazette, 50 of 1971, 8 July 1971 
58 Report of the Parliamentary Salaries Tribunal 1974, Government Gazette, 21 June 1974, p 2203 
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2000: Contemporary Allowances 
Many other changes occurred over the following 30 years and Parliamentary 
Allowances now exist in a different form. Parliamentary Allowances are divided into 
two differing sections, one section being a cash component and the other section being 
a non-cash, yet reimburse-able section. Electorate Allowance, the amount of which is 
determined by the size and distance of the electorate is a part of the cash component 
along with a Postage Allowance and an Accommodation Allowance. 
The non-cash component includes Printing and Stationery, Air Charter, 
Accommodation Allowance in Electorate and Mobile Phone reimbursement. 
However, these non-cash reimbursements are not payable to all MPs as many of the 
allowances' amounts are dependent on the location of the MP's electorate. 
As it has been noted within the first chapter of this study, the actual allowances 
themselves will come under the least scrutiny as they are not always considered to be 
the major factors in a parliamentarian's remunerative package. The salary and 
superannuation of a Western Australian Member of Parliament remain the major foci 
of this study. However, it is necessary to analyse the 'global' package that a Western 
Australian Member of Parliament receives. 
Therefore, it is now necessary to move onto the following chapter which reviews both 
the historical and contemporary aspect of Western Australian Parliamentary 
Superannuation. 
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Chapter Three: 
.. Australian Parliam~ntary Superannuation 
3.1 - Introduction to Superannuation 
-Parliamentary Superannuation (Overview) 
3.2 - Western Australian Parliamentary Superannuation 
3.3 -Australian Parliamentary Superannuation 
-Parliamentary Superannuation 1948-1983 
-Choice of Super 2001 
-Parliamentary Superannuation (Structure and Method: 2002) 
3.4 - Recent Developments (2004) 
3.5 - Future Directions (2006 - ) 
3.1 Introduction to Superannuation 
Within the contemporary workforce, Superannuation has become a prevalent, and 
mandatory, component of an employee's remuneration package. Derived from the Latin 
word 'annus,' meaning annually, superannuation in its definitive form is a method of 
yearly payment by an employer into a cumulative fund that will tide the employee 
through their years of retirement. The legal rate, to be paid by an employer that is found 
within the general Australian workforce today, is 9 per cent. The actual employee can 
usually opt to pay any proportion of their salary into a fund that will constitute their 
superannuation savings. In effect, superannuation is a 'savings account' towards 
retirement. 
Superannuation has become such an intrinsic part of the workforce' s remunerative 
package that all employees are legally bound, through a Hawke Government initiative, to 
contribute towards a fund regardless of age, work-category or earnings. Many workplaces 
have organisations that, both administratively and financially, manage the fund. It should 
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be noted at this stage that such funds need to ensure that the monies received by 
employees are well maintained and that the monies received can be invested into 
trustworthy accounts or shareholdings that will ensure profits. Such organisations need to 
make profits through the use of the share market so that the money saved into their fund 
in the current year will be worth the dollar-equivalent amount by the time that employee 
retires. 
This process occurs regularly without fail, under the discretion of the Australian 
Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA). Organisations are regularly checked and 
audited to ensure that such profits are being met, the test of such organisations is to gauge 
whether they could pay all members, all of their funds at once. If this is possible, the 
organisation could be considered to be in 'good standing.' 
Members of Parliament, in both Federal Australia and Western Australia, have come 
under a different method of remuneration for some time. Parliamentary Superannuation is 
the facet of MP's remunerative package that has, in recent years, come under the most 
criticism from the public. During the writing of this thesis, many 'monumental' decisions 
towards the 'normalising' of Parliamentary Superannuation were taken. This thesis 
intended to take into consideration the future of Parliamentary Superannuation, however, 
due to the unforeseen events that have transpired near the completion of this study, its 
nature will change enormously. These events will need to be covered and will be looked 
at in the final sections of this chapter. Namely, the sections that entail 'Recent 
Developments' and 'Future Directions.' 
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Parliamentary Superannation (Overview) 
Parliamentary Superannuation was enacted for the means of allowing retiring or defeated 
MPs, over the age of 65, to live the retired years of their life in security. That is, an MP 
should be able to live at the same standard-of-living prior to their retirement. Western 
Australian MPs were granted this through the Parliamentary Superannuation Act 1948. 
Historically speaking, there have been a great number of amendments to this Act.59 
It could have been felt that many MPs went into politics late in their life, after having 
worked in a previous profession that would have allowed them to save. But it was felt 
that MPs also needed to accrue savings, and a greater amount of savings, at the critical 
age towards retirement. MPs spending their final years of work would not accrue any 
funds towards retirement unless it was out of their own pocket. Therefore, with the 
original institution of Parliamentary Superannuation, it was felt that the contributory rate 
of the employer, namely the Government, should pay a much greater amount than the rest 
of the workforce. Western Australia has followed much the same course. 
Although the events of the last six months (February 2004) have dictated a new form of 
Parliamentary Superannuation for the next session of Parliament, the current, and now 
almost-redundant form of Parliamentary Superannuation, came under a great deal of 
criticism for many years. It could be argued that the ideal of a person entering into the 
politics in the twilight of their lives no longer existed and that there was a 'new breed' of 
younger MPs now receiving payment and carrying on employment after electoral defeat. 
Many constituents were alarmed at the payouts that MPs would be receiving from the 
fund and saw no reason for its continued existence. With some research, it could be 
59 Within 20 years of this Act's conception, it was amended over IO times. 
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supposed that the average age of MPs had grown younger, consequently making it easier 
to purport the claim that MPs no longer needed to be remunerated at such a rate as many 
of them would continue other employment. In 2001, The West Australian newspaper 
makes a similar claim, stating: "MPs who have retired from Parliament young and 
healthy, often going to other jobs, have been rewarded with huge payouts."60 
In the same double-paged article, which is entitled 'What you pay new MPs in cash, 
perks and super,' stated that the 1970-1996 version of Western Australian Parliamentary 
Superannuation states that "a backbencher with 15 years service, could receive $725,000 
at age 45." This amount would be apparently have been granted to this MP for 
contributing "$152,00 over (those) 15 years."61 However, the particulars of the varying 
types of historical superannuation will be looked into with more detail further into this 
Chapter. 
This overview of events and feelings towards the issue bring the study to its review of the 
Western Australian Parliamentary Superannuation Scheme as it has had varying faces 
over the last 30 years and will continue to evolve into the future. This is a similar 
scenario with the federal Parliamentary Superannuation Scheme which will be visited 
after the Western Australian review. 
3.2 Western Australian Parliamentary Superannuation 
Commencement: 
The Western Australian parliamentary superannuation scheme has been established in 
much the same way as the arrangements for federal MPs. Instituted in 1948 under the 
60 The West Australian, 30 April 2001, Pg. 13 
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Parliamentary Superannuation Act 1948, the Western Australian arrangements of 
remunerative superannuation ensured MPs of a secure retirement. Originally, the Act set 
out a body, called the Parliamentary Superannuation Board, to administer the 
superannuation scheme. 
Through structural changes which occurred in 2001, the Salaries and Allowances 
Tribunal were given greater power in making recommendations to parliament regarding 
the status, amount and structure of the MPs' superannuative process: "Under Section 
28(2) of the Parliamentary Superannuation Act 1970 the Tribunal may inquire into and 
determine any matter in connection with contributions to and the benefits payable under 
the Scheme."62 
Western Australian parliamentary superannuation basically guaranteed MPs a secure and 
comfortable lifestyle upon retirement, as it shall be seen, was quite similar to the events 
surrounding the federal MP's remuneration. The rates received by Western Australian 
MPs, it was stated, should remain much the same as other Australian jurisdiction's rates: 
61 Ibid. 
Minimum basic pensions payable in other States and the 
Commonwealth range from 41.2 per centum to 50 per centum. 
The Tribunal has found that the current W.A. level of38.8 per 
centum after 7 years contributory service is unfavourable 
compared with standards in other States and the 
Commonwealth. Therefore the Tribunal determines that the 
rate of 46 per centum should apply. Increasing the rate to this 
level still leaves Western Australia behind the 
Commonwealth, New South Wales and Victoria but is 
comparable with the Australian average. 63 
62 http://www.sat.wa.gov.au/200 l .htm 
63 http://www.sat.wa.gov.au/super%,201987.htm 
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Western Australian parliamentary superannuation has followed in suit with most of the 
other states in determining the rates that MPs were receiving. This may seem a different 
considering Western Australia's unique method of determining MP remuneration through 
an independent tribunal that simply considers other states' actions and subsequently put a 
similar determination into effect. 
By 1990 the tribunal had looked into various issues regarding a variable commutation 
figure along with some anomalies that had been noted within the Higher Office Pension 
Scheme. However, the greatest changes to Parliamentary Superannuation came out of the 
determinations made after 2000. 
Members, would receive varying rates of superannuation, which would be dependent 
upon when a particular MP was elected. This was due to a change in the rates that MPs 
were to receive for their superannuation: 
For those Members elected to the State Parliament as at or after 14 
December 1996 and who elect to transfer from the contributory scheme 
established under the Parliamentary Superannuation Act 1970; and 
For those Members elected to the State Parliament after the closing date 
of the contributory scheme; 
the rate of contribution to be made on behalf of the Members is 9 per 
cent of the parliamentary salary determined in accordance with Section 
6(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Salaries and Allowances Act 1975.64 
This was what could be considered, in retrospect, the beginning of some of the major 
changes that were to take place over the following three to four years. 
64 http://www.sat.wa.gov.au/super%,202000.htm 
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This study is not overly concerned in matters relating to the 'actual sums' received by 
MPs as such rates would vary greatly depending upon length of service, status or band 
along with the responsibility of that MP and how large their personal contributions would 
have been. However, as it has been noted, most of the Western Australian parliamentary 
superannuation experience, is derived from what has happened on the federal level. This 
relationship between the states' determinations and the federal government's policy 
decisions has become more apparent over the last couple of months. Therefore, it is 
considerably more important to review what has been happening at the national level so 
that this thesis may be able to gauge the nature of the relationship between Canberra's 
Remuneration Tribunal and Western Australia's Salaries and Allowances Tribunal. 
3.3 Australian Parliamentary Superannuation 
Introduction: 
Australian Federal Parliamentary Superannuation has been extant since 1948 when it was 
created under the Parliamentary Superannuation Act 1948. The Federal Government's 
review of its own superannuation arrangements has been at the forefront of all state 
governments, including Western Australia, and needs to be looked at in a viable context 
so that lessons may be drawn from it. Therefore it is necessary to begin with a Senate 
review that was recently held into Parliamentary Superannuation. 
The review, as a part of a Senate Committee, was held in 2002 and although it did spend 
a great deal of time focussing upon the actual amounts received by Members of 
Parliament, it also focussed upon the philosophical and argumentative aspects of 
Parliamentary Superannuation. The review looked at many poignant notes that will now 
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be taken into consideration whilst reviewing the actual process of remunerating Federal 
MPs their superannuative amounts. 
The premise, or 'background to inquiry,' commenced with a fairly sharp quote stating: 
"What is happening now is that the superannuation scheme we have in place actually fails 
the test of fairness."65 This quote, by former Senator Cheryl Kernot sums up what could 
be considered the contemporary argument against the Parliamentary Superannuation 
Scheme. It is interesting to see such a quote opening the 2002 Senate review on 
parliamentary superannuation. 
The origins of Parliamentary Superannuation, the report continued to remark in its 
opening statement, should be "similar to arrangements for senior executives in the rest of 
the workforce."66 In this sense, the report noted, on the commencement of its study, that 
there were perceptions within the public, and perhaps within governmental circles, that 
the arrangements under the current superannuation system where not 'in-line' with the 
rest of the community's. Furthermore, this perception was a fairly common perception of 
the general populous. 
The committee stated "from the outset" that said public perceptions were not overly 
supportive of the superannuation scheme enjoyed by MPs and consequently listed the 
various public perceptions that had been noted. These public perceptions will be viewed 
briefly, as it is not this study's aim to devise a superannuation scheme for MPs, but rather 
to focus upon the salaries received by MPs. The review upon Parliamentary 
65 House of Representative Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, 25 November 1996, P 5905 
66 http://aph.gov.au/senate/committee/super _ ctte/report _ 25/ c02.htm 
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Superannuation mainly takes the focus of looking at what is in place and what do the 
general public feel about it: 
• "Over-generosity of the schemes" 
Many people within the general public feel that the superannuation rates enjoyed by MPs 
are far too generous. To say everyone feels this way would be a gross generalisation, 
however, the question of what an MP is worth remains the main focus of this study. 
• "Being out of step with the superannuation available to the rest of the community" 
Evidence throughout this study illustrates the contribution rates of MPs towards their own 
superannuation or pension plans. As it has been seen, Australia-wide, the average 
contribution rate of any MP is approximately 12 per cent. The Government, on top of this 
amount, contributes an additional amount of approximately 60 per cent or more.67 When 
the general workforce's dollar-for-dollar contributions are compared with the 
contributory rates of the Government towards MP's superannuation, there can be seen a 
vast difference in the two schemes. 
• "Unreasonable early access to full parliamentary pension entitlements" 
Most members of the general public, by law, are unable to claim any of their 
superannuation savings until they have reached the age of 65 years old. However, and as 
this Chapter shall illustrate, MPs have been able to start claiming their pensions before 
than the age of 65. Similarly, those MPs who are ineligible to claim a pension because 
they did not serve for longer than eight years, can claim the lump-sum of their 
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superannuation savings. The general workforce is unable to gain early access to full 
pension entitlements. 
• "The availability of lucrative post-parliamentary employment" 
There are two major sides to this argument. One argument states that some MPs can 
claim upon their superannuation savings because they did not serve for long enough, but 
in the meantime, can continue working and earning more towards their savings and their 
retirement. The other argument, although somewhat unprovable, proposes that many MPs 
would find lucrative, expertise based, work after serving within Parliament. For example, 
the Minister for Health could easily find themselves in charge of the Department of 
Health, a major hospital or a medical research group . This argument is based upon the 
premise that MPs establish their post-parliamentary employment whilst still in 
parliament. 
• "A Committee of parliamentarians was inquiring into their own scheme',68 
This is the last argument that was proposed to the Senate Committee's hearings and it is 
an argument that has also been previously seen within this study. It has become apparent 
that many constituents become disgruntled, and even disenfranchised, with the 
parliamentary process when they see MPs determining what their own salary and 
superannuation rates will be. This may because not many other employees have this 
opportunity or simply because they consider it to be unethical. 
67 SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SUPERANNUATION AND FINANCIAL SERVICES, Report 
on the Provisions of the Parliamentary (Choice of Superannuation) Bill 2001, The Commonwealth 
Parliament of Australia, August 200 I, Canberra, Pg. 12 
68 Ibid. 
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Parliamentary Superannuation 1948-1983 
However, not all would agree with the arguments that have been mentioned by the public 
and by Senator Kemot. Mr Benjamin Chifley, in a somewhat similar fashion to Sir John 
Forrest's earlier remarks from Chapter 1, stated: 
In its general purpose the scheme aims to meet the situation, 
long recognised by members of all parties, that men or women 
who serve in parliament often sacrifice opportunities to 
provide against the day when their parliamentary careers come 
to an end.69 
There are two main sides to the argument that Mr Chifley proposes through the statement 
that he made in Parliament in 1948. Firstly, he supposes that the many people who go to 
Parliament to serve, actually make sacrifices against other careers in which they could 
possibly make more money. Secondly, that when an MP's parliamentary career comes to 
an end, they will be able to provide for oneself. Both of these arguments have been 
viewed earlier within this study and could today be considered a little redundant. 
The Chifley Government implemented the Parliamentary Superannuation Scheme for 
many reasons. As noted, entering Parliament meant foregoing other possible careers and, 
contrary to the public's earlier noted argument, that it was difficult to re-establish 
employment once an MPs career had ended. The last main reason given for its 1948 
implementation was that it would "entice people to enter Parliament who would 
otherwise not come." 70 
69 House of Representative Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, 1 December 1948, P 3738 
70 http://www.aph.gov .au/senate/committee/super_ ctte/report _ 25/c02.htm 
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The 1948 version of Parliamentary Superannuation was "funded to the extent of the 
member contributions, and was framed along the lines of the Commonwealth public 
service superannuation scheme."71 However, between 1948 and 1973 some legislative 
developments changed the nature of Parliamentary Superannuation and made it a much 
more generous plan. Pensions, originally based upon a set amount, were changed in 1963 
to being based upon the salary that an MP received. Then in 1973, ''the maximum benefit 
payable to an MP was increased from 50 per cent to 75 per cent of the parliamentary 
salary payable."72 
Prior to 1973, certain MPs could claim their superannuation savings from the age of 40. 
However this was only if the MP had voluntarily retired. In 1973, this amount was raised 
to the age of 45. By 1978 the involuntarily retiring MP did not have to be older than 45 
years old as the age component of the package was dismissed. However, along with this 
dismissal, the commutation rate was raised to 100 per cent of the MPs salary payable. 
Nonetheless, this was again reduced to 50 per cent in 1983.73 The scheme used by Federal 
MPs has, in many various ways, remained the same since 1983, therefore it is necessary 
to review the standard and workings of parliamentary superannuation in throughout 2000 
to 2002. 
Report on the Provisions of the Parliamentary (Choice of Superannuation) Bill 2001 
In 2001, Mr Peter Andren (Independent Member for Calare) gained much publicity for 
his views upon Parliamentary Superannuation and what particular measures should be 
taken towards its future. Mr Andren's proposal was that Members of Parliament should 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
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be allowed to 'opt out' of the current (2001) Parliamentary Contributory Superannuation 
Scheme (PCSS) and should be able to defer their superannuation payment until after the 
age of 55. After appearing on Channel 9's A Current Affair, who canvassed the 
community about their views, "The Senate Select Committee on Superannuation and 
Financial Services subsequently received more than 2,500 submissions, 35 petitions with 
nearly 1500 signatures, as well as nearly 700 emails."74 
The Australian Liberal Party stated that the amendments would bring the scheme into line 
with the rest of the community and the Australian Labor Party stated that it was not a bad 
option to take. The Australian Democrats stated that they had made the original claims in 
a 1997 Australian Democrat generated report, whereas Bob Brown (Leader of the 
Australian Greens) wrote a media release stating that it was "a feeble attempt to reform 
superannuation" and that all MPs should actually be given the option of opting out of any 
parliamentary superannuation scheme into a 'usual' scheme.75 
The report into the amendments suggested by Mr Andren illustrated the various 
percentages of parliamentary allowance that MPs would receive in retirement. The table 
over I eaf illustrates the report's tab le: 76 
74 INFORMATION AND RESEARCH SERVICES, Parliamentary Contributory Superannuation 
Amendment Bill 2001, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2001, Pg. 10 
75 Ibid. Pgs 11-13 
76 Ibid. Pg. 3 
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Years of Senrice Percentage of Parliamentary 
Allowance 
8 50 
9 52.5 
10 55 
11 57.5 
12 60 
13 62.5 
14 65 
15 67.5 
16 70 
17 72.5 
18 or more 75 
Mr Andren, against this background introduced the bill and went to a public hearing for 
the Senate Committee's review. In the explanatory memorandum, which accompanied 
the Bill, Mr Andren stated: 
Despite a Senate Inquiry in 1997 which concluded the 
parliamentary scheme lacks transparency, is out of step with 
superannuation practice in the wider community as is in some 
cases excessively generous, there appears to be no will on the 
part of the Government or the Opposition to reform the 
scheme.77 
At the public hearing on the Bill, Mr Andren 'amplified' his reasons for the bill, stating 
"its totally unfunded nature," it was gradually increasing and increasing the pressure on 
the taxpayers, choice was available in the community and that some members would like 
the "honour" to opt out of such a system, thus "preserving their integrity."78 
The Bill became an Act in 2001 and now provides "that the payment of parliamentary 
pensions for new Senators and Members of Parliament will be deferred until they reach 
77 SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SUPERANNUATION AND FINANCIAL SERVICES, Report 
on the Provisions of the Parliamentary (Choice of Superannuation) Bill 2001, The Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, August 200 I, Pg. 6 
78 Ibid. 
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55, become invalids or die." The Act also provides the individual with the right of 
choosing to "commute part of the pension benefit to a lump sum" which is also deferred 
to the age of 55.79 
Despite the Committee being in disagreement to public statements regarding the generous 
and intransparent nature of the scheme, it nonetheless welcomed the developments that 
had arisen out of the exercise and noted that such future discussions into the issue should 
take place. However, the major recommendation found that the Federal Remuneration 
Tribunal make a new determination regarding to the MP's overall remuneration package. 
Attached to the Appendix of the report is contained a 'Dissenting Report' by Australian 
Democrats Senator Lyn Allison. In Senator Allison's Report, she states that, although 
there were some changes that the Democrats agree to, there were many issues that do not 
take the amendment to its fullest extent. Allison believed that the scheme was far too 
generous and that this had still not been addressed: "the Government Actuary has 
reported that the 'notional employer contribution was 69.1 per cent."80 Nonetheless, 
Allison and the Australian Democrats supported the Bill, even though it did "not 
constitute a proper reform of the system."81 
Western Australian Greens' Members of the Legislative Council submitted a proposal to 
the Australian Greens Conference regarding the issue of parliamentary superannuation. In 
a somewhat similar set of recommendations to that of Bob Brown's recommendations, 
the proposal stated: I) "MP's superannuation schemes should be brought into line with 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. (Appendix of Report) 
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superannuation schemes used by the general community. II) Failing this reform, MPs 
should have at least the option to leave their parliamentary superannuation scheme for a 
scheme in use in the general community. III) MPs' superannuation schemes should be 
determined by an independent body and not be MPs themselves. IV) All parliamentary 
superannuation schemes should use ethical investment principles. 82 Although most of 
these principles have not been adopted, some major changes have taken place that are, in 
some respects, akin to some of the Greens' recommendations. 
However, before moving on to review the events of 2004 that may revolutionised the 
scheme, it is important to briefly pause upon the scheme in its form as at 2002. This is 
necessary so that the full implications of 2004' s events and decisions can be viewed 
objectively and academically. 
2002 Parliamentary Superannuation Scheme (Structure and Method) 
There are certain standards, or benchmarks, that must be attained by MPs so that a 
pension can be acquired. An MP cannot simply serve for one term as a representative and 
then expect to receive a lifetime pension. However, a one-term serving MP can receive a 
lump-sum payout at the age of 55. There are various rules and regulations that must be 
briefly examined so that the full picture of the parliamentary superannuation scheme may 
be gauged. 
There are three particular criteria that entitle MPs towards a lifetime pension, MPs must 
fulfil one of these criteria to do so. I) MPs need to have served for 12 or more years II) 
The MP has ceased being an MP on four or more occasions during the expiration or 
81 Ibid. 
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dissolution of the house or Ill) Their retirement is involuntary and the MP "has not 
completed less than eight years service." In summary, ''the essence of qualification for a 
pension is 12 years for voluntary retirement and eight years for those who retire 
involuntarily." 83 
MPs can claim varying amounts depending upon their service as an MP and whether their 
particular salaries increased due to service completed within the Ministry or another 
related area: "The minimum pension is 50 per cent of backbench salary (after 8 years) 
and the maximum is 75 per cent of backbench salary (after 18 years)."84 
Those who are not entitled to a pension because they did not serve the intended amount 
of time, 8 years being the minimum, are entitled to a lump sum payout. This lump sum, as 
noted previously, is now payment-deferred until the MP reaches the age of 55. 
Involuntary retirement of such an MP constitutes a "refund of all contributions (without 
interest) plus a supplement of two and one-third times those contributions." Whereas 
voluntary retirement for such an MP constitutes a "refund of all contributions (without 
interest) plus a supplement of one an one-sixth times member contributions over the last 
eight years."85 Most states and territories, with Western Australia being the exception, 
follow a very similar method of paying pensions to MPs. 
82 http://lee.greens.org.au/ campaigns/processes/Code%20of%20Conduct.doc 
83 http://www.aph.gov.au/ senate/ committee/super_ ctte/report _ 25/ c02.htm 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
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3.4 Recent Developments 
While this thesis was still being undertaken, several developments regarding the Federal 
Parliamentary Superannuation occurred within the time of the study's submittal. Such 
developments that have recently occurred will have the possibility of revolutionarily 
changing the structure and methodology of Parliamentary Superannuation. Therefore, it is 
essential that this study take these recent developments into serious consideration. 
The nature, or the drive, behind the major changes now proposed to Parliamentary 
Superannuation could be debated. Some would argue that the drive behind the changes 
was simply a matter of 'grabbing votes' in an election year. Although the changes will 
not take effect for some years, they will apparently become effective in 2007 when a new 
parliament is elected and will have broad reaching implications. 
It is not very often that an Opposition has the opportunity to dictate their policy decisions 
to the Government of the day. However, on the issue of Parliamentary Superannuation, 
the Government was coerced into accepting the Opposition's platform on the basis that 
the public opinion on the issue was very strong. Such events illustrate the volatility of the 
issue and how the public's general perception of Parliamentary Superannuation was that 
it was far too high. As it was noted earlier within this Chapter, various Independent MPs, 
Greens and Democrats had argued their case for a revolutionary overhaul of the system, 
but had received little or no recognition whatsoever for their claims. 
This was the first time that the issue of Parliamentary Superannuation had come to the 
fore with both of the major parties involved in a dispute about what should happen. The 
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fact of it possibly being an election year gave considerable weight to the issue and the 
Government was, therefore, 'electorally persuaded' to act. The result of such persuasion 
was, largely, one of bipartisan proportions. 
The volatility of the issue was noted by the 7.30 Report's Kerry O'Brien as "the old hand 
grenade of parliamentary superannuation" and also noted that the issue had been "a 
running sore with the electorate."86 As noted, this was due to the fact that MPs could 
receive half their salary as a pension for serving eight years as an MP. 
The Opposition Leader, Mr. Mark Latham, made an 'election-bid' proposal that the 
Parliamentary Superannuation Scheme would be shut down under a Labor Government 
and that sweeping changes would take place. The fact of this being a notoriously votes 
driven approach by party leaders is backed by Professor Nick Economu from Monash 
University: "It's very populist in the sense that Mr Latham is feeding on community 
attitudes towards politicians."87 
The Treasurer, Mr. Peter Costello, raised the somewhat philosophical debate that was 
noted within Chapter Two. Mr Costello stated that he did not think that changing the 
super scheme for MPs entice better people into politics. But Spokesperson of the 
Association of Funds, Ms Phillipa Smith stated that the scheme was akin to a "cash cow" 
which provided a backdoor entry for MPs to grant themselves luxurious payouts. 88 She 
86 http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2004/sl043983.htm 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
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stated: "The politicians put in about 11.5 per cent of their wages into super, but the 
Government tops it up by a subsidy that is equivalent to 69 per cent."89 
As this thesis has proposed, Parliamentary Superannuation was established at a time 
when people went into politics near the end of the professional careers. Such a claim is 
supported by Dr Economu: 
The superannuation scheme was originally formulated at a time 
when people went into politics quite late in their life, usually 
having worked in some other profession or doing some other job, 
and went into Parliament at a much older age. 
These days politicians are much younger, they seem to be going 
into politics as a career and the superannuation they can get if they 
survive a couple of terms is very generous.90 
In an historical occasion, Prime Minister Mr. Howard, called a press conference late in 
the day and made the announcement that the Parliamentary Superannuation had seen its 
end and would be replaced at the next Parliament. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
I am sorry it is so late. The party has approved the Cabinet's 
decision to legislate immediately to close down the existing 
Commonwealth parliamentary superannuation scheme to people 
elected at the next Parliament. It will be replaced by a scheme that 
attracts a Government contribution of 9 per cent. Which is the 
community standard.91 
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In a subsequent interview on The 7.30 Report Mr. Mark Latham made a similar 
suggestion that this study has made about the relationship between Parliamentary 
Superannuation and Australia's democratic system: 
This is all about rebuilding some trust and confidence in our 
democracy so that people can look at the system of entitlements 
and think there is a fair dinkum standard instead of the double 
standard we have had in the past.92 
The double standard, to which Mr. Latham refers, existed between the general 
community's super rates and MP's super rates. This suggestion implies that there existed 
two classes of people, each with their own set of agreements and entitlements. 
The current arrangement now awaits approval through the passage of both Houses of the 
Federal Parliament and will come into effect in 2007. However, this fact in its own right, 
caused debate as MPs elected in the next general election will come under the new 
scheme whereas those MPs re-elected will remain under the old scheme. 
In an interview with Laurie Oakes on the Sunday program, Mr. Wayne Swan, Member 
for Lilley, was asked whether this was very fair: "But why should there be two classes of 
MPs? Why should someone elected after the next election get only nine per cent from the 
taxpayer, but someone like you our Mark Latham gets 69 per cent?" 93Mr. Swan stated 
that such things are difficult to practically arrange. 
92 http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2004/sl 043986.htm 
93 http://sunday.ninemsn.com.au/sunday/political_ transcripts/article_ 14 79.asp 
69 
Chapter Three: Parliamentary Superannuation 
The various comments and events that occurred in February 2004 illustrated the 
Parliament's ability to discuss a bipartisan approach towards such issues. Whether the 
events be viewed in a cynical light as 'vote grabbing' or in an idealistic light as bipartisan 
parliament at its best, Parliamentary Superannuation will now be brought into line with 
community standards. 
The interesting event that followed the discussion and alteration of the Parliamentary 
Superannuation Scheme relates, pertinently, to a statement made by The Treasurer Mr. 
Peter Costello: "Under the Latham plan, this means your State MPs are going to be on 
much more generous superannuation than your Federal MPs."94 
This statement is true in some regards as the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal of 
Western Australia determine Western Australian MPs Superannuation. However, the 
other States of Australia have their Remuneration determined by one body, namely the 
Federal Remuneration Tribunal. Amendments to the Federal super scheme may have 
ultimately filtered through to most states. 
However, within days, Premiers Peter Beattie, Bob Carr, Steve Bracks and Geoff Gallop 
all stated that they were happy with the suggested amendments and that, when the time 
came, they would also fall into line with the amendments to be made by the Federal 
Government. 95 It is not surprising that most, if not all, MPs made statements of agreement 
towards the proposals put forth, as to do otherwise may have resulted in political suicide. 
94 http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2004/sl043983.htm 
95 Ibid. 
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However, it is with interest, that this study notes the 'agreement' of Premier of Western 
Australia, Dr. Geoff Gallop. It is possible that Dr. Gallop's government can dictate future 
directions for MP superannuation, however, the determinative process within Western 
Australia also includes the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal. 
The statement made by Dr. Gallop uncovers a precedent that has not been noted 
elsewhere. The Salaries and Allowances Tribunal, established as · an 'independent' 
tribunal who review issues of a fiscal and parliamentary nature, make determinations 
accordingly and independently from governmental or external interference. It is arguable 
that Dr. Gallop is not in a position where he can dictate government policy to an 
independent tribunal. Otherwise the question needs to be asked: what is the point of 
having an independent tribunal? This consequently effects the future directions of the 
Salaries and Allowances Tribunal, and the part that it may play in determining 
parliamentary remuneration in the future. 
3.5 Future Directions 
Given the data that has been analysed, before concluding this Chapter's review of 
Parliamentary Superannuation, it is necessary to review some of the major changes that 
have recently occurred so that some of the future directions of the Western Australian 
Parliamentary Superannuation Scheme may be reviewed. 
The future of parliamentary superannuation in Western Australia could become a simple 
linkage with the Federal Government's superannuation scheme. Superannuation rates, 
payments and percentages for Western Australian MPs could, given the decisions of late, 
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be determined by the Remuneration Tribunal. Although this issue, in itself, is more a 
matter for the Recommendation Chapter of this study, it is nonetheless, a noteworthy 
point. 
Structurally speaking, it could be considered administratively expensive and pointless to 
have two, unrelated, tribunals inquiring into the same issue when only one body is needed 
to forecast such determinations. The Remuneration Tribunal, which has similarly been 
dictated to by MPs policy, could in all likelihood, become the independent tribunal that 
would oversee the remunerative determinations for all Australian jurisdictions. A simple 
legislative link would suffice in linking Western Australian Parliamentary 
Superannuation to that of the Federal Parliamentary Superannuation Scheme's structure. 
However, before looking into such claims fully within the Review and Recommendations 
Chapter, it is important to review what has happened within Australian politics with 
regards to Federal, and other State's, remuneration. Similarly, various other Westminster 
based jurisdictions will be reviewed for their methodology in determining MP 
Remuneration. 
It could be said that the superannuation rates earned by Members of Parliament over the 
last thirty-to-fifty years have been rather generous. This component of Parliamentary 
Remuneration has borne the brunt of public criticism and has now been futuristically 
amended. This chapter has noted, not in so much detail the amounts and rates received by 
MPs, but rather, the historical and philosophical reasons for such amounts being received 
by MPs. Given the events of late, this thesis does not purport to understand what the 
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future holds for Parliamentary Superannuation in Western Australia, however, it will be 
with great interest that proceedings and developments will occur. 
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Chapter Four: 
Australian (State and Federal) Remuneration 
4.1 - Introduction 
4.2 -Australian State and Territory Remuneration 
4.3 - House of Representatives Remuneration 
4.4- The Australian National Audit Office Remuneration Report 
(1999-2000) 
4.5 - Parliamentary Entitlements and Allowances 
(Federal Government) 
4.1 - Introduction: 
In 1973 the Federal Government of Australia instituted the Remuneration Tribunal Act 
which established a committee to determine Parliamentary Salaries and Allowances for 
the Federal tier of government. Prior to this Act's introduction, Federal Parliament itself 
determined what the amount of remuneration it would receive. The Remuneration 
Tribunal, established in Canberra two years before the creation of the, somewhat parallel, 
Salaries and Allowances Tribunal in Western Australia, have in many ways had a very 
similar history. Apart from the Remuneration Tribunal, the Australian National Audit 
Office, the Department of Finance and the Auditor General's Office have all contributed 
towards the debate on parliamentary remuneration. 
There have been governmental reports, comparisons between states, comparisons 
between both public and private jobs, remunerative increments according to fluctuations 
in the Consumer Price Index and Average Weekly Earnings, and there has also been a 
great deal of debate. 
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The creation of the Remuneration Tribunal was brought about under the Whitlam 
Government (1972-1975), derived from the Kerr Committee's recommendation that there 
should be an independent tribunal formed to determine remunerative amounts for Federal 
MPs.91 
With the exception of W estem Australia, Parliamentary Salaries for all Australian States 
and Territories are presently (2003) determined by the Federal Remuneration Tribunal's 
determinations.98 There does exist arbitrary Remuneration Tribunals in several States and 
Territories, however, it is the determinations of the federal Remuneration Tribunal that 
carry the most weight. Therefore, it is necessary to look at the Federal Tribunal's various 
decisions over time. However, before delving into historical and contemporary analyses 
of the federal Remuneration Tribunal's determinations, it would be advantageous to 
briefly review each state of Australia so that a greater understanding of the Australian 
'remunerative scene' may be achieved. 
4.2 - State and Territory Remuneration 
Victoria: 
The State of Victoria was the first among all Australian states to create a link between its 
remunerative scheme and the federal remunerative scheme. Shortly before this link was 
formed, a committee oversaw the introduction of remunerative determinations. Sir 
91 Background Paper 7, Australian Parliamentary Library 1997-1998, 
(http://www.aph.gov .au/library/pubs/bp/l 997- I 998/98bp07 .htrn) Pg. 4 
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George Paton, Sir Henry Bland and Professor Donald Cochrane, all of whom were on this 
committee stated: " .. .if there are any relativities, they are to be found with Members of 
other Parliaments."99 
The link, created in 1975, established that Victorian MPs should receive the same amount 
"payable to members of the House of Representatives, less $500."100 This amount has 
subsequently increased to over 99% of a Member of the House of Representative's salary. 
Interestingly, in Victoria in 1997, it was found that up to 21 MPs earned a second income 
of up to $120,000 p.a. The article, which appeared in the Herald Sun, provided evidence 
of MP Mr Atkinson earning $120,000 per year along with an $800 per day consultancy. 101 
The article, painted most of the other 20 MPs with the same brush. 
New South Wales & Queensland: 
In the late 1980's, both New South Wales and Queensland moved to form the same link 
as the Victorian State Parliament. That is, the amount payable to members of the House 
of Representative, less $500 is the annual salary payable to MPs from N.S.W. and 
Queensland. Gradually, the remaining States and Territories, with the exception of 
W estem Australia, forged a similar linkage. 
98 This is with the exception oj'Tasmania, whose remuneration is determined by the Tasmanian Industrial 
Commission, who nevertheless, agree with an 85.19% link to t~at of a Federal MP 's salary; which is still 
set by the Remuneration Tribunal. 
99 MOORE. B, The Remuneration of Members of the Western Australian Parliament 1888-1999, Perth, 
2000 (Unpublished), Pg. 208 
100 Ibid. Pg. 205 
101 The Herald Sun, April 2 1997, Pg. 7 
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South Australia: 
South Australia followed the same methodological structure of determining the 
remuneration of South Australian State MPs when, in 1990, Parliament determined a link 
with the Members of the House of Representatives. This link was an amount payable, 
from time to time, at a rate of $1000 less than those in the House of Representatives. 
However, in April 1995, this Act was amended to $2000 less than the basic 
Commonwealth salary.102 
Northern Territory: 
The Remuneration Tribunal Act itself provides the ground upon which a Member of the 
Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory may be remunerated. The payable amount 
being $3000 less than a Member of the House of Representatives.103 
Tasmania: 
"The Parliamentary Salaries and Allowance Act 1973, as amended by the Parliamentary 
Salaries and Allowances Amendment Act 1996 places the responsibility for determining 
the salary of a Tasmanian Member with the Full Bench of the Industrial Commission."104 
Ultimately this amendment could be seen as being inconsequential since, in 1997, the Full 
Bench of the Tasmanian Industrial Commission simply reformed the link between 
Tasmanian MPs to members in the House of Representatives. Consequently, Tasmanian 
102 MOORE. B, The Remuneration of Members of the Western Australian Parliament 1888-1999, Perth, 
2000 (Unpublished), Pg. 208 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
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Members of Parliament would receive 85.19% of the base salary received by 
Commonwealth Members of Parliament. 105 
Australian Capital Territory: 
Members of Parliament in the Australian Capital Territory were to be remunerated 
accordingly by the Remuneration Tribunal's autonomous determination. The 
Remuneration Tribunal Act of 1995 determined that there would be no linkage to other 
parliaments formulated for Members of the ACT Parliament, as they would be 
determined by the federal Remuneration TribunaI.106 
The Tribunal's establishment originally stemmed from the Parliamentarians' constitutional 
right of payment. As specified in the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution, "Until the 
Parliament otherwise provides, each Senator and each Member of the House of 
Representatives shall receive an allowance of four hundred pounds per year, to be 
reckoned from the day on which he takes his seat.11107 
By 1997, many developments occurred and all Australian States and Territories, except 
W estem Australia, came under the umbrella of the Remuneration Tribunal with 
parliamentarians being remunerated by a stipulated percentage of the Tribunal's 
determinations of those who served in the House of Representatives. This means that the 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. Pg. 206 
107 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution (section 48) 
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determinations of the Remuneration Tribunal have enacted what MPs in the States and 
Territories of Australia would receive. 
The Whitlam Government (1972-1975) brought about the realisation of the Kerr 
Committee's recommendation from 1971 for the establishment of an independent 
remuneration tribunal. It was then intended that the Remuneration Tribunal "would de-
politicise the issue of Parliamentary Remuneration and conditions.11108 It seems apparent 
that both the States and Territories, by forming a simple linkage to that of the members of 
the House of Representatives, may have been trying to depoliticise the issue for 
themselves. The reason why this seems apparent is because their remunerative increase is 
not of their own accord, but is simply, an automatic adjustment. This 'automatic 
adjustment' has not depoliticised the contention surrounding Parliamentary Remuneration 
and, as this study delves further into the historical documents surrounding this issue, it 
will become clearer that it remains a volatile subject for the Federal, State and Territorial 
Governments. 
The Remuneration Tribunal made several determinations for the members of the House 
of Representatives before stating in its 1982 Determination that: "traditionally, 
government salaries have lagged behind the workforce's."109 This may certainly be true, 
however, it appears to be an attempt of the Remuneration Tribunal's aim in depoliticising 
the issue, as statements such as this were not often made in Determinations. 
108 Background Paper 7, Australian Parliamentary Library, 1997-1998, 
http://www.aph.gov .au/library/pubs/bp/l 997-1998/98bp07 .htrn) Pg.4 
109 Reports and Determinations - Jan 1982, Remuneration Tribunal, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1982, Pg. 8 
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As it has been illustrated, various parliaments and tribunals throughout Australia tried 
varying methods in order to realise the illusive figure of what an MP was worth. Ideally, 
such a determination would have to be accepted by both the constituents and the 
parliamentarians. Unfortunately, one could easily assume that the illusive figure was not 
even what a parliamentarian was really worth, but rather, a comprised, 'voter-friendly' 
amount. In an attempt to discover a justifiable amount, the Remuneration Tribunal 
employed private research consultants Cullen/Eagen/Dell in 1988 to complete a work 
value study. These were the same private consultants who provided the Western 
Australian Parliament with a work-value study two years later in 1990. The consultants 
determined that Federal MPs were grossly underpaid and needed severe increases in order 
to bring them into line with the rest of the community. However, the Hawke Government 
(1983-1991) opposed the recommendations of both the Federal Remuneration Tribunal 
and the Cullen/Eagen/Dell study and decided to link MP's Salaries to the Senior 
Executive Service Band 1.110 
Although no explicit reason as to why the recommendations of the study were rejected, a 
report by The Remuneration Tribunal stipulated that the role of the Tribunal was to only 
advise the Parliament. This is surmised by the following statement that it made in its 
report: 
the Tribunal has a formal role in advising the Minister ... on an 
appropriate base salary for Senators and Members of the 
Federal Parliament. The Tribunal cannot issue a determination 
on this matter - it can only provide advice, as it does on the 
additional salaries payable to Ministers. The Government can 
choose to accept or reject the Tribunal's advice on these 
110 Background Paper 7, Australian Parliamentary Library, 1997-1998, Pg. 4 
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matters and must undertake the necessary action to bring the 
Tribunal's recommendations into force. 111 
Nonetheless, often MPs do not make it easy on themselves or the tribunals when 
increases are passed through Parliament under what seems to be disreputable 
circumstances. The power of the media, in such circumstances is indefatigable. One 
particular example of public condemnation appeared on the front page of the Sydney 
Morning Herald in 1998: "in just nine minutes, wedged between 20 hours of tortuous 
debate on mostly environmental bills, the Members of the NSW Upper House 
unanimously granted themselves an average increase of 30% in their superannuation 
entitlements." The vote took place around lam and "there was no discussion, no 
dissension."112 
The report, on members of the Legislative Council in New South Wales paints all 
parliamentarians with the same brush. It is unfortunate for many that such a stinging 
report would be expressed on the cover page of the Sydney Morning Herald as it is 
arguable that the NSW MPs were entitled to such an increase. Yet, such stories will not 
assist parliamentarians in general and their attempts at depoliticising the issue of 
Parliamentary Remuneration. At the crux of the depoliticisation process is the search for a 
fair and equitable link that MP Salaries can be tied to. 
111 Report on Senators and Members of Parliament, Ministers and Holders of Parliamentary Office -
Salaries and Allowances for Expense of Office: Report 1999/01, Remuneration Tribunal, 7 December 1999 
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The media have fuelled public displeasure towards the amounts received by MPs. At 
times, it seems as though it is not the amount of remuneration received by MPs that 
constituents are upset about, but rather, there seems to be a perception in the public that 
parliamentarians do not do enough work for the amounts that they receive. The Herald 
Sun reported that the Australian Federal Parliament was the 'laziest' in the English-
speaking world: 
Averag-e Sitting- Davs '1950-2000): 
Countrv Amount of Sitting- Davs 
Australia 64 days - House of Representatives 
New Zealand 88 days - House of Representatives 
United States 143 days -House of Representatives 
Canada 141 days - House of Commons 
Britain 162 days - House of Commons 
I U 
It is quite obvious that such a report does not heighten the general populous' view of 
parliamentarians in Australia. Nor does it help Federal MPs justify any sort of 
remunerative increments whatsoever. 
In 1999, the Sydney Morning Herald raised the Remuneration Tribunal's desire to find a 
link that might equitably determine what parliamentarians should earn. However, the 
Sydney Morning Herald saw the method of finding a link as "a way of taking the 
112 The Sydney Morning Herald, 10 Jan. 1998, Pg. 1 
113 The Herald Sun, 6 May 2002, Pg. 6 
82 
Chapter Four: Australian Parliamentary Remuneration 
political heat out of the issue of a pay rise" and went on to say that "politicians' pay might 
be linked to Federal Court Judges."114 
Since the Hawke Government legislation, parliamentary salaries had been tied to SES 
Bands within the Australian Public Service. The SES Bands were tied to the Continuous 
Improvement in the Public Service Enterprise Agreement Act, formerly known as 
Improving Productivity, Jobs and Pay in the Australian Public Service Act 1992. This 
convoluted relationship of Acts was finally ended when the Workplace Relations Act 
1996 which brought individually negotiated agreements, within the Public Service, into 
play and Parliamentary Salaries could no longer be tied to SES Bands. The remuneration 
of MPs was consequently frozen and the Tribunal stated: 
The Remuneration Tribunal, in its Statement on Members of 
Parliament - Allowances and Entitlements, dated 8 October 
1997, has drawn attention to this lack of an adjustment 
mechanism, and recommended that this be given early 
attention. Any action to re-establish a salary adjustment 
mechanism would bring the issue of parliamentary 
remuneration back onto the public agenda, when the point of 
tying parliamentary salaries to SES salaries was precisely to 
de-politicise the issue. 115 
A salary adjustment needed to be found since the linkage with SES Bands had been lost, 
but the conundrum of raising the issue of parliamentary remuneration in the public light 
was a worrying thought for the Remuneration Tribunal. It could be safely said, in light of 
this statement, that the main role of the Federal Remuneration Tribunal was, and still 
remains, finding a link that will determine MP salaries in a non-contentious fashion. 
114 The Sydney Morning Herald, 8 December 1999, Pg. 7 
115 Background Paper 7, Australian Parliamentary Library, 1997-1998, Pg. 5 
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The Remuneration Tribunal decided to survey the Members of Parliament in 1996 in 
order to receive some feedback on the way they felt about their Remuneration Packages. 
The Tribunal stated that a large number of submissions were received, apparently due to 
the fact that MPs never had the chance to air their grievances on the issue. There were 
some notable points raised by many MPs, they were: 
i-A greater flexibility within existing entitlements; 
ii-Significant expansion of funding; and 
iii-New entitlements relating to individual family circumstances and differing 
electoral demographics. 
In response to these requests, the Tribunal suggested that a more flexible system would be 
difficult to attain since: "The Tribunal's view continues to be that accountability is best 
served by the public knowing the purpose for which funds are available to Members, 
recognising the distinction between provisions directed to a member's individual benefit 
and those expenses which are incurred in the discharge of electorate functions, and 
appreciating the justifications, controls and accounting attaching thereto." 116 
Although the flexibility of parliamentary allowances seems important, any 
recommendation that this thesis makes in regards to an overly flexible Parliamentary 
Remuneration structure would be easily dismissed by the Federal Tribunal on the bases of 
the need for greater accountability. It would be difficult to put the salary and allowances 
into one 'global' package in order to make them more flexible as it would be harder to 
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keep a tabs on how the monies were being spent. Under the current federal structure of 
allowances, it is easier for the Tribunal and the Auditor General's Office to review. The 
Tribunal's poignant note is important, as it shall become more evident, because it is 
difficult under the current 'inflexible system' to keep accountability to its greatest practice. 
It could be said that the Federal Remuneration Tribunal has a 'pre-remuneration state,' 
and as it was stated earlier, the parliament decides upon whether the 'pre-remuneration' 
will evolve into a 'current-remuneration state.' However, there is also the 'post-
remuneration state' whereby the Australian National Audit Office analyse the monetary 
aspects of Parliament and review: How the Remuneration has been dealt with, has it been 
fair, have discrepancies occurred and what are some suggestions for the future of 
Parliamentary Remuneration. 
4.4 -The Australian National Audit Office Report: 
In 1999-2000, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) produced the 
Parliamentarians' Entitlements report which was an extremely detailed report on 
Parliamentary Remuneration and its usage by the Members of Parliament. Although many 
parts dealt with in this report are irrelevant to this particular study, there were numerous 
significant recommendations made by the ANAO in regards to the restructuring of 
Parliamentary Remuneration and Entitlements. 
Well-structured Parliamentary Remuneration needed to exist, according to the ANAO, 
since Parliamentarians needed an appropriate level of resources in order to best serve the 
public. The ANAO stated that while the Remuneration Tribunal had been looking into the 
1161998 Report, Remuneration Tribunal, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1998, Pg. 7 
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flexibility of payments, it believed that MPs should be able to trade-off one entitlement 
for another. This would assist them in performing their parliamentary and electoral duties. 
For the sake of comparison, no such suggestion has ever been made by the Salaries and 
Allowances Tribunal of Western Australia in regards to flexibility of entitlements. 117 
An example of this is shown through Scheduled Fare Travel where the table below shows 
the lowest amount consumed by one MP at $2,006, whereas the highest level is $85,098. 
The greatest difference was in regards to 'Photographic Services' where the lowest level 
consumed was $33 and the greatest amount was $93,933. These figures clearly illustrate 
the fact that MPs roles vary from their office to their electorate and to the level of 
responsibility they have. Consequently the suggestion is made that the entitlements 
received by MPs should be flexible enough to cater for the varying levels of responsibility 
and needs due to such matters as geographical location. The table below, from the 
ANAO's report, demonstrates that need for the Remuneration Tribunal to able, in some 
ways, to cater for the individual needs of parliamentarians. The table overleaf helps 
illustrate this point further: 118 
117 Audit Report: Parliamentarians' Entitlements 1999-2000, Australian National Audit Office, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 2001, Pg. 7 
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Entitlement Expenditure 
Actual Usage Range (of Spendinl!) 
Entitlements Lowest Highest Average 
$ $ $ 
Scheduled fare travel 2,006 85,038 31,991 
Travelling Allowance 1,340 47,512 17,497 
Private-plated vehicle 753 40,061 16,946 
Special Purpose Aircraft 210 656,608 96,123 
Official car transport 64 135,707 9,231 
Spouse & Dependent Travel 228 40,935 6,774 
Retirement Travel 70 146,588 13,242 
Printing: 
Members 
Senators Not available Not available 7,103 
Flags 28 16,860 2,802 
Photo2t'aphic Services 33 93,933 2,444 
The ANAO stated that there should be enhanced guidance given to MPs in regards to 
their entitlements and what they were entitled to since: "A number of reviews of the 
administration of Parliamentarians' entitlements have identified the need for clear 
guidance as to the definition of the terms 'parliamentary business,' 'electorate business' 
and 'party business,' given the key role these terms play in determining Parliamentarians' 
eligibility for a number of otherwise largely uncapped entitlements. 119 It has been 
understood that the MP has three main branches from which his or her role stems: 
Parliamentary Roles, Electoral Roles and Party Roles (if applicable). It will be decided 
later as to which of these, if any, are able to come under a performance management 
system that determines what MPs get paid. One could suppose that MPs would certainly 
seek out enhanced guidance if their level of entitlements depended on their performance. 
118Ibid. Pg. 14 
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The ANAO provided five guidelines for salary determination that will be reviewed at a 
later stage: 
"1.Flexibility: allowances must be sufficiently flexible to recognise the varying needs of 
different electorates and to allow Senators and Members to respond to these needs. The 
Tribunal noted that it was committed to ensuring that, over time, it can deliver Senators 
and Members greater flexibility in how they utilise their expenses of office within 
appropriate parameters. 
2.Accountability: the expenditure of public funds by Senators and members must at least 
meet the normal standards of accountability that apply to the expenditure of public funds 
in general and may sometimes be subject to other arrangements. 
3.Fairness: Allowances should be structured to preclude any real or imputed favour to 
any particular parliamentary grouping or party. 
4.Supporting Quality Service: Allowances should support Senators and Members in 
providing quality services to their constituents as their elected representative and; 
5. Work/Family Balance: Allowances should be structured to support Senators and 
Members in achieving a better integration of work and family responsibilities and should 
119 Ibid. Pg. 24 
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reconcile their family commitments with formal duties, which require frequent and 
prolonged absences from their families and family home."120 
The five point recommendation by the ANAO suggests a dramatic change in the way that 
remuneration has been looked at over the last century and is quite different to what has 
been happening elsewhere. Some of the recommendations, if implemented, would change 
the current state of remuneration in an almost revolutionary fashion. Therefore, it is now 
necessary that these five points recommended by the ANAO be reviewed to see how they 
would impact upon Parliamentary Remuneration. 
As noted before, the ANAO made a statement pertaining to the idea that a remunerative 
package should have a certain amount of flexibility. The premise that parliamentarians 
should be able to exchange one type of entitlement for another does have its merits 
because the individual needs of MPs needs to be catered for. In contrast to this, the 
ANAO felt that it was already difficult to keep record of the current remunerative practice 
and that a greater flexibility of payments would only further confuse the situation. 
This practice of accountability was the ANA O's second point, upon which it was argued, 
that the remunerative scheme must meet societal standards whereby parliamentarians are 
called to be culpable for all expenses incurred. One could suppose that if there were a 
stronger structure in place to ensure accountability that the public may not be so trenchant 
in their feelings towards parliamentary remuneration. Therefore, the third point of 
Fairness in remunerative schemes plays a vital role in a system that should not favour any 
120 Ibid. Pg. 36 
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particular person or party. If parliamentary remuneration were flexible enough to cater for 
the needs of individual parliamentarians, it should consequently follow that the payments 
would be fair enough to allow MPs to carry out their duties. The current state of Federal 
Parliamentary Remuneration is based upon the level at which an MP may be working. 
There is a base salary for backbenchers, and as the responsibility grows, so too does the 
level of remuneration. 
The ANAO's recommendation of Supporting Quality Service has already been noted 
through the fact that MPs have to be given sufficient funds so that they may provide a 
quality service to the constituency. The last recommendation is very interesting as it 
touches upon the social life of an MP. The Work - Family Balance recommendation 
recognises the amount of work that MPs do perform, and consequently, spend a lot of 
time away from their families. Subsequently, entitlements need to be in place so that MPs 
may move their families either to Canberra or the Member's electorate. Alternatively, 
MPs need travel entitlements so that they may visit and spend time with their families as 
the opportunity arises. 
As it was stated earlier, an MP's remunerative package encompasses all types of expenses 
including office expenditure, travel and accommodation expenses; some of which are 
difficult to maintain accurate records. The ANAO recommended that the Department of 
Finance provide Senators and Members with financial recording kits in order for them to 
be able to have a greater control over spending amounts. The Department of Finance 
disagreed saying that there are already methods in place for administrative, records 
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management and financial planning for MPs. However, the ANAO did not believe that 
the training was sufficient. 121 
It is now important that the issue of Office Expenditure within an MP's office be visited 
as it can be a stream through which much-uncapped remuneration funds can flow freely. 
This thesis suggested in Chapter 1 that an education of the constituents needed to occur 
whereby they could come to a greater understanding of the remuneration packages, which 
would consequently create less contention. However, the ANAO's recommendation calls 
for the education and training of MPs so that the flow of funds may be monitored within a 
controlled environment.122 
Some allowances that were brought into the light of public condemnation were 
photocopying and mobile phone costs where, according to The Age newspaper, "one 
federal MP spent $23,598 on photocopy paper and another rang up a mobile phone bill of 
$19,234." 123 According to these figures, the ANAO's recommendations seem worthy of 
serious consideration and placing a cap on some of these entitlements should be taken 
seriously. In response to this situation the Prime Minister, Mr. John Howard has stated 
that he was considering putting a cap on such entitlements. 124 
After proposing that further studies should be completed which should focus on 
comparisons of other remuneration systems, the ANAO recalled the findings of a 1997 
121 Ibid. Pg.37 
122 Ibid. Pg. 24 
123 The Age and Sunday Age, Aug 10 2001, Pg.4 
124 Ibid. 
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Baxter Review. The report's main recommendation was that, as soon as possible, a single, 
centralised remuneration, allowances and entitlements system should be administered by 
the Department of Administrative Services. This would help find any discrepancies or 
exploitations of remuneration funds. 125 Subsequently, Recommendation 7 of The 
ANAO's report focussed, once again, on the issue of office expenditure. It stated that 
sufficient documentation needs to be shown to the Department of Finance Administration 
(DOF A) before a purchase or spending can occur. 
As the Travel Allowance is a prevalent allowance that this study stated it would briefly 
look into, it is necessary to analyse the four guidelines suggested by the ANAO that are 
tabulated below: 
i) "Seeking to enhance the legal basis for, and thereby compliance with, the statement in 
the Senators' and Members' handbook that the Parliamentarians are required to certify that 
travel, for which costs have been met by the Commonwealth, was undertaken within 
entitlement. 
ii) Ensuring nominated payment control checks are operating; 
iii) Introducing risk based payment procedures that provide reasonable assurance that 
travel expenditure is in accordance with the traveller's proposed itinerary and that travel is 
in accordance with actual entitlements and; 
125 Audit Report: Parliamentarians' Entitlements 1999-2000, Australian National Audit Office, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 2001, Pg. 45 
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iv) Where cost effective, adopting systematic data matching techniques to ensure accurate 
and consistent data is provided to Parliamentarians for certification and identify possible 
non-compliance for further inquiry."126 
These four guidelines were rejected by the DOF A on the grounds that "the existing 
control mechanisms in place are already being applied and are effective." In response to 
this claim, the ANAO stated that they only audited 616 travel related items and 
discovered a 29% error rate in transactions. 13% of which was outside entitlement and the 
remaining 16% were inconclusive due to the fact that the DOFA did not provide ANAO 
with enough information. The ANAO also found, "from a small sample," 127 that financial 
recoveries from 54 parties needed to occur as a consequence of their auditing which 
found these parties to be out of entitlement.128 
The stark findings of the small surveyed sample by the ANAO illustrate the fact that the 
Parliamentary Travel Allowance is an allowance that needs a little more attention than 
first thought. It is an allowance that has gained the public's attention recently after several 
MPs had been shown to be exploiting the system. The ANAO stated that harsher 
procedures have been put into place since these events, but there is still more room for 
tightening the structure. 129 Interestingly, since the structure had been tightened, DOF A 
stated that they would undertake a check on approximately 40% of all Travel Claims. The 
126 Ibid. Pg. 83 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
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ANAO stated that out of their sample of 26 travel claims, a possible 11 or 12 (40%) 
should have been checked by the DOFA. However, none of them had been audited. 
The Parliamentary Travel Allowance is an allowance that often receives a considerable 
amount of criticism from the public. To the public's disapproval, it was reported in The 
Age that 16 Victorian State MPs were overseas at "a cost to taxpayers of about $300,000. 
Only four will be required to submit individual reports on their trips.11130 The are 
numerous other examples of MPs embarking on a long overseas trip, and on return, 
submit a few paragraphs as a report on their findings. Such allowances can enrage the 
general public and do not help raise the current public perception of parliamentary 
remuneration. 
One problem surrounding parliamentary remuneration, and in particular allowances and 
entitlements, is the fact that it is not really governed by a centralised body. It was found 
by the ANAO that parliamentary allowances and entitlements were governed by: 
Department of Finance Administration, the Department of the Auditor General, the 
Attorney General's Department, Treasury and home departments. The ANAO found: 
No one entity is responsible for the administration and coordination of 
delivery of the entitlements, or for the production of comprehensive 
management information regarding the totality of expenditure incurred 
in respect of those entitlements across a range of departments. 131 
130 The Age, 21 July 2001, Pg. 2 
131 Audit Report: Parliamentarians' Entitlements 1999-2000, Australian National Audit Office, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 2001, Pg. 8 
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It is therefore necessary that the ANAO Report's key findings regarding Parliamentary 
Allowances and Entitlements be reviewed so that a clear, working and manageable 
system may be discovered. It is not necessary to cover all twenty-eight recommendations 
that the ANAO Report made, however, it is interesting to note that few recommendations 
were wholly agreed upon by the Department of Finance (DOFA). This clearly 
demonstrates the rift that exists between Governmental Departments over the issue of 
parliamentary remuneration. 
Although few of the ANAO's recommendations were agreed upon by DOFA, some 
recommendations that were made by the ANAO are noteworthy of brief examination. 
Each of the recommendation's numbers correlate with the ANAO's numbering system 
and do not run in numerical order: 
Recommendation 2: There should be a comparison of the Australian Remuneration 
Scheme with other international jurisdictions 
The Australian National Audit Office believed that it would be beneficial if the 
Department of Finance Administration reviewed how parliamentary entitlements were 
dealt with in other jurisdictions. One jurisdiction in particular, Canada, will be reviewed 
in the following chapter. The ANAO believed that such a study could suitably "improve 
flexibility, transparency and accountability" with the Australian parliamentary setting. 132 
132 Audit Report: Parliamentarians' Entitlements 1999-2000, Australian National Audit Office, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 2001, Pg. 43 
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In disagreeing to the ANAO's recommendation, DOFA stated that they believed this had 
been completed. The ANAO believed that DOF A had started this comparative work, in 
order to reform parliamentary entitlements, in 1998, but this work was not completed.133 
Recommendation 3: Development of a definition of what is Electoral, Parliamentary 
and Party Business so that expenditure may be justified 
ANAO, in light of improving transparency and government accountability, recommended 
that DOF A produce a framework of guidelines to assist Parliamentarians in the 
management of their entitlements. The Department of the Senate and the Department of 
the House of Representative both agreed with this proposal, however, DOFA stated that 
this was not a role for them, but rather, was a Governmental matter. ANAO believed that 
it was the responsibility of DOF A to propose this change to the minister who could, 
consequently, take it to the Government for its consideration.134 
Recommendation 6: Records Management 
Whilst completing the audit of parliamentary entitlements, the ANAO discovered that 
"M&PS' files invariably are not referenced which meant that the ANAO was unable to be 
sufficiently assured about the integrity of the files provided for audit examination." 
DOF A consequently replied that the recommendation, which stated: "enhancing 
department's electronic and paper based records management systems and procedures" 
for greater reliability and effectiveness, 135 was consistent with DOF A practice. The 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. Pgs. 49-50 
135 Ibid. Pg. 62 
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ANAO believed that accountability could not be put into practice if information systems 
were not maintained. 
Recommendation 9: Transparency and Accountability 
So that transparency and accountability may be improved, the ANAO Report 
recommended that the cost incurred by Parliamentarians be tabled in Parliament so that 
the reports may be made public. DOF A stated that monthly reports on parliamentarian 
expenditure are tabled in parliament. The ANAO, retorted to DOFA's claim stated that, 
although there are parliamentary expenses tabled within parliament, they are not consist 
with legal requirements and provide little detail on the actuality of the expenses.136 
As it has been noted, Parliamentarians have: varying levels of responsibility, different 
sized electorates, varying numbers of constituents, belong to differing committees along 
with many more differences. The fact that parliamentary entitlements' total expenditure is 
tabled in parliament does not clearly illustrate the justification of such amounts being 
spent. 
Recommendation 11 & 18: Benchmarking Entitlements 
Both ANAO Report recommendations eleven and eighteen both dealt with DOF A 
providing parliamentarians with benchmarks so that they may judge their level of expense 
accordingly. DOF A stated that they were constantly reviewing and updating their 
benchmarking practices but made no reference to any specific activity. 
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Recommendation 13: Travel Allowance 
The Parliamentary Travel Allowance is the allowance that has probably attracted the most 
criticism from the constituency and the media. In the period from 1999-2000, Federal 
Parliamentarians spent $3.92 Million on overnight stay. The ANAO Report states that 
parliamentarians are not always eligible for such a payment and that there needs to be a 
large strengthening of the structures in place. The ANAO made a long statement 
regarding the Travel Allowance that must be reviewed: 
Existing controls over Parliamentarians' travel entitlements are, on the 
whole, in need of strengthening for greater effectiveness. In respect of 
Travel entitlements, ANAO audit sampling was of 616 travel-related 
items which revealed an error rate of 29"/o, comprising 13% of items 
examined being outside of entitlement and 16% of items where Finance 
provided insufficient information for ANAO to conclude the 
expenditure was either within or outside entitlement. Further evidence 
of the deficiencies in control framework of travel entitlements is that 
ANAO's analysis of a relatively small sample of travel transactions 
resulted in financial recoveries from 54 current and former 
Parliamentarians to an aggregate amount of$28,575.137 
DOF A disagreed with the report's recommendation that there need to be tighter structures 
in place to ensure that abuse or accidental error upon the system does not occur and 
stated: "In a total of 86,000 transactions" there was a less than 0.05% error rate. 
In the ANAO's final statement of Recommendation 13, stated DOFA claims to check 
40% of all claims, however, when ANAO sampled 26 claims, none of them had been 
136 Ibid. Pg. 69 
137 Ibid. Pg. 83 
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previously been checked by DOF A. This fact could easily be considered ammunition for 
ANAO against DOFA claims that the structures in place were not effective enough. 
Recommendation 14: Greater controls within the Trave/Allowanceframework 
The Parliamentary Travel Allowance has recently received a lot of public criticism and 
the Recommendation 13 highlights the need for a structural change in the way that travel 
entitlements have been administered. Recommendation 14 is by far the longest and most 
detailed recommendation in the ANAO's study into Parliamentary Entitlements. It covers 
nominee and spouse travel, independent children travel and retirement travel (also known 
as the 'gold pass). Before this chapter can be concluded, it is essential that these findings 
be aired. 
The ANAO continued its argument for greater control over the parliamentarians' travel 
entitlements as many discrepancies had been discovered through the study. The ANAO 
made three strong recommendations which must ultimately be considered in the Western 
Australian context.: 
(i) Examining the merits of expanding the public reporting of Parliamentarians' 
travel costs to include the cost of spouse/nominee and dependent children travel. 
(ii) Seeking to introduce into the Senators and Members handbook a requirement 
for there to be a travel declaration completed for all occasions on which 
spouse/nominee and dependent children travel at Commonwealth expense and; 
(iii) Implementing effective procedures to monitor trip counts; inform 
parliamentarians when their spouse/nominee and/or dependent children have reached 
the limit of their entitlements; identify instances where travel exceeds entitlements; 
d ak • d" k · 138 an m e appropriate a ~ustments, or ta e recovery action. 
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It could be considered unfortunate that DOF A who believed that "effective and robust 
systems were already in place to monitor trip counts and take appropriate action" deemed 
such constructive recommendations, made by the ANAO, unnecessary139 However, the 
ANAO disagreed with DOFA's self examination stating: 
Based on the analysis undertaken, it was not apparent to ANAO that 
effective and robust systems were in place in 1999-2000 to monitor trip 
counts and take appropriate action. The end-of-year reports provided by 
Finance to Parliamentarians in November 2000 indicated 38 instances 
where spouse and dependent travel entitlements had been breached, but 
Finance did not seek repayment or other advice from those 
Parliamentarians at the time it sent out the end-of-year reports ... no 
recovery action has been taken (by (DOF A).140 
One of the final facets of the Parliamentary Travel allowance that draws a great deal of 
attention, and needs to be reviewed, is the issue of Retirement Travel. The ANAO made a 
very interesting finding in its statement that some Members who had retired from 
parliament were actually spending more on travel than those Members who were still in 
parliament. The retirement travel allowance is an allowance that does not have to be 
publicly reported and is not considered to form a part of the individual's total taxable 
income for taxation purposes. The stipulations of the Retirement Travel Allowance are 
described by the ANAO as follows: 
138 Ibid. Pg. 92 
139 Ibid. Pg. 93 
140 Ibid. 
Following a Senator or Member's retirement or departure from the 
Parliament, he or she is able to travel within Australia at 
Commonwealth expense for non-commercial purposes on scheduled 
commercial/commuter air services, mainline rail services and other 
government services, or by motor coach or other vehicles operating as 
regular carriers ... Depending on the length of parliamentary service and 
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any Ministerial or other official offices held, a retired or former 
Parliamentarian may access Life Gold Pass travel entitlements. 141 
The ANAO reported that the cost of retirement travel entitlements in 1999-2000 was 
approximately two million dollars. As noted, the ANAO stated "in many respects the 
travel entitlements of retired Parliamentarians and their spouses are greater than those of 
sitting Parliamentarians and their spouses."142 The ANAO made the following, lengthy, 
finding which needs to be noted for the purposes of this study: 
... one Life Gold Pass holder (excluding spouse) took more than 100 
return trips at Commonwealth expense in 1999-2000 at an aggregate 
cost of$95 654. In comparison, sitting Parliamentarians may only travel 
when on parliamentary business, electorate business or (in defined 
circumstances) party business. Spouses of retired Parliamentarians 
issued with a Life Gold Pass prior to 1976 are provided with 
unrestricted access to travel at Commonwealth expense. The spouse of 
one pre-1976 Life Gold Pass holder took more than 70 return trips at 
Commonwealth expense in 1999-2000 at a cost of$50 944. Spouses of 
Parliamentarians issued with a Life Gold Pass after 1976 are provided 
with up to 25 return trips per year at Commonwealth expense. In 
comparison, spouses of Senators and Members are provided with a 
maximum of nine return trips to Canberra, three interstate trips to attend 
official functions to which they have been invited.143 
Through the statements that have been viewed, one may be able to come to a greater 
understanding of why many constituents are displeased with the remunerative 
arrangements for both current and former Members of Parliament. Earlier in this chapter, 
it was noted that the Remuneration Tribunal called for a more centralised system of 
determining parliamentary remuneration and allowances. Many administrative and 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid. 
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practical discrepancies have been noted by the ANAO report and, in reply, DOF A has put 
several defensive arguments forth. However, if one centralised body were solely in charge 
of the determinations, accountability would be a victim of complacency. 
The richness of information, provided in this chapter, by two departments in disagreement 
with one another, does in actual fact provide a certain level of accountability. Therefore, it 
is thus necessary to now examine how Parliamentary Remuneration works within other 
Westminster based systems of governance around the world, namely Britain. 
Comparing a democratic system with many similarities will provide for a more global 
picture on Parliamentary Remuneration to be gained. Reviewing a jurisdiction such as the 
British remunerative scene will also allow for greater scope in making recommendations 
within this study. Comparing a system such as Britain's will also allow the ideas that have 
been successfully implemented within Britain to be easily transposed to the Australian 
remunerative situation. 
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Chapter Five: 
British Parliamentary Remuneration 
5.1 - Background 
5.2 - British Parliamentary Remuneration (A Brief History) 
5.3 - Parliamentary Salaries 
5.4 - Parliamentary Pension 
5.5 - Allowances for the Members of the House of Commons 
5.1 Background 
Recalling the fact that most Australian States and Territories started receiving 
Parliamentary Remuneration in the late 19th Century, it could be thought that Mother 
Parliament in Britain would have one of the longest formal histories of remunerating its 
Members. However, this is not the case as Members only started receiving a regular 
salary in 1911.144 Nonetheless, there has been a great deal of debate since the Middle 
Ages in Britain as to whether Office Holders should receive any form of recompense 
whatsoever. Many references to the British Parliament's decisions about Parliamentary 
Remuneration have appeared in Western Australian Parliamentary Debates and many 
decisions have been based upon this. 'Mother Parliament' remains the origin from which 
many of Australia's parliamentary, political and electoral practices have been derived 
from. But this was not the case with Parliamentary Remuneration. 
144 Members' Pay, Pensions and Allowances, House of Commons Information Office, London, 2000, Pg. I 
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Similar to the other constituencies that have been covered through this study, British 
Parliamentarians have attracted a great deal of public criticism over 'pay hikes.' This has 
been particularly prevalent recently as both British Houses of Parliament have been 
undergoing a reformation of sitting procedures. One such procedure being the altering of 
sitting times so that Members do not have to sit for too many hours at a time. 
Some people have accused British MPs of raising their salaries and lowering the amount 
of work that they perform. One particular newspaper stated "Take A Break; Become a 
Member of Parliament,"145 insinuating that the recent reforms were a way of making MPs 
jobs an easier way of making money from the public without doing much. 
The British media, as noted, have been particularly relentless in their disapproval of the 
remunerative increments received by British MPs. In many ways, the British story of 
Parliamentary Remuneration is very similar to what has been experienced within 
Australia. The Guardian newspaper has been particularly vehement in their attacks on 
remunerative increments and on Parliamentarians in general. One particular article, which 
appeared in The Guardian on February 26, 2000, accuses British MPs of being 
"freebiemongers" and states that some of them attend useless, and costly, conferences that 
would kill more than Mobutu, Mugabe and Marcos ( did) through sheer boredom.146 
145 http://www.theweekly.org.uk/000008.php 
146 The Guardian, 26 February 2000 
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The Weekly stated on its news website that most MPs get paid for a full-time position, but 
only work part-time hours, stating that the main reason for this is that so many MPs have 
second jobs that they need to tend to. The Weekly backs this claim up with these figures: 
"66% of Conservatives, 28% of Liberal Democrats and 8% of Labour MPs had at least 
one other paid job. Note that at least,"147 from the aforementioned remarks, it could be 
safely concluded that British MPs, like the other representatives covered thus far, face 
much criticism when dealing with the troublesome issue of Parliamentary Remuneration. 
One of the main reasons for this troublesome history is the fact that the general public, 
through the media, do not accept the remunerative amounts simply because there is no 
justification in the amounts received. That is, there is no solid link or comparator to 
which MP Salaries can be tied to so that the public condemnation of remunerative 
increments may be cleared. This, as it shall be seen, has also been a problem within 
Parliament itself. 
In similar fashion to the W estem Australian experience of introducing Parliamentary 
Remuneration for MPs, British MPs experienced a great deal of difficulty in introducing a 
formal method of payment to Members. The British historical experience has transformed 
the structure and appearance of Parliamentary Remuneration and it is necessary that this 
may be covered so that any lessons learned from the British journey may be used in the 
recommendations of this study. Furthermore, the recent review of Parliamentary 
Remuneration by British agencies has been largely affected by sweeping reforms and 
147 Ibid. 
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suggestions about how Parliament should work. The reforming of the Peers in the House 
of Lords, sitting times and even suggestions towards a part-time Upper House has often 
been mentioned within remunerative reports. Therefore, the conclusion of this chapter 
will take into consideration the so-called Modernisation of the House of Commons and 
how it may affect the roles and workloads of MPs, and consequently, Parliamentary 
Remuneration. 
5.2 British Parliamentary Remuneration {A Brief History) 
As already noted, Members of the British Parliament did not receive any formal method 
of remuneration up until 1911. However, the payment of MPs can be tracked back "as far 
as the 13th Century, when the shires and boroughs allowed their representatives certain 
wages for attending Parliament."148 The rates, first introduced in 1322 saw Knights 
receive four shillings per day, whilst citizens received two shillings for the duration of 
Parliament. However, there were variances in the method of payment and it is noted that, 
in 1463, the representatives of Borough of Weymouth paid with five hundred mackerel. 149 
It should be noted that this form of payment was not seen as a formal method of paying 
representatives of certain constituencies, areas or boroughs. Most representatives would 
receive financial aide through a business venture of their own or through the generosity of 
their constituents. Within a representative democratic society, such as Britain, 
representatives are encouraged to be a voice for all the people. Such 'generous' payments 
148 Members' Pay, Pensions and Allowances, House of Commons Information Office, London, 2000, Pg. 1 
149 Ibid. 
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from individuals within society may have been encouragement for Members to sway to 
one particular angle for the benefactors' gain. 
However, by the end of the 17th Century, and for most of the 18th Century, the payment of 
Members by their own electors had ceased. This is evident through a diary entry left by 
Samuel Pepys: 
At dinner ... all concluded that the bane of the Parliament hath 
been the leaving off the old custom of the places allowing 
ways to those that served them in Parliament, by which they 
chose men that understood their business and would attend to 
it, and they could expect and account from, which they now 
cannot.150 
By the 18th and 19th Centuries, Members of Parliament held lucrative positions as many 
were "prepare to pay large sums of money for a seat."151 However, in the 1830's the 
Chartists stated that the payment of members should be a part of the People's Charter. 
Pro-payment Democrats argued that the payment of members was necessary so that all 
willing people could have an opportunity to enter into parliament; not just rich people. 
However, the opponents of payment argued "payment would make politics into a trade or 
business ... politicians would do anything or promise anything in order to keep their 
salary."1s2 
ISO Ibid. 
ISi Ibid. 
152 HIRST J, Australia's Democracy, Allen & Unwin Publishing, Crows Nest, 2002, Pg. 75-76 
107 
Chapter Five: British Parliamentary Remuneration 
Parliament was still seen in a fairly noble light and many opponents of payment did not 
want to see Members being paid for a service that they believed should be an honorary 
position to hold with no reward or recompense whatsoever. However, those who 
proclaimed the payment of Members believed that such an honorary position should be 
open to all who desire and, therefore, those who make it into Parliament should be 
compensated so that they can support themselves. Nonetheless, in the 1830's, Members 
of Parliament were not to be paid for some time. 
In similar circumstances to the difficulties experienced by the Western Australian MPs in 
trying to secure some formal scheme of remuneration, British MPs took several 
unsuccessful votes upon the introduction of remuneration. Motions and Bills were 
"brought before the house in 1870, 1888, 1892, 1893, 1895 and 1903, but MPs remained 
unpaid until 1911."153 
Interestingly, the first Bill passed to provide Members of Parliament with funds to help 
them in their representative service was not seen in the usual way that remuneration has 
been previously seen. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lloyd George, spoke about his 
definition of remuneration: 
153 Ibid. Pg. 2 
When we offer four hundred pounds a year as payment of 
Members of Parliament, it is not a recognition of the 
magnitude of the service; it is not a remuneration, it is not 
recompense, it is not even a salary. It is just an allowance, and 
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I think the minimum allowance, to enable men to come here, 
men who would render incalculable services to the State ... 154 
This statement by Mr Lloyd George is unlike any definition of remuneration that has been 
uncovered so far by this study. "It is not recognition .. .it is not recompense ... it is not even 
a salary" stated Mr George. In actuality, he clearly states that the amount should not even 
be considered as "remuneration." The amount granted to MPs was simply seen as a 
gesture of good will that would allow more willing people to enter into the service of 
Parliamentarian. 
Since 1911, remunerative increments have occurred through various governmental 
mechanisms and have been increased, and reduced in 1931, at irregular intervals. It was 
then in 1963 that the Government decided to appoint an independent tribunal to review 
Parliamentary Remuneration. The committee, entitled the Lawrence Committee, 
presented its findings to Parliament in 1964 and both Houses of Parliament passed all of 
its recommendations.155 The creation of the Lawrence Committee in 1964 may have been 
a result of Members believing that they should no longer be directly in charge of 
determining what pay they should receive for themselves. However, there is no available 
documentation on such a claim. 
By 1970, special legislation that came under the Commission for Industry and Manpower 
Bill allowed for another small committee to be established so that the issue of 
154 Ibid. 
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Parliamentary Remuneration and how such determinations should be made. It was felt 
that there should be a more permanent body established to review the salaries received by 
Members of Parliament rather than simply establishing temporary and ad hoc committees 
such as the previous Lawrence Committee. Consequently, in 1971, the Top Salaries 
Review Body (TSRB) was created to look at remunerative increments for MPs. The 
TSRB was commissioned to monitor MP Remuneration and make seasonal 
determinations. 156 
The TSRB's recommendations were not always acted upon by the British MPs and would 
sometimes only accept half-measured recommendations. This is particularly prevalent 
when in 1975, the TSRB recommended a 4,000 pound increase in Parliamentary Salaries. 
Parliament knocked back the determination and settled for a 1,000 pound increase. 
Similarly in 1979, the TSRB recommended an increase, but the Government would only 
accept it on the condition that it could be gradually implemented over the 3 term of 
Govemment. 157 
It is shall be noted later within this chapter, the TSRB felt that the Government was not 
approving of its determinations because of a fear of voter backlash. The MPs may have 
been entirely worthy of such a pay-increase, however, the TSRB felt that the Government 
would not accept such increases because the public would not accept them. 
155 Ibid. Pg. 2 
156 Ibid. Pg. 3 
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Examples of Governments being worried about implementing recommended 
determinations have been viewed earlier in this thesis. It may appear irrational for 
Government to back down upon recommended determinations by various autonomous 
bodies, however, this fact in itself, may be a method through which Parliamentary 
Salaries are kept in line with the rest of the community's. It is far from a 'formal' or 
'tangible' system, however, and within fairness, the fear of losing votes at the general 
election because of large pay increases may be an informal method that could be utilised. 
The Review Body on Top Salaries continued to determine MP' s remunerative rates until 
1993 when it was revised and reformed into the Senior Salaries Review Body (SSRB). 158 
The SSRB was an all-encompassing body that would determine the remuneration to be 
received by many other groups that serve the British Government. Such people included 
under the umbrella of the SSRB are: MPs, Judicial officers, senior civil servants, senior 
officers of the armed forces and other types of senior public appointments. 
Structurally speaking, the Senior Salaries Review Body is connected to, and a part of, the 
Office of Manpower Economics. Two of the main considerations of the SSRB's 'aims' 
are: 1) The reward of success and; 2) relating reward to performance management.159 
However, there is no particular mention to the rewarding through performance 
management and monitoring of British MPs. 
157 Ibid. 
158 http//www.ome.uk.com/ssr_review.cfin 
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Likewise, there is no mention of the Office of Manpower Economics illustrating how they 
would measure or reward the roles of MPs. Nor does the website say what it would use or 
make mention of the methodological approach to such rewards. However, Chapter Seven 
will investigate the notion of 'the rewarding of success' when it visits performance 
management systems. 
The Office of Manpower Economic upholds that there should be seven guiding principles 
to those who choose to serve in public life. Such principles should be viewed as they may 
come in useful when determining a performance management system. Such a code of 
practice helps contribute towards a job description of an MP that may be measured by 
their duties. This also provides good grounds upon which to start analysing how British 
MP' s fiscal values are determined. Therefore, each of them will be briefly reviewed: 
i) "Selflessness: Holders of public office should take decisions solely in terms of the 
public interest. They should not do so to gain financial or other material benefits for 
themselves, their family or their friends. 
Recalling the sentiments echoed by Edmund Burke, it is the duty of the representative to 
represent the whole nation, not themselves or just their constituency. It could be argued 
based upon this 'selflessness' notion, that Parliamentarians should not be overly 
concerned about how much they are to earn in politics. 
159 http://www.ome.uk.com 
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ii) Integrity: Holders of public office should not place themselves under any financial or 
other obligation to outside individuals or organisations that might seek to influence 
them in the performance of their official duties. 
Once again, the notion of 'selflessness' is recalled through the idea of integrity which 
plainly states that MPs need to perform their duties for the benefit of all, and should under 
no circumstances, place themselves under the direction of outside factors. 
iii) Objectivity: In carrying out public business, including making public appointments, 
awarding contracts, or recommending individuals for awards and benefits, holders of 
public office should make choices on merit. 
The MP is in a position of power that can carry a great deal of responsibility. Such a 
responsibility can be parallel, in some cases, to that of CEO' s in large private firms. Such 
CEO's would receive a handsome salary and pension, yet Members are encouraged, 
through their 'objectivity,' to use their position objectively. 
iv) Accountability: Holders of public office are accountable for their decisions and 
actions to the public and must submit themselves to whatever scrutiny is appropriate 
to their office. 
This point, alongside the notion of 'selflessness' is one of the more pertinent points to the 
subject of Parliamentary Remuneration. Many Parliamentarians may not be inclined to 
divulge their 'actual' income, that they receive from their parliamentary or other jobs. 
Similarly, as it has already been noted through this study, most legislation that relates to 
salaries, and superannuation in particular, is cumbersome and carries several links to 
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other types of legislation that are, at times, inaccessible. This statement by the Office of 
Manpower Economics clearly states that MPs should "submit themselves to whatever 
scrutiny is appropriate to their office." Such an attitude would gain a greater amount of 
transparency within governmental circles. 
v) Openness: Holders of public office should be as open as possible about all the 
decisions and actions that they take. They should give reasons for their decisions and 
restrict information only when the wider public interest clearly demands it. 
Many determinations towards Parliamentary Remuneration have been made within many 
jurisdictions over the past 100 years. When the government knocks remunerative 
determinations back, there has been no reason given as to why such a measure was taken. 
Similarly, although many reports written explain why such determinations have been 
made, few have outlined the methodological approach that has been taken in gaining such 
decisions. 
vi) Honesty: Holders of public office have a duty to declare any private interest relating 
to their public duties and to take steps to resolve any conflicts arising in a way that 
protects the public interest. 
Members of Parliament need to 'honest' in declaring the amounts earned whilst in public 
office. This may ensure that public trust is regained and so that conflicts of interest or 
self-interest may not arise. 
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vii) Leadership: Holders of public office should promote and support these principles by 
leadership and example."160 
Members of Parliament need to ensure that they carry out these Principles of working 
within the public spotlight as many Heads of Department, Civil Servants will look to 
them for leadership. A public faced with a government earning more than they should 
may be compelled, through a lack of leadership, to do the same. 
In 1985, the TSRB employed private consultants to review the nature and amount of 
remuneration received by British MPs. The TSRB stated, when determining an MP' s 
Salary, it is important to take into account the salaries of other jurisdictions. They 
included: Civil Service, Private Sector and Judicial remuneration. 161 
Although there is no mention of an actual recommendation by the Hay Consultants, there 
was a note made on how such reviews needed to be conducted. Such a methodology 
could be useful to this study' s recommendation: 
The main HAY Multi-Company Comparison is conducted 
annually among HAY clients. It is supplemented by quarterly 
updates ... Company evaluations are periodically audited and 
correlated against HAY standards, and a correlation of factors 
applied where necessary to ensure a consistent basis of 
comparison.162 
According to this data obtained from Hay Consultants, it seems apparent that MP's Pay 
and workloads need to be visited and revisited on a regular basis. This will ensure that a 
160 Code of Practice for Members, http://www.ome.uk/downloads 
161 Review Body on Top Salaries Report 22, London, 1985, Pg. 48 
162 Ibid. 
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viable rate of remuneration is being given to MPs. Similarly, the method of comparing 
one position to that of an MP may also be necessary in determining what an MP is worth. 
Finally, Hay Consultants noted the caution with which the government can approach and 
implement remunerative increments. Mainly due to the public condemnation which may 
result, Hay stated that there is often a "temptation for government, faced with a 
recommendation that will result in significant percentage increase to delay or phase"163 
the increase. The fairness of phasing or delaying increments, for both MPs and 
constituents alike, is somewhat questionable as MPs may certainly be entitled to such 
increments. Similarly, the issue of transparency and public knowledge of such events 
should always be open and clear. 
There have been many attempts to change the structure and dynamics of how 
Parliamentary Salaries operate within Britain and, given the background that has been 
covered so far, some of these methods may be questionable. Ad hoc committees have 
been formed, independent bodies have been created to oversee the determination process 
and links have been made with other professions. 
Shortly after the creation of the TSRB, it was moved that Parliamentarians Salaries 
should be linked to the salaries of senior civil servants. The motion, amended by the 
163 Ibid. 
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House, (128 votes to 127) read: "That in the opinion of this House, it is desirable in 
principle that the salaries of Members should be regulated to correspond with a point on 
the scale paid to an Assistant Secretary in the public service."164 The motion was agreed 
upon, but was not put into effect by the Government. 
In 1983, the TSRB determined that MP Salaries should be increased by 31 % to bring 
them into line with community standards. The TSRB also mentioned that determinations 
should be made every two years so that MP Salaries may not lag behind societal 
standards. However this idea was rejected because the issue, according to the Leader of 
the House, was "sensitive in its economic and social consequences."165 It could be 
supposed that the 'social sensitivity' was a fear that voters may backlash against such 
increases. 
The debate on finding a formula to determine MP' s salaries continued for several years 
until 1987 when the Government agreed upon linking the salaries of MPs to a pay scale 
within the public service. It was determined that MPs would receive 89% of national 
maximum point pay scale.166 There is no available documentation as to why the figure of 
89% was determined by the Government. There is no apparent problem in forging such a 
link between MP Remuneration and Civil Service Pay Bands, however, justification as to 
why such links are being formed should be given. 
164 Code of Practice for Members, http://www.ome.uk/downloads 
165 Ibid. 
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By 1998, British MP's Salaries had reached approximately AUS$86,000 and it was 
determined that there would be a mechanism created to augment a set increase on a yearly 
basis. The link between MP Salaries and the senior civil service remained, yet the new 
mechanism allowed for yearly, or perhaps 'quieter,' movements of MP's Pay. The 
following statement from a Research Paper that the House of Commons devised 
stipulates the workings of the new mechanism: 
For each year starting with 1st April, from 1997 onwards, the 
yearly rate shall be increased by the average percentage by 
which the mid-points of the Senior Civil Service pay bands 
having effect from 1st April of that year have increased 
compared with the previous 1st April.167 
There was no reason given as to why the Government changed the formula for 
determining MP Pay from a percentage of the maximum band (being 89%) to increasing 
MP's Pay based upon a yearly movement figure within the Senior Civil Service. 
However, it does seem to make the determination process a little more convoluted than 
before. 
In 2001, the Review Body on Senior Salaries (RBSS) employed the Hay Methodology 
again to assist them in their determinations. The RBSS took into account the following 
considerations: 
166 Ibid. 
161 Research Paper 98, http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp98/rp98-086.pdf 
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i) "We examine the job size relativity of ministerial and paid office holders in 
Parliament against a general sample of public and private sector comparisons. 
ii) We compare ministerial level jobs in base pay terms against both private and public 
sector comparisons. 
iii) We examine both job size relativity and pay data in more detail for jobs and 
equivalents below Minister of State, where there are more public and private sector 
comparisons available. 
iv) We look at the changes in relativity to the external market for Ministers and MPs pay 
since 1996."168 
Although the aforementioned report has spoken of comparisons to the Senior Civil 
Service, it has not specifically mentioned upholding the pay-band link that already 
existed. It seems more apparent that market forces and job comparability and relativity 
were more at stake in this report. 
When comparing an MP's workload or value to a public sector position, the report found 
that a median Westminster MP, or backbencher, would compare with a: Headmaster of a 
large Secondary School, a Battalion Commander or a Director of a District Hospital. 
When comparing the position of an MP to private enterprise, it was found that an MP' s 
job value was "key line role reporting to Board director in major company with direct 
impact on one hundred to two hundred million pounds resource or a Board role in a 
168 Review on parliamentary pay and allowances, Review Body on Senior Salaries, St Clemens House, 
London, 2001, Pg. 2 
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substantial UK enterprise."169 Nevertheless, the report recommended "private sector 
comparisons for these salaries should be treated with the utmost caution."170 
The circumstances of linking and determining Parliamentary Salaries remained the same 
and yet the House of Commons released another report on Parliamentary Pay and 
Allowances one month later. This report included a recapitulation on the salaries received 
by Members of the Parliament in recent times: 171 
Dates Members Pal'.: Since 1994 ($AU172) 
1.1.94 to 31.12.94 62,000 
1.1.95 to 31.12.95 66,000 
1.1.96 to 30.6.95 68,000 
1. 7 .96.to 31.3.96 86,000 
1.4.97 to 31.3.98 87,000 
1.4.98 to 31.3.99 90,000 
1.4.99 to 31.3.00 47,008 
1.4.00 to 31.3.01 96,500 
The table above shows an increase in MP Salaries by over 20,000 pounds in just over ten 
years. Inflation, consumer price index and average weekly earnings aside, there would not 
be many comparable positions that have earned such increases within the general 
workforce. 
169 Ibid. Pg. 4 
170 Ibid. 
111 Parliamentary Pay and Allowances, http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2001/rpO 1-
043 .pdf 
172 Amounts are approximations given the varying Australian dollar-pound relationship 
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By the end of 2001, Members of Parliament's salaries were to rise to approximately 
52,000 pounds in March of 2002. Many of the strategies employed by the House of 
Commons Research Library and by the Review Body on Senior Salaries in finding a 
formula for determining MP's salaries have been seen before within the Australian 
Federal context. The link for determining what an MP gets paid remains the same in 
2004. 
5.4 - Parliamentary Pension 
The Lawrence Committee, mentioned earlier, recommended to Parliament that Members 
should be entitled to a Parliamentary Pension in 1965. "The scheme was unusual in that 
both the benefits and contributions were fixed in money terms."173 By 1970, it was 
determined that the Review Body on Top Salaries, the same body that reviewed 
Parliamentary Salaries and Allowances, should also review the Parliamentary Pension 
Scheme. 
In 1972, it was determined by the Parliamentary and Other Pensions Act 1972, that MPs 
Pensions should accrue at 1160th of an MPs salary for every year of service. This Act was 
amended in 197 6, 1978 and 1981 until 1983 when Parliament determined that the accrual 
rate should be raised to 9% of an MPs salary for each year of service. However, as of 
April 1992, the accrual rate was decreased to 6%. 174 
173 http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary _publications_ and_ archives/factsheets/m05 .cfm 
174 Ibid. 
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A Review of the Parliamentary Pension Scheme in 2001 helped to shed light on the 
healthy situation in which Members' Pensions found themselves to be. The review, 
initiated by the Review Body on Senior Salaries (RBSS) looked at how Parliamentary 
Pensions were functioning and made special comment on whether certain components of 
them were working. 
By 2001, the review was analysing previous work that had been carried out by the Hay 
Consultants, but stated that the review was not overly satisfactory as it did not take into 
account many factors of an MP's workload: " .. .It attached insufficient weight to the 
quality of MP's work, additional unpaid duties, the volume of casework and the 
exceptionally long sitting hours."175 
The Superannuation's accrual rate, which had remained at 1150th of an MP's salary was 
brought into question and some Members requested, due to the dissatisfaction with the 
Hay Report, that this be increased to 1140th of their salary. However the 2001 Review by 
the RBSS stated that few positions in both the private and public sector enjoyed accrual 
rates of 1140th or even I/501h of a salary. The review stated, contrary to some Member's 
beliefs, that 1150th of a Member's salary did actually "compensate for the unusual features 
of an MP's job."176 
175 Review of the Parliamentary Pension Scheme, Review Body on Senior Salaries (Report 47), St.Clements 
House Publishing, Norwich, 200 I 
176 Ibid. 
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It was also noted by some Members that they may have short careers within the House 
and the finding of new employment can be difficult. However the request to analyse the 
financial impact of these factors was not taken into account as the review only looked into 
death whilst serving. 177 
Unlike the political processes found within most other Westminster based governments 
around the world, some Members of the House of Commons enter the House of Lords 
upon retirement. The review was asked to analyse the Members Pension Plan to see 
whether they continue earning their pension whilst serving, with a full salary, in the 
House of Lords. It was consequently determined that Members who retire from the House 
of Commons and return to the House of Lords should receive a full salary, but the 
pension should not be paid until their tenure has been completed in the Upper House of 
Parliament. However, they could continue to accrue a greater pension through their 
continued service. 178 
Similarly, the Review was asked to analyse the situation of a Member of Parliament, over 
the age of 65 who had previously served within Parliament and whether they should be 
receiving their pension from their previous experience. It was determined that Members 
who serve over the age of 65 and with prior experience, shall receive their accrued 
pension along with the full salary of an MP. 179 
177 Ibid. Pg. 2 -If a Member dies whilst serving, the family is entitled to an amount of four times their 
salary. This was enacted to assist with financial difficulties that may be experienced through death. 
178 Ibid. Pg. 4 
179 Ibid. 
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Some Members of the British Parliament have the option of taking out their pension 
before the age of 65. If a Member of Parliament serves for longer than 15 years, they are 
able to claim their pension from the age of 50 without any actuarial reduction. Overall, 
the review found the Pension Plan to be in 'good terms' but also stated that there would 
be no increase in the immediate future as the average person's life expectancy had grown. 
This would have a cumulative effect on the amounts that are being paid to retired MPs. 180 
5.5 - Allowances for Members of the House of Commons 
Office Costs: 
In 1969, Members of the British Parliament were granted 500 pounds per year that could 
be used for secretarial expenses. By 1972, the TSRB raised this amount to 1,000 pounds 
per year. This amount was updated periodically until 1992 when MP voted for large 
increases in the allowance. 181 The media were very hostile towards the determination and 
The Daily Telegraph reported it as "MPs in the trough."182 By 1996, MP's Office 
Allowance had totalled 46,363 pounds per year.183 
As of 5 July 2001, a new system of reimbursing Members of Parliament for expenditure 
incurred through Office Expenses was being phased in. The Senior Salaries Review 
Body, through the division of a new office cost system, had to find a balance between 
180 Ibid. Pg. 10 
181 Members Office Costs- the new system (Research Paper 01/88), House of Commons Library, London, 
2001, Pg. 8 
182 The Daily Telegraph, 16 July 1992 
183 Members Office Costs- the new system (Research Paper 01/88), House of Commons Library, London, 
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flexibility and accountability. The redundant system had a global spending package where 
MPs had greater flexibility in determining what they would spend the money on. The new 
system was to restrict Members flexibility in spending as accountability was at risk. It 
was felt that not everyone was welcome the restriction in flexibility: 
The current (redundant) Office Costs Allowance gives MPs 
freedom to allocate the money across the full range of 
allowable expenditure. For example, some Members may 
choose to buy more equipment rather than employ staff ... this 
flexibility however, is accompanied by serious issues of 
accountability .184 
One of the last recommendations of the SSRB was that MPs should be able to employ a 
certain number of staffers without having to pay for them out of their Office Costs 
Allowance. It was felt by most Members that such staff should be employed by the 
Member and paid by the Government. This resolve was passed without division as all the 
Members agreed that this was essential. 185 
Supplementary London Allowance: 
As the cost of living in London can be expensive, Members of Parliament are given an 
allowance to support them whilst living in London. This is especially for Members of 
seats in London. 186 The supplement ranges from 1,245 to 1,473 pounds p.a.187 
2001, Pg. 23 
184 Ibid. Pg. 8 
185 Ibid. Pg.12 
186 This is not paid to Ministers with an official residence in London 
187 Parliamentary Pay and Allowances: Current Rates (Research Paper 98/86), House of Commons 
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Additional Costs Allowance: 
As there are also Members who live outside of London and may need temporary 
accommodation inside or outside of London, the Additional Costs Allowance helps 
reduce the financial burden related to accommodation. The Additional Costs Allowance 
ranges from 11,268 to 13,322 pounds p.a.188 
Motor Mileage Allowance: 
The Motor Mileage Allowance is only intended to recompense Members for travel 
between Westminster, their homes and their electorates. It varies from engine size to the 
distance traveled, but assists Members with their everyday duties. The reimbursable rate 
ranges from 16.3 pence per mile to 24.2 pence per mile depending on the engine size and 
distance traveled. 189 
Bicycle Allowance: 
The Bicycle Allowance is a relatively new allowance that enables MPs to travel on 
official business by means of a bicycle. This, as the report suggests, was also becoming 
common within private enterprise. The allowance ranges from 6.4 to 6. 7 pence per mile 
depending on the distance traveled. 190 
Library, London, 2001, Pg. 20 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid. Pgs. 21-22 
190 Ibid. Pg. 24 
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Winding Up Allowance: 
To complete or follow up work on behalf of a Member who may have died, retired or 
been defeated carries an allowance that is equal to one-third of the Office Cost 
Allowance, which was covered earlier. This is only in the case of completing business 
which relates to parliamentary or constituent matters. 191 
Reimbursement of Costs due to recall during a recess: 
In some unforeseen circumstances, Members may be requested to return to Parliament for 
sitting. As it may occur during a recess, Members would not normally be covered for such 
expenses. This allowance ensures that MPs do not experience any financial burden 
because of such events. 
'Short Money:' 
Named after the Leader of the Labour Party, Mr. Edward Short, who introduced this 
notion in 1975, Short Money provides opposition parties with financial assistance for 
their parliamentary duties. It normally assists in the payment of administrative or research 
tasks. "The amount of assistance is set by a formula based on a party's votes and seats 
gained at the previous general election."192 As of 2001, the amount of Short Money 
claimable stands at approximately $22,000AUS per seat.193 The total Short Money 
allocated in 2000-2001 was over $10,000,000AU. 
191 Ibid. Pgs. 24-25 
192 Ibid. Pgs. 33-34 
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However, there is also an amount of funds that is allocated towards the amount of votes 
that may have been gained by any parliamentary candidates. For example, if a particular 
candidate gains 10,000 votes towards their election, this amount is multiplied by 21.99 
and is then divided by 200. Therefore, the candidate who gains 10,000 votes will earn 
1099 pounds. As voting is not compulsory in Britain, this may have been instituted as a 
means of rewarding those who have enticed voters to turn up. However, if such formula 
were to be investigated in Australia, it may be possible to use such a system in 
remunerating MPs towards some of their expenses. If such amounts could be accurately 
audited, the extent of such a system could be far reaching in many regards. A similar 
system of rewarding, or compensating, candidates who gain a certain amount of votes in 
elections has been seen within many jurisdictions within Australia, but not within 
Western Australia. This issue will be considered in further detail in the Recommendations 
that this study proposes in Chapter Eight. 
Nonetheless, given the data that has been analysed within this Chapter, it could be 
ascertained that British MPs and agencies alike, have encountered many difficulties in 
finding a justifiable link or formula that could determine Parliamentarians' Remuneration. 
In similar circumstances to the other Westminster-based jurisdictions that have been 
reviewed, the British Parliament has experimented with a variety of options. 
193 The actual formula is: 21.99 ponds multiplied by the number of votes gained, then multiplied by 1/200 
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Many of the options employed by the British Parliament have appeared to be an attempt 
in finding a balance between a reasonable remunerative amount, and an amount that will 
be accepted by the general public. This is evident through the various determinations that 
have been made by independent British bodies, but have subsequently been withdrawn by 
Parliament. 
The British Parliament of late has also been revising many of the procedures and 
functions of Parliament in an attempt to 'mainstream' the role of an MP. Such 
mainstreaming has involved a revision of procedural orders and has also delved into the 
actual sitting hours of Parliament. Some British citizens have seen this modernisation as 
Members of Parliament getting more for doing less. 
The following chapter will focus on the study's final international comparator, namely 
Canada. There have been many progressive steps towards a more transparent 
remunerative system within Canada and several monumental reports which have made 
some insightful comments on Parliamentary Remuneration. As Canada is also based upon 
the Westminster system of governance, it will also allow effective ideas that have come 
from the Canadian experience to be easily transposed to the Australian situation. 
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6.2 - The Canadian Model of Remuneration 
6.3 - Canadian MP Salary & Superannuation (1994 Report) 
6.4 - Canadian MP Allowances & Entitlements 
6.5 - Canadian Remunerative Findings: 
-Canadian Remunerative Comparisons 
-Sobeco Ernst and Young Report Recommendations 
-Future Directions 
As the structures and processes within both Australia and Britain have been analysed, it is 
necessary to focus upon the final international consideration, namely Canada. As it has 
already been noted, it is essential that this study takes into account what is happening 
within other international jurisdictions. Various decisions and detenninations that have 
been made in Canada may be transposable to the Western Australian Parliament. The 
remunerative history of Canadian MPs allows this study to gain further insight into the 
methodologies that work and those structures and processes that do not work. Some of the 
more successfully instituted methodologies employed by the Canadian experience may be 
useful when searching for a methodology to use in Western Australia. 
The main resource used to complete this chapter was a notable and in-depth report that 
was completed by Sobeco Ernst & Young (SEY) on Canadian Parliamentary 
Entitlements: this report is recognised for its fastidious attention to detail, insightful 
comments and recommendations. SEY, labelled by Mr. Nick Discepola, Member for 
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Vaudreuil, as a "reputable Montreal management consulting firm,"194 were hired to review 
all of the facets of Canadian Parliamentary Remuneration. Not only does the report, 
entitled Parliamentary Remuneration, explain how Canadian Parliamentary 
Remuneration works, but also makes some very interesting recommendations about the 
future of remuneration. Although this resource was produced in 1994, it nonetheless 
remains a vital source of information. 
One of the underlying themes in Sobeco Ernst and Young's report stated that: 
"Parliamentarians' compensation programs appear to be a collection of benefits granted 
over the years, without any concern about or vision of total compensation; they also 
appear to have no underlying specific objectives."195 As it will become more apparent, 
Sobeco Ernst and Young illustrated this point through the Members' generous pension 
plan which seems to have no thought-out objectives. 
The issue concerning attracting the 'right sort' of people to stand for Parliament has been 
a topic that has required need for comment. Referring to the aforementioned report ''the 
Canadian Parliament should offer compensation which can attract and retain the high-
calibre people required to provide the kind of legislation and government that Canadians 
need and want."196 The point made by Sobeco Ernst and Young is true, but as it has been 
noted that, under a democratic system, anyone; rich or poor, educated or not, is entitled to 
stand for office and receive the usual benefits. In theory, it may be the salary that attracts 
the right sorts of people to stand for public office, but ultimately, it is the people who 
194 http://www.collection.nlc-bnc.ca/l00/201/301/hansard-e/35-l/224_95-06-22/224GOlE.html 
195 Parliamentary Entitlements 1994, Sobeco Ernst and Young, pg.59 
196 ibid 
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have the power to decide who they want to represent them. Under a democratic system 
there is no prototype for the sort of person that makes it in politics and therefore the right 
sort of salary is not the answer to solving the 'remuneration problem.' 
Nonetheless, Sobeco Ernst and Young made the credible point that "election to 
Parliament should not be an opportunity for anyone to get rich, nor should Members have 
to suffer financially when sitting in the House. In order for this to occur, the 
compensation levels in Parliament must be in line with the salaries paid in Canada."197 It 
could be argued that the salary status of MPs should be looked at as deterring the wrong 
sort of person for the job. That is, the 'get rich' person who would like to benefit from 
'large' salaries granted to MPs. 
What does that mean? Politicians can come to this place with 
the most honourable of intentions but when they see they will 
make a huge pile of money if they can get re-elected, that they 
can get the equivalent of winning the lottery, they become 
distorted in their vision of the country. They become blurred 
with the dollar signs before their eyes ... 198 
Mr Breitkrues, Member for Yorkville, also believed that a large remuneration package 
only provides the ''wrong incentive in the performance of their job."199 More recently, 
former Saskatchewan parliamentarian Allan Morrison said that MPs did not need ''that 
much money" and that he actually felt embarrassed going to bank every month to cash in 
his pay cheque.200 
197 ibid 
198 http://collection.nlc-bnc.ca/100/201/301/hansard-f/35-1/197 _95-05-09/197G02E.hmtl 
199 ibid 
200 http://sask.cbc.ca/regional/servlet/View?filename=saskmpraise 
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As it could be noted from the opening remarks of this chapter, Canadian Parliamentary 
Remuneration also comes under great dissent from the general public, media and the 
MPs. Ted White, an MP who writes columns for the North Shore News, wrote that after 
receiving the increment in salary, he received some letters "that were bordering on 
abusive." These comments provide insight into a topic that appears to generate public 
dissention wherever it is mentioned. 
6.2 - The Canadian Model of Remuneration 
As noted, the most detailed recent review on Parliamentary Remuneration in Canada was 
completed by private consultants from Sobeco Ernst and Young. This report has not been 
publicly published and has only become available to this study through the Salaries and 
Allowances Tribunal's library.201 However, before looking at this report's 
recommendations on the Canadian system, the Canadian remunerative scheme needs to 
be canvassed. 
Within Canada itself, there are independent commissions that are responsible for the 
determination of remunerative amounts for MPs. These commissions are responsible for 
salary and allowance reviews in six Canadian provinces. Modelled much like the Salaries 
and Allowances Tribunal of Western Australia, they make remunerative determinations 
accordingly. The provinces that are not governed by this model are New Brunswick and 
Quebec where "salary is linked to the inflation index and civil service rates 
201 This report came under a privacy act for some time but has since been released. The Canadian 
Government was contacted with regards to the use of this document and permission was granted as the 
report's period of being in a non-publishable state had expired. Nevertheless, the report was not published. 
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respectively."202 It may also be possible that such a methodology could be used within 
Australian jurisdiction. 
Insofar as the timing of remunerative determinations is concerned, the "Government is 
required by the Parliament of Canada Act to appoint a Commission to review the MP 
compensation package within two months after each election."203 The appointed 
Commission then has six months only to report on its recommendations.204 
One interesting point that plagues remunerative proceedings is the fact that some MPs, 
either by principle, disgust, ethics or fear of losing votes, do not always wish to receive 
the recommended adjustment in remuneration. Under Canadian legislation, there is an 
"opt in - opt out" clause which provides for MPs to decide for themselves as to whether 
they wish to be recipients of the increment. However, any MP that declines the increment 
takes what is called in Canadian Parliamentary circles as the 'poison pill.' It is called the 
'poison pill' because any Member that refuses to participate in a remunerative adjustment 
loses the right to any future increase in remuneration, even if they are re-elected many 
times over.205 
When deciding upon a methodological approach in analysing the Canadian MP's 
remunerative status, Sobeco Ernst and Young decided to approach the idea of 
parliamentary remuneration through different means. They remained focussed on the 
202 The Pay, Allowances, Services and Facilities of Legislators in Sub-National Legislatures: A 
Comparative Survey. RUSH M (University of Exeter), October 1998, Pg.IO 
203 http://www.tedwhitemp.com/Colwnns/June20,200 I .html 
204 ibid 
205 ibid 
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original ideal that remuneration is 'compensation' and that MPs receive compensation in 
many ways. Instead of just looking at unrelated figures, Sobeco Ernst and Young decided 
to roll all the benefits received by MPs into one universal 'Compensation Figure.' This 
allowed the inquiry to determine the total remunerative amount that MPs receive so that 
the salary and all of the allowances may be totalled. 
In a work value study one would normally find that ''the value of various benefits are 
compared to the number of hours actually worked and a total compensation hourly rate is 
determined."206 This is not normally done with MPs as they are not like professions 
where work schedules are not able to be accounted for. Unlike what has been visited in 
previous chapters, Sobeco Ernst and Young recommended that: "A comprehensive study 
of Members compensation should, however, take the factor of time worked into account 
since it is an important and distinctive part of a Parliamentarian's work."207 
The study found that when Parliament is sitting, Canadian MPs work approximately 278 
hours per month. This represents "an 11 hour day 6 days a week."208 Taking both sitting 
and non sitting days into consideration, Sobeco Ernst and Young found that Canadian 
MPs work approximately 2870 hours per year. In comparison with that amount was: 
Professional or Executive work schedule - 2360 hours per year and the average Canadian 
work schedule which was 1880 hours per year. 
206 Parliamentary Entitlements 1994, Sobeco Ernst and Young, pg.22 
207 ibid 
208 ibid, pg.23 
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It has not been noted as of yet, however, Canadian Members of the House of Commons 
and Senators receive quite varying amounts of remuneration, which is mainly due to the 
fact that the workloads are quite different. Whilst Parliament is in session, Senators work 
approximately 187 hours per month whereas Members worked 280 hours. When 
Parliament is not in session, figures showed Senators at 123 hours per month with 
Members working 220 hours per month. The House of Commons is also in session a 
great deal more than the Senate.209 Even though the actual amounts of hours worked per 
year would vary, it could be appreciated that the Canadian Member of the House of 
Commons working a 70 hour week whilst Parliament was in session!210 
Member of Parliament, Ted White, sums up the feeling of being an MP under a great deal 
of pressure quite succinctly below: 
As an MP myself, I can certainly testify to the fact that an 
MP's job involves long hours of work. Travelling on Sundays 
and at night is the norm, and 60 to 80 hour weeks are not 
uncommon, but it goes with the territory, and no one is forced 
to become an MP. Yes, theoretically the pay needs to be high 
enough to ensure that competent people stand for election ... 211 
Mr White's comments on accepting the responsibility of being an MP, including the 
workload are quite pertinent to this study. No person is forced to become an MP and the 
position itself, being one of 'servitude,' may lend itself to altruistic tendencies. 
Nonetheless, the facets of the position that are somewhat philanthropic do not entirely 
justify a low standard of remuneration. 
209 ibid, pg.24 
210 ibid, pg23 
211 http://www.tedwhitemp.com/columns/040398.html 
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With a greater understanding of the depth of the issue in Canada, the process and 
structure of Parliamentary Remuneration, it is now necessary to review the effect that this 
has had on the practical salary and entitlements of MPs in Canada. The Sobeco Ernst and 
Young Report of 1994 will take the main focus in explaining both the past and present 
situation of Parliamentary Remuneration within Canada. 
6.3 - Canadian MP Salary and Superannuation (1994 Report) 
The 1994 rate of base salary for a House of Commons, Canadian Member of Parliament 
was $64,400 per annum. However, added onto this remunerative amount was an expense 
allowance of $21,300. This amount is non-taxable and MPs do not have to account for 
how it is spent. One particular observer stated that, in actual fact, since this unaccountable 
allowance is non-taxable, it really has a value of $42,600.212 It was noted on a 
constituents website called Taxpayer.com that the base salary of a Canadian MP alone 
placed them within the top 6.7% of Canadian income earners.213 It should be noted that of 
2004, one Canadian dollar was about equivalent in the currency markets to one Australian 
dollar. 
The salary received by Members in Canada, according to some opinionated letters that 
Sobeco Ernst and Young's report alluded to, noted that the MPs' salaries are not $64,000, 
but $100,000 as there is a non-taxable part of the salary that is not accounted for. Sobeco 
Ernst and Young stated that it is true that MPs receive a non-taxable allowance of 
212 Parliamentary Entitlements I 994, Sobeco Ernst and Young pg. 10 
213 http://www.taxpayer.com/ studies/mpcompensation/salaries.htm 
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$21,300 which is worth nearly double its amount because it is not taxable, but also noted 
that it is soley for parliamentary purposes and does not offer MPs real compensation.214 
MPs who decided to participate in Sobeco Ernst and Young's management interview 
stated that their non-taxable allowance was spent on: housing and lodging, donations and 
miscellaneous contributions, business meals, travelling expenses, social activities, 
garments and other. One would suppose that these things would normally be paid out of 
their own paid pocket from their normal salary. The fact that this additional allowance is a 
non-accountable allowance gives it the appearance of an additional salary.215 
In response to this, Taxpayer.com, stated that the tax-free allowance was 'farcical' and 
that there should be some form of system of documentation to ensure that transparency 
does not suffer. It stated that "nothing clouds transparency and represents unfairness in 
MP compensation more than the tax-free Expense Allowance."216 
Interestingly, one particular recommendation of Sobeco Ernst and Young's study was that 
Parliamentarians needed to provide some sort of proof of expense in order to gain a 
refund for the expense incurred. As within any business, an employee using the 
company's credit card needs to provide the company with some form of documentation to 
show both the nature and cost of the services or goods. So too would the Canadian MP 
have to provide documentation of expenses when claiming funds from a tax-free expense 
allowance. 
214 Parliamentary Entitlements 1994, (Sobeco Ernst and Young, pg.61) 
215 ibid, pg. I I 
216 http://www.taxpayer.com/studies/mpcompensation/salaries.htm 
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Although it is not stated thoroughly, it was contended that Canadian MPs would be able 
to increase their tax-free allowance whilst freezing their salaries so that they would be 
able to have a salary increment without anyone realising. This is because the tax-free 
allowance is not considered an actual salary in its own right. 
One of Sobeco Ernst and Young's major recommendations on the salaries received by 
MPs in Canada was that their earnings should be incremented every year in accordance 
with the figures received from the Average Weekly Earnings in Canada (A WEC). Sobeco 
Ernst and Young stated: "In our opinion (in linking MP pay increments to A WEC) this 
accurately reflects the collective increase in Canadians' wealth.',217 In this case, the public 
of Canada would have no argument against the increases in MP salaries as they too, 
according to the statistics, would also be receiving various rises in their salaries. In other 
words, the public would not be recalcitrant when MPs receive remunerative increments. 
One would have to argue that if Average Weekly Earnings were to decrease, then 
consequently, MP salaries too would have to decrease. One particular concern of note that 
was raised by Sobeco Ernst and Young's report on Parliamentary Remuneration, and 
several people they met with, was ''that Members earn relatively conservative basic 
salaries, but their pension plan is much too generous."218 
Insofar as the Parliamentary Pension Plan in Canada is concerned, Sobeco Ernst and 
Young made several major recommendations that will now be reviewed to see if there is 
anything that could be suggested for the Australian systems. Sobeco Ernst and Young 
217 Parliamentary Entitlements 1994, Sobeco Ernst and Young, pg.100 
218 Parliamentary Entitlements 1994, Sobeco Ernst and Young, pg.58 
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stated what they believed to be the objective of a pension plan: "The goal of a true 
pension plan is to allow a worker to accumulate capital during his or her lifetime. Upon 
retirement, this capital will allow him or her to maintain a lifestyle comparable to the one 
enjoyed prior to retirement."219 
The Honourable Dale Johnson, Member for W etaskiwin, sums up the history, and the 
general feeling towards, the Canadian Parliamentary Retirement Plan when stating during 
Government Orders: "In 1952, the Liberal Government of Louis St. Laurent introduced 
the members retiring allowance."220 On its introduction, Mr Johnson states that the 
original intention of the plan was to be a dollar-for-dollar contribution where any Member 
contributing a dollar would have that dollar matched by the Canadian Government. 
However, he goes onto state: "How in the world did it get so far off track? Today the 
taxpayers contribute the 80% and the MPs contribute 20%."221 
Sobeco Ernst and Young stated that "MPs who serve for 6 or more years receive a 
lifetime pension plan which commences as soon as a member seeks to hold office. "222 
Members of the House of Commons' benefit is equal to 30% of the average sessional 
allowance (as at 1994, the rate was $64,400pa) after 6 years as an MP and increases by 
5% every year until it reaches its maximum of 75% after 15 years. But Senators' benefit 
equal 18% and increases by 3% every year until it reaches it maximum of 75% after 25 
years. An inflationary adjustment is made when the member reaches 60.223 
219 ibid, pg.66 
220 http://collection.nlc-bnc.ca/100/201/301 /hansard-:ti'35-1/197 _95-05-09/197G02E.html 
221 ibid 
222 Parliamentary Entitlements 1994, Sobeco Ernst and Young, pg.17 
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In 1994 Canadian dollars, Members would contribute 11 % of their sessional allowance, 
whilst Senators contributed 7%. If they did not serve the full six years that would entitle 
them to a lifetime pension, they would get a refund of their contributions along with the 
interest that it would have accrued over the time served. Putting this into context, if 
someone leaves office after serving 6 years, they will receive an annual lifetime 
allowance of $19,320. Sobeco Ernst and Young estimated the approximate value of such 
a situation for someone who leaves at 40 being $343,000, someone who leaves at 50 
being $342,000 and someone who leaves at 60 being $302,000.224 
In contrast to this, during Government Orders, the Honourable Jim Abbot, Member for 
Kootenay - East, stated with great dissatisfaction that a pension plan of this size was 
simply wrong: 
All we are asking in very simple tenns is a defined 
contribution on the part of the employer, namely the people of 
Canada, a matching of $1 for $1. Instead of that, the 
government is saying: "Either you come in and share the 
booty, get in on this $3.50 contribution for every $1 that you 
put in and become a millionaire at the expense of the Canadian 
taxpayers or you're out without anything.225 
The following scenario helps illustrate the magnitude of such parliamentary retirement 
plans and extracts a total cost which results from such plans. It also provides furth.er 
insight into the workings and nature of Parliamentary Remuneration within Canadian 
politics: 
224 ibid, pg.18 
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The Member must contribute 11 % of his or her sessional 
allowance during (their) 15 years of service, and the Senator, 7% 
during (their) first 25 years. The accumulated contributions with 
accrued interest are refunded to the Member should (they) leave 
office after a period ofless than six years. 
The value of a Member's retiring allowance may be considerable, 
particularly when (they) leave office at a relatively young age. For 
example, a Member leaving office after six years would be entitled 
to an annual allowance of $19,320, assuming that the sessional 
allowance remains at a constant $64,400. However, because this 
allowance is payable to the Member for life, and may even be 
extended in part to (their) spouse or children, the value is 
approximately $343,300 if (they) leave at age 40 ... $302,000 if 
they leave at age 60. 226 
One Canadian MP made the point that they get such large superannuation payments 
because the size of the contributions they make of their own accord. This, as Sobeco 
Ernst and Young noted, is doubtful and the Member must be in error.227 A 40 year-old 
retiring MP, who contributed 11 % of their sessional allowance of $64,400 p.a. would 
have totalled $7,084 paid into their retirement fund per annum. Over six years this 
amount would only total $42,504. But, as it has been noted, MPs who serve for only six 
years actually receive $343,300 for life, on retirement. This is simply because the 
Government contributes over 44% p.a. into a Canadian MP' s retirement fund as well. 
The report suggested MPs or ex-MPs should not be able to claim their pension until they 
were over the age of 55. This was due to the fact that "a relatively young person leaves 
parliament after the specified 6 years, they will most undoubtedly continue to work whilst 
receiving their immediately effective, lifetime pension plan. But there is no need for a 
226 Parliamentary Entitlements 1994, Sobeco Ernst and Young, pg.18 
227 Parliamentary Entitlements 1994, Sobeco Ernst and Young, pg.19 
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relatively young person to receive it as they are still working and are not retired at all. 
They will be accruing more retirement funds from their new employer."228 
The report suggested that the retirement plan should become effective at the same age as 
everyone else, which in Canada, is the age of 55.229 There are not many professions that 
would start paying you a lifetime pension from the moment you left their employment and 
therefore it is strange to expect MPs to receive a lifetime pension from the time they leave 
parliament. 
The facts reported are the reason why Sobeco Ernst and Young recommended a reduction 
in the value of the pension plan from a salary equivalent of 44% to 12.5%.230 It was also 
recommended that MP' s contribution rate of 11 % be reduced to 5% which is the 
equivalent of most private companies. 231 Although all of these amounts were reductions 
in benefits, Sobeco Ernst and Young did find that MP salaries should be increased by at 
least $24,000 p.a. 
The Honourable Mr. Harper, Member for Calgary West, stated his belief that the report 
compiled by Sobeco Ernst and Young was generous. However, at the crux of his 
argument was not the question as to whether MPs deserved these levels of remuneration, 
rather, he stated that taxpayers should not be asking themselves whether it is hard work, 
"because it is hard work, (instead) they should be asking is this valuable work."232 
228 ibid, pg66 
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During question time, in the Canadian House of Commons in 1995 the debate continued 
and one particular flaw in the Canadian Parliamentary Retirement Plan was discovered 
through the questioning of the Honourable Mr. Martin, Member for Esquimalt-Juan de 
Fuca (Prime Minister of Canada since 12 December 2003): 
• Mr. Martin: "The Income Tax Act says that pensions must be reduced by at least 3% 
per year if collected before age 60. Does this occur in the plan before us?" 
• Some Hon. Members: "No. " 
• Mr. Martin: "Does it occur in the new plan?" 
• Some Hon. Members: ''No." 
• Mr. Martin: "What does this do? It is another MP pension plan that contravenes the 
Income Tax Act and is completely illegal. 233 
Mr. Martin was making particular reference to the Canadian Parliamentary Retirement 
Plan allowance that MPs would be able to claim their fund at age 55; without fear of 
reprisal from the Taxation Department. If a Canadian citizen were to claim their pension 
at an early age, they would be charged a total reduction of 3 per cent for every year prior 
to the age of 60. A 50 year old Canadian retiring would have a total reduction of 30 per 
cent. Mr. Martin's statement was outlining the fact that the law which applied to 
Canadian taxpayers did not apply to MPs. 
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6.4 - Other MP Allowances & Entitlements 
As with most MPs around the world, Canadian MPs have been privy to many allowances 
and entitlements. The non-taxable allowance has not been included within this section as 
it was considered to be more salary than entitlement. The main allowance that a Canadian 
MP earns is the Expense Allowance that helps them to cater for the everyday living and 
functioning expenses. The amount granted mainly depended upon the level of authority 
one held within Parliament itself. 
Another allowance that MPs are entitled to is the Accommodation Allowance which 
would assist MPs when travel to or away from home. It was found that there were many 
discrepancies in the spending for the Accommodation Allowance and that a certain 
amount should be taken from the Expense Allowance and put into the Accommodation 
Allowance's fund. 
Canadian MPs are entitled to 64 return air trips in Canada per year. Six of these trips can 
be given to their family members for any reason. Sobeco Ernst and Young saw this 
benefit as potential compensation and consequently stated that it needs to be added to the 
Total Compensation of an MP. Once this benefit was converted, it was estimated that the 
six trips per year could add a possible $12,000 p.a. to the MPs total remuneration. 
Canadian MPs also received free services up until 1994 such as: barber, beauty salon, 
steam room, shoeshine, massage, gymnasium, restaurant, cafeteria and picture framing. 
233 ibid 
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However, such benefits have now ceased and Canadian MPs must pay for their own 
services. 
At the end of the financial year the Parliament of Canada Act requires the Speaker of the 
House of Commons to table a financial report of each individual Member of the House of 
Commons. This is a public report which basically sets out all of the expenses of each and 
every Member of the House of Commons. In this fashion, MP's expenses and allowances 
are open for all to see and transparency is not a contentious issue whatsoever. Thus 
allowing for greater accountability. 
6.5 - Canadian Remunerative Findings 
Sobeco Ernst and Young's study went on to make comparisons between international 
governments, provincial governments, the Canadian public service and private enterprise. 
This study will now view some of the tables that were produced by the Sobeco Ernst and 
Young report so that a clearer, global, picture may be gained. 
Table I.I Salary Received By Member/34 
Country and Type of Member 
Canadian Member - Lower House 
Australian Member - Lower House 
UK Member - Lower House 
Belgium Member-Lower House 
Amount (in Canadian$ at 1994 rates) 
$97,244 
234 Parliamentary Entitlements 1994, Sobeco Ernst and Young pg.35 
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As it can be noted, both Australian and Canadian Federal Parliamentarians receive similar 
remunerative rates. Belgium and the United Kingdom being the lowest paid in this 
comparison by far. However, it should be recalled that the remunerative amount received 
by Canadian MPs was a 'total compensation' figure. However, this 'total' amount did not 
take into consideration, the tax-free component of an MP's salary. 
Not only did Sobeco Ernst and Young look into the international factors at play, but they 
also took into account the various professions within Canada so that some tangible 
comparisons may be made. It was determined by Sobeco Ernst and Young that MPs have 
the equivalent responsibility of an entry level Senior Executive position within the 
Canadian Public Service; someone who earns approximately $84,000pa.235 The major 
difference that can be noted within Table 1.4 below is the pension plan that MPs receive. 
There is a 32% difference in pension plans received by MPs and Senior Executive public 
servants. 
Table 1.4 Public Sector & MP Compensation Comparisons236 
Salary Insurance Pension Plan Total 
Compensation 
Commons Public Commons Public Commons Public Commons Public 
Sector Sector Sector Sector 
$64,400 $84,000 6.9% 6.1% 44.1% 11.4% $97,244 $98,700 
Although the pension plan of a Member of the Commons is over 32% greater than that of 
a public sector mid-levelled executive, the Total Compensation figure is quite similar. 
However, the longer the MP were to remain in parliament, the greater the Total 
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Compensation would become and one would notice the increase within the MP's 
retirement fund. It is also noteworthy of viewing the Basic Salary for a Member of the 
Commons as Sobeco Ernst and Young did not take into account, at this stage, the tax-free 
expense allowance received by Canadian MPs. This figure would have increased the 
'Salary' to approximately $86,000. Thus affecting the 'total compensation' figure and 
augmenting it to a total of$1 l 7,244. 
One of the greatest bones of contention surrounding Parliamentary Remuneration is the 
retirement plan that MPs are entitled to receive once leaving parliament. Sobeco Ernst 
and Young found that the Canadian Retirement plan was not in fact the most generous out 
of its comparable sample. 
Table 1.2 Percentage of Sessional Allowance in Retirement Plan237 
Countrv and Member Type Rate 
Canadian Member - Lower House 44.1% 
Australian Member - Lower House 53.4% 
UK Member - Lower House 17.3% 
Belgium Member - Lower House 54.3% 
The figures noted above show the percentage of the Sessional Allowance that is 
contributed into an MP's retirement fund. Although the figures show an interesting array 
of payment plans, Sobeco Ernst and Young went on to later compare Canadian MPs with 
the Canadian Private Sector. The above table does not explicitly outline the actual amount 
received by Canadian MPs as the total value of their Retirement Fund is actually 55.1 % 
235 Parliamentary Entitlements 1994, Sobeco Ernst and Young, pg.49 
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since members contribute 11 % of their allowances. The above table only illustrates the 
cost to the Government.238 
Sobeco Ernst and Young found that the "magnitude of this allowance become more 
apparent when it is compared it with the sessional allowances received and the 
contributions made during the 6 years as the contributions only represent 12% of the total 
retiring allowance.239 The study doubted that the high benefits of the plan were not based 
upon high contribution levels and made reference to CEO's who contribute around 35%. 
Sobeco Ernst and Young also noted international comparisons on the Canadian MP' s 
Travel Allowance. When viewing the amounts in Table 1.3, it should be noted that the 
$21,000 Travel Allowance received by Canadian MPs is the same tax-free expense 
allowance. The allowance that has to help the average Canadian MP cover their day-to-
day expenses. 
Table 1.3 Travel Allowance240 
Country and Type of Member 
Canada Member - Lower House 
Canada Member- Senate 
Australian Member - Both Houses 
UK - Both Houses 
238 ibid, pg.19 
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Sobeco Ernst and Young Recommendations: 
Gained from the aforementioned comparisons, Sobeco Ernst and Young made some stark 
recommendations regarding what the future should hold for Canadian Parliamentary 
Remuneration. In Canada, as noted, parliamentarians receive a base salary, but some MPs 
receive additional funds for additional responsibilities. Further to this, MPs receive an 
additional allowance to assist them with housing, lodging, meals, travelling, social and 
other expenses. These expenses vary according to the individual's circumstances, but it 
was found that almost half of MPs used this additional fund for secondary housing 
expenses.241 It was found that "33% of members spend 25% more than the allowance"242 
was intended to be. The idea of Remuneration being compensation for MPs has been lost 
in this situation as this fact is illustrating one of two possible scenarios. Firstly, Canadian 
MPs are not being remunerated accordingly and cannot function within the funding 
constraints or secondly, that they are living and working beyond their reasonable means. 
The Honourable Mr Paul Szabo, Member for Missisauga South, stated with reasonable 
concern, that the various allowances, some of which have been covered earlier, should be 
able to individually cater for the individual MP's needs: "The independent study 
conducted by Sobeco Ernst and Young ... did recommend a redistribution of the various 
elements of (the) package."243 
239 ibid, pg.18 
240 ibid, pg. 38 
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Insofar as the future indexing or increasing of parliamentary salaries are concerned, 
Sobeco Ernst and Young noted: "It has been suggested that when parliamentarians are 
reviewing their own awards, they cannot be objective, therefore a few suggestions were 
made." Sobeco Ernst and Young made three suggestions that could be considered: 
i) A group representing all Canadians could determine from time to time what sort 
of increases MPs should receive. 
ii) A group of 'wise' people and compensation specialists could determine the matter 
or; 
iii) The comm1ss1on that reviews parliamentary salaries could be given greater 
independence. 244 
Looking at each option briefly, it could be said, without too much equivocation that the 
first option of a group representing all Canadians would be rather difficult to establish, 
run and review. Firstly, it would be hard to choose the sorts of people who would be on 
such committees, where they should come from and what their political leanings could 
be. Secondly, it would be hard to imagine that all of the people selected would have an 
insightful view on parliamentary remuneration, its history, its implications and its overall 
workings. Thirdly, with the first two points in mind, could you trust the final product or 
decision of the group? 
The second suggestion was that a group of 'wise' people or compensation specialists 
could determine future pay levels. However, this is as problematic as the first suggestion 
since it would be difficult to decide who would be 'wise' enough to carry out such a task. 
244 Parliamentary Entitlements 1994, Sobeco Ernst and Young, pg.99 
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Secondly, it could be asked if these 'wise' people would always be objective in their 
determinations. Nonetheless, people who are independent compensation specialists could 
probably perform the task quite well, as has been shown, have already seen examples of 
this in Canberra in 1988 and in Perth in 1990 with the Cullen/Egan and Dell study. 
One of the most legitimate of all the suggestions of the Sobeco Ernst and Young Report, 
is the recommendation that the Commission to Review Salaries and Allowances of MPs 
be given greater independence. As stated "it is possible that this Commission could be 
adjusted in such a way as to better satisfy and implement the goals of greater 
independence and representation of the Canadian people."245 
Sobeco Ernst and Young always provided that transparency needed to exist within any 
remunerative structure or process so that the public is fully informed. Transparency, 
within government circles, relates to the 'understandability' of the systems, structures and 
functions of Government. Jonathon Swift stated that the "management of public affairs" 
should not only be comprehendible to those of "sublime genius." In relation to 
Parliamentary Remuneration, a transparent Parliamentary Salaries structure would mean 
the way in which salaries and allowances are determined is clear and accessible to the 
every day person. This issue relates strongly to accountability as, under a transparent 
system, records and figures must be accessible to the public. Similarly, the structures and 
processes under which such determinations take place must also be transparent and open 
to the public to view and review. 
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The Sobeco Ernst and Young report did briefly look into the issue of a performance 
management system within the Canadian Parliament. However, they did not have enough 
resources to look into the issue of performance in determining parliamentary salaries. 
They did not conclude that it was impossible but encouraged further studies into the 
advantages and disadvantages of such a scenario. 
Future Directions: 
As it would have been noted over the previous chapters, Parliamentary Remuneration is a 
rather slow moving component of the Parliamentary Process. This occurs for the many 
reasons which have been discussed thus far. Since the major report on Parliamentary 
Entitlements in 1994 by Sobeco Ernst and Young, Canadian Parliamentary Remuneration 
has not changed a great deal. However, there have been some interesting developments 
that will need to be covered before closing this chapter's study of the Canadian scene. 
The most influential developments within Canadian Politics have been with regards to the 
actual salary that Canadian MP's earn. By 2000, Canadian MP salaries had reached 
over AUS$109,000 p.a. However, in June 2001, Canadian MP salaries reached 
AUS$131,400 p.a. This was in return the abolition of the tax-free allowance of just over 
$20,000 p.a. 246 
It could be argued, given the fact that the allowance was practically worth double as it 
was tax-free, that MPs did not get what they deserved. In actual fact, if the tax-free 
245 ibid, pg. 100 
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component were worth double, the increment should have reached to over $150,000. 
Nonetheless, as of April 2003, MP Salaries were further incremented to $139,200 p.a.247 
Insofar as the Sobeco Ernst and Young's reports research on trying to find a link for 
future increments in Canadian MP Salaries, it was decided in June 2001 that MP Salaries 
should be tied to Supreme Court Judges Salaries. However, it still remains at the 
discretion of MPs to determine what Supreme Court Judges' salaries will be.248 
A study commissioned to review the roles of Canadian MPs found that MP's roles had 
changed greatly over the last 20 years and this was mainly due to certain trends and 
developments. The study, entitled: The Roles of the Member of Parliament in Canada: 
Are they Changing? found that the traditional, or 'classical,' roles of an MP remained, but 
activity had increased through: The emergence of political parties, social pluralism and 
the modem interventionist state.249 It could be supposed that such a study gave more 
credence to MP' s remunerative increases. 
In conclusion, the Canadian remunerative experience has not been foreign to what has 
been experienced within other Westminster based jurisdictions. The Canadian 
Government has attempted to use many varying forms of determination when deciding 
what MPs should be paid, and yet, there still appears to be a great deal of public 
controversy surrounding the issue today. One only has to visit various Canadian Web-
247 Indemnities, Salaries and Allowances, Members of the House of Commons (1867-2003) 
(http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/about/process/info/Salary .asp) 
248 http://www.tedwhitemp.com/Columns/June20,2000.html 
249 http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0204-e.htm 
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News providers to see the public vitriol over MP Remuneration and how rarely it is 
acceptable to have MPs increasing their packages. 
There have been links with other professions made, comparisons to other countries, work-
value consultants hired and special committees formed to air their thoughts on the issue. 
These attempts have been made with varying degrees of success, yet it still remains 
prevalent, that in Canada too, there is still a need for a clear and transparent system of 
determination that will be accepted wholly by the community at large. 
Before concluding the global review and making any recommendations based upon what 
has been gained from reviewing the overall Westminster approach in dealing with 
Parliamentary Remuneration, this thesis noted that it would take into consideration some 
of the methods that have been adopted by various public and private companies in 
remunerating their employees according to performance benchmarks. The various 
philosophies behind such systems and the practical workings of performance management 
systems in private and public organizations will now be taken into consideration. 
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Chapter Seven: 
Performance Management Systems 
& The Roles of Members of Parliament 
7.1 - Performance Management 
7.2 - Private Sector Performance Management 
7.3-Public Sector Performance Management 
7.4 - Major Roles of Members of Parliament: 
-Measurable Roles of Members of Parliament? 
7.5 - Conclusions on Performance Management 
7.1: Performance Management: 
Meaning: 
The use of the performance management as a mechanism for determining the salary of 
an employee has been used for many years within the private sector. Recently, 
however, various benchmarking and performance management systems have been 
introduced into the public sector workforce as well. It has been a systematic method 
of measuring the performance, or lack thereof, of various employees at all hierarchical 
levels of an organisation. As it was noted earlier in this study, it is the intention of this 
study to find a formula for determining the salaries of Members of Parliament and to 
investigate the plausibility of implementing a performance management system into 
the daily duties of an MP. 
Performance management systems are used for many various reasons, some of which 
are utilised to pay bonuses to employees, others in order to find a gauge of value of 
the work the employee is carrying out. The implementation of a useful and efficient 
performance management system is a long, and often, difficult process which requires 
the co-operation of both the employee and the employer. 
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In this light, it could be argued that the employer of the employee, being the MP, is 
the general public as they ultimately decide upon the MP's continuance or not. 
However, a body is usually established to make regular reviews of the system and to 
make sure that the benchmarks are being met. In the case of the Western Australian 
MP, a body, namely the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal, already exists to perform 
such duties. 
It has already been noted that placing a performance management system into an 
MP's Remuneration package has been considered impossible as the measurement of 
an MP's workload has been considered a very difficult duty to perform. However, 
Cullen-Eagan-Dell managed to hierarchically place Western Australian Members on a 
scale in conjunction with Federal Members in a study that was completed in 1999. 
The scale, noted overleaf, attributes a certain amount of points to each Member 
according their responsibilities and workloads. 250 
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Bands Illustrating Members' Responsibility 
Band 1 (650-799 points) 
Parliarnentarv Member 
Band 2 (800-949 points) 
Whip 
Chairman of Committees 
Band 3 (950-1149 points) 
Leaders of Non-Government Party 
Parliamentary Secretary of Cabinet 
Deputy Leader of the Opposition (Assembly) 
Minister (Minor) 
Band 4 (1150-1399 points) 
Leader of the Opposition (Council) 
President of the Council 
Speaker of the Assembly 
Band 5 (1400-1699 points) 
Leader of the Opposition 
Minister (Medium) 
Leader of the Government (Council) 
Band 6 (1700-2099 points) 
Deputy Premier 
Minister (Mai or) 
Band 7 (2100-2599 points) 
Band 8 (2600-3199) 
Premier 
From this evidence, it could be gathered that there might be certain ways of measuring 
certain components of an MP's workload. This 'responsibility-level study was also 
carried out in Federal Parliament. It is unfortunate that the methodology used in 
distributing and creating such a point-based system was not made public along with 
the report as it gives evidence that, to some extent, it is possible to gauge the varying 
levels of responsibility within Parliament. 
25° CULLEN, EAGAN & DELL, A Report on the Remuneration Arrangements for Members and Office 
Holders of the Western Australian Parliament, Government Printer, Perth, December 1999 
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Paying bonuses, being the main concern of a performance management system, is at 
the crux of the 'performance management philosophy.' Incentive needs to be driven 
not only through fiscal means, but rather, through varying devices that will allow the 
employee to develop an intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, desire to perform well. 
Extrinsic systems of performance management, that reward with fiscal payments, may 
appear to work well, however, the central concern of an effective system remains in 
the fact that employees should receive feedback and future guidance on how to 
improve on their performance in the future. 
The recurrence of public vitriol over MP Remuneration has been well-noted 
throughout this study, and according to the plethora of commentary by the media on 
the issue, the idea of implementing yet another salary-based bonus scheme may not be 
the method that this study is seeking. However, an envisaged performance 
management system that guides an MP' s future expenditure and also provides 
assistance through consultation may be what is ultimately determined by this study. 
Therefore, it may not be the incentive of this study to determine a system that sets an 
actual 'dollar amount' to be paid to well performing MPs. Moreover, it may be in 
finding a method of guiding MPs into secure, accountable practices that will allow 
MPs to get the most out of their budgets. In 1994, the Western Australian Auditor-
General's report stated that proper, accountable practices were the utmost reason for 
the implementation of performance management systems: "Reporting of performance 
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indicators by management has become a fundamental part of a new approach to 
accountability."251 
The Auditor-General raises a serious point that needs to be analysed as it could have 
serious implications upon the image of the general MP. Performance management 
systems, being the "fundamental and new approach to accountability" are not 
currently utilised within parliamentary circles. If this is the case, it could be argued 
that the proper, accountable practices, insofar as expenditure is concerned, are not 
being followed by MPs. Recalling Chapter Four's findings by the Australian National 
Audit Office, many discrepancies were found within MP's travel and office 
entitlements. Although the Department of Treasury and Finance wrote the findings 
off, it is important to realise that many MPs may exceed spending unintentionally; the 
fact remains that they still need to be held accountable. 
The Department of Finance Administration (DoF A), that negated the 27 remunerative 
recommendations made by the Australian National Audit Office, also stated that 
measuring the performance of an employee can be a very valuable exercise. It stated 
that employees needed "audits, reviews or evaluations on a regular basis."252 
Furthermore, DoF A argued that systems such as performance management systems 
are best used when they show trends over a period of time. 253 This statement may 
suggest that it could be possible to establish such a performance management system. 
However, even though such a system may be incapable of producing high quality 
251 http://www.audit.gov.au/reports/report94_ 07 .html 
252 http//:www.dofa.gov.au 
253 ibid 
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remunerative recommendations, it could nonetheless, over a given period of time, 
illustrate various trends throughout individual MP expenditure. 
This chapter continues to focus upon the various types of performance management 
systems that are currently utilised by both private and public sector agencies. 
However, the dichotomy may not be whether such a system should, or even could, 
exist, rather it could suggest whether such a system would be used to analyse trends in 
expenditure or whether it would actually remunerate MPs accordingly. 
Given the generic overview and description of performance management systems and 
their advantages and disadvantages, it is now necessary to focus upon the varying 
types of methodologies that are used both within the private and public sector. In this 
fashion, the study may be able to create a hybrid system that will be easily transposed 
into the Western Australian MP's remunerative package. 
7.2: Private Sector Performance Management 
A large number of companies have evolved out of the advent of performance 
management systems, and many such companies provide consultative evaluations on 
employees and the conditions under which such systems can work. However, within 
the private sector, performance management systems are mainly used to provide 
incentive for further sales and profits. For example, a company that exceeds its 
average share price through the efforts of a particular individual or group of 
employees may endow a bonus upon them for the efforts undertaken. 
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In the private sector, many employees are given benchmarks and goals to attain that 
will allow them to claim upon set bonuses. Although this is not the case within the 
MP' s brief, it is necessary to review how performance management systems work 
within the private sector as some valuable lessons may be learned. 
Hay Group, the largest Management Consultancy Group in the world, provides much 
literature on the implementation, maintenance and review of performance 
management systems within the private sector. This, being the same company who 
performed the work-value studies for both Western Australian and Federal MPs alike, 
will form the main analyses of this section. 
Hay Group consulting has many resources at its disposal that aids many of their 
studies into corporate and private management, performance management systems 
and how to make profits. Although, as it has been noted, much of the literature 
contained within such literature points at better ways of making profits, some of the 
methodological approaches may be useful in determining a methodology for 
remunerating Members of Parliament. Therefore, it is necessary to contrast the Hay 
Group methodology, or overall philosophy, against the method in which Members of 
Parliament are remunerated. 
Hay Group's overall understanding of Remuneration in its purest form is described as 
a way of allowing the employee to uphold a secure lifestyle that will be able to 
support them. In particular, Hay Group state, in Fair Pay for a Fair Day's Work: "the 
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employer (should be) willing to provide enough base salary to satisfy the standard of 
living for the job performed."254 
The aforementioned statement provides light upon the grounds that employees need to 
be able to survive upon their 'base' salary alone. That is, without the added incentive 
of fiscally incremented bonus that is dependent upon performance. Upon this, it is 
therefore concluded that MPs should receive a 'base' salary that sets an amount apart 
from a bonus, or additionally funded, amount. 
Such bonuses, Hay Group states, can be based upon the part that has been played by 
an employee in creating positive market trends for the company. This is an example 
that Hay use when discussing the validity in finding a 'metric,' that is, something that 
can act as a benchmark or as a tool of measurement. Setting such metrics should allow 
the organisation to track the individual's progress and should be "challenging, but 
fair."255 
Hay Group admits that most performance management systems function additionally 
well within the private sector where profit margins become the actual metric. Business 
Plans compliment the developmental acquisition of goals and benchmarks and allow 
for employees to set targets towards tangible and realistic goals. However, Hay states 
that such plans can be developed through two major means: I) Budget Based: whereby 
the actual rewards received by employees are factored into the forecasted budget at 
254 http://wwwhaygroup.com/mediafiles/downloads/ps _ incentives _portfolio.pdf 
255 ibid 
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the beginning of the financial year; or II) Surplus Based: whereby rewards are funded 
as a result of a surplus being gained through super-productivity.256 
However, this scenario seems somewhat unrealistic given the fact that it is the MPs 
themselves who determine the budget To state that they would be rewarded from a 
budget, determined of their own accord, would simply land MPs into a similar 
position into which they have found themselves today. Likewise, for MPs to gain a 
bonus through the development of a surplus could also create further tension as it may 
be felt that MPs were not spending enough on the general community and were trying 
to save an amount for their own pockets. 
Nonetheless, Hay Group state that different metrics can be used in measuring the 
performance of an employee. As it has been noted, financial metrics can be used, that 
review and measure items such as revenue, costs, profits and various other margins. 
· This, as it has been noted may not be the soundest way of remunerating an MP. 
However, there are non-financial means of remunerating MPs as well, namely through 
measurable devices such as customer satisfaction, output, delivery and quality 
service. 257 
In determining how many companies were allotting performance-related bonuses to 
their employees, Hay Group decided to perform a survey of 75 United States 
companies. The table overleaf, illustrates the findings of the survey: 
256 ibid 
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Increases 2001 
Monetary increase to hi2hest performers 6.07% 
Average increase to performers 4.10% 
The 'highest performers,' on average, were seen to receive an average bonus of 
approximately 6.07%. Performers 'in general,' were seen to receive an average bonus 
of approximately 4.10%.258 Given a Western Australian Member of Parliament's base 
salary, enacting a similar equation would see them in receipt of approximately $4,000 
to $6,000 dollars as a bonus. How such a system would be devised still remains 
questionable. 
7.3: Public Sector Performance Management 
The private sector methodology of remunerating employees according to their 
performance does have merit. However, its merit within a parliamentary remunerative 
setting needs a great deal more justification as, from what has been viewed, elements 
impinging on a Member's 'performance rating,' such as profits gained, margins made 
and costs cut do not necessarily reflect an MPs daily job description. Therefore, it is 
necessary to review some of the public sector models of performance management 
benchmarking that are being used, both here in Australia and, on an international 
level. 
It has been through the historical progression of the 1980' s that the Australian Public 
Service slowly embraced, and began the implementation, of various performance 
257 Ibid. 
258 http://www.haygroup.com/mediafiles/downloads/Performance _ Management_ WP_ Booklet.pdf 
165 
Chapter Seven: Performance Management Systems 
management systems. Such systems, as noted by the Australian Public Service 
Commission, were adapted from the private sector.259 The simple fact that such, the 
now well-established, performance management systems within the public sector 
were once based upon profit and margin, is evidence that such systems may even be 
transposable to the parliamentary sphere. 
The Productivity Commission, whose responsibility it is to oversee the 
implementation of such systems within the Australian Government Civil Service, 
stated that performance measurement systems can: I) Enhance measurement 
approaches and techniques in relation to aspects of performance such as unit cost and 
service quality. II) Can help identify where there is scope for improvement. III) Can 
promote greater transparency.260 
The identification of where there may be scope for improvement, along with the 
promotion of greater transparency, would be two outcomes of a performance 
management system that would benefit the outcomes of this study. Similarly, 
enhancing the measurement of providing quality service, rather than rewarding quality 
service, may also be of use in determining a formula of remuneration. 
The Australian Public Service Commission (APSC) states that performance 
management systems should be 'rewarding' performance and not reprimanding a lack 
259 http://www.apse.gov .au/publicationsO 1 /performancemanagement3 .htm 
260 Review on Government Service Provision - http://www.pc.gov.au 
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thereof. 261 When attempting to implement such a performance-based system into a 
new workplace, there are two guiding principles that should be followed: 
I) Alignment: Basing the performance management system on a "detailed 
understanding of the outcomes sought by Government." II) Credibility: "Winning the 
support of staff through transparency, fairness and simplicity.262 
From this statement, information needs to be gathered on what particular outcomes 
are set by Parliament, the MP and perhaps the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal. 
There should exist a negotiation process through which an MP may be able to come to 
a reasonable plan, in conjunction with the organisation's greater outcomes, that will 
be clear and simple. Some type of body would need to oversee the development of 
such a plan. 
The APSC also developed three steps, in conjunction with many governmental and 
private organisations,263 that need to be taken into account when implementing and 
maintaining a performance management system. These three steps, which will be 
revisited further in the study, are as follows: I) Identify work goals and expectations 
associated with performance. II) Identify the steps necessary to achieve Step 1 whilst 
261 http://www.apsc.gov.au/publicationsO l/performancemanagement3 .htm 
262 http://www.apsc.gov.au/publicationsO l/performancemanagement4.htm 
263 Organisations involved in the study included: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
Australia, Department of the Attorney-General, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, 
Treasury, Department of Transport and Regional Services, Department of Health and Aged Care, 
Public Service Merit Protection Commission, Department of Finance Administration, Department of 
Defence, Australian Customs Services, Australian Taxation Office, Centre/ink, Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Intellectual Property 
Australia, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Productivity Commission, National Gallery of Australia, 
Australian National Audit Office, Screensound Australia, CS/RO, Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation, Australia Post, Australian Sports Drug Agency, A USTRADE, Health Insurance 
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listing the core skills involved to complete this task. Compile a list statement of 
knowledge and ability relevant to the particular work area. III) Develop an Individual 
Development Plan by identifying the skills strengths and gaps from Step 2. 
In a final note, the APSC stated that the reward of the individual is not the only 
method of performance that can be used as a team or group of individuals can be 
rewarded for a combined effort and outcome. However, in a study conducted by the 
APSC, many stated that they did not personally believe that "performance 
management systems encouraged people to work harder. "264 
Looking at international examples of performance management systems, a British 
government agency265 categorises such systems into seven areas:266 
Strategic Benchmarking 
Strategic Benchmarking is used where organisations seek to improve their overall 
performance by examining the long-term strategies and general approaches that have 
enabled high-performers to suceed. 
Performance (or Competitive) Benchmarking 
This system is used where organisations consider their positions in relation to 
performance characteristics. In other words, two people with similar positions 
compete against each other for better targets. 
Commission, Ford Motor Company, Austrlian Stock Exchange, SAS Institute, Qantas, Lend Lease and 
Cable and Wireless Optus. 
264 http://www.apse.gov .au/publicationsO 1 /performancemanagement6 .htm 
265 http://www.benchmarking.gov.uk 
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Process Bechmarking 
When trying to improve on one particular area of an organisation, people from similar 
organisational backgrounds are requested to be used as a comparator so that various 
figures may be analysed. 
Functional Benchmarking 
This process is somewhat similar to Competitive Benchmarking, however, the 
individuals who compete are from different organisations. 
Internal Benchmarking 
This system of benchmarking involves seeking partners from inside the same 
organisation. Consequently allowing the varying levels of responsibility to be 
identified. 
External Benchmarking 
This process involves seeking outside organisations that are known to be the 'best in 
their class' so that valuable lessons may be learned from them. 
International Benchmarking 
The International Benchmarking System simply requires the use of similar systems 
within other jurisdictions. As this type of methodology has been used within this 
266 http://www.benchmarking.gov.uk/about_bench/whyuseit.asp 
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study, it would be of use to review the hierarchical model of implementation and 
maintenance: 
Collect and analyse your 
own data 
Seek / find partners 
Study and come to an understanding of 
vour own orocesses 
Hold preliminary meetings - begin 
to develoo oerformance indicators 
Partners exchange data 
Data analysed and compared 
Improvements identified 
Improvement plan prepared and agreed 
Improvements implemented 
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Out of the seven various types of performance management systems that can be 
introduced into varying types of organisation, the above chart only outlines possible 
steps that can be taken given possible circumstances. Though it may not be possible to 
implement the entirety of the International Benchmarking System into place with the 
Western Australian Parliament, it may be possible to devise a hybrid system that is the 
result of a culmination of several of the systems that have been mentioned. Therefore, 
it is necessary to briefly review the major roles of Members of Parliament so that 
some deductions on the possibility of implementing such a hybrid performance 
management system may be determined. 
7.4: The Member of Parliament's Roles 
As was noted within the Introductory Chapter of this study, the usual roles of 
Members of Parliament fall into three main categories: Parliamentary Duties, 
Electoral Duties and Party Duties. To an extent that will soon be realised, some of the 
Parliamentary and Electoral duties of MPs may be measurable. However, the 
somewhat ethical question of measuring an MP's party role remains a question of 
theoretical proportions as the party may assist the MP in the fulfilment of their duties. 
Yet, the party may also impede the Member from other commitments such as 
Parliamentary and Electoral duties, 
Although technology's efficiency has greatly increased and MPs are more likely to 
use it when completing many of their duties, the 1947 Tribunal Report that was cited 
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in Chapter Two, nonetheless, provides a comprehensive list of duties for MPs.267 This 
list provides a detailed charter of the various duties that most MPs would probably 
perform on a daily basis. However, only one such role could come under a 
performance system. The other measurable roles would relate to the Members 
budgetary requirements. 
Attend Sittings of Parliament 
Through Sessional Orders, Members are required to attend most of the sittings of 
Parliament. However, although the commencement of sitting begins at the same time, 
the adjournment of Parliament varies from night to night; depending on the business 
that needs to be completed. Members often find themselves sitting through until the 
early hours of the morning. 
The most useful way of measuring such a role would be in paying MPs an hourly rate 
for sitting. This component could be withdrawn from their 'overall salary,' and could 
become a 'casual' type rate that pays them by the hour. Therefore, Members will be 
remunerated fairly and according to the workload of that day. The range of sitting 
hours throughout the 1990's varied from 414 hours in 1991/92 to 737 hours in 
1997 /98. The average sitting hours were 496 hours. The figure between 1992 and 
1998 almost doubled, however there remains no mention in the Tribunal's 
determinations as to how MPs would be compensated for the extra hours worked. The 
table below helps illustrate the varying sitting times clearly: 
267 MOORE B. The Remuneration of the Members of the Western Australian Parliament 1888-1999, 
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Recommendations into this point will be taken into further within the following 
Chapter when the study's overall aims and conclusions are reviewed. 
Budgetary Requirements 
As it has been noted throughout this study so far, many Members find themselves at 
the mercy of public criticism, when various figures released show the sums of money 
that are spent through, and for, the MP' s means. The amount concurred by a particular 
Member may be fully justifiable, however, so that some amount of relativity and 
transparency may be gained, it would be important for the public to view the Mean of 
expenditure in each of the Member's offices. 
It would seem that the onus is upon the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal of Western 
Australia to devise a system that calculates trends in MP expenditure, whilst 
identifying future areas of augmented spending. For example, most MPs would not 
have received large budgets for computer hardware and software, yet with the advent 
of computer and information technology, Members are now provided with funds to 
allow them to purchase able equipment. 
In relation to the United Kingdom's aforementioned benchmarking service, this type 
of benchmarking would come under the umbrella of Competitive Benchmarking 
whereby MPs could compare both expenditure rates and trends against one another's 
figures. Said trends, if greatly augmented, could be flagged by those at the Salaries 
and Allowances Tribunal and that particular MP, who has overspent, could receive 
Perth, Unpublished, Pg. 17 
173 
Chapter Seven: Performance Management Systems 
reward in the form of professional advice on budgeting. Although this not appear to 
be 'competitive benchmarking' on the surface, it could be conceived that one 
particular MP may be seen in a better light by the public for spending less rather than 
another who has often shown trends of unnecessary expense. In this method, MPs 
competition is from fellow MPs, who, on having their financial arrangements for a 
particular term tabled and made public, are consequently judged by the voters. These 
may appear to be irrational, if not outlandish, forms of measurement, however, they, 
as the Productivity Commission stated, provide greater transparency and 
accountability. 
Committee Participaion: 
Members of Parliament are often asked, or volunteer, for special work upon both 
Select and Standing Committees. Whether they are the Chair, researcher, secretary or 
figurehead, many MPs contribute towards to the development of knowledge through 
their participation in such committees. The Members commitment to committee work 
may be a sign of dedication and devotion within an MP to promote to the 
development of policy. It could be argued that such an activity could be rewarded, as 
it often requires more work on the MPs behalf. 
However, whether this contribution relates to a matter of performance measurement 
or not remains questionable as, ideally, the membership of an MP on a committee 
would not form the basis for measurement, but the MP's contributions would. Yet 
nonetheless, an MP could still be recompensed through means of a greater salary for 
their membership, and commitment towards the development of such committees. 
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7.5: Conclusions on Performance Management 
Although The Quest for a Formula continues and the search for a method of 
determining the future of Western Australian Parliamentary Remuneration has not yet 
been reached, it is necessary to make some conclusions upon the issue of performance 
management systems in the Western Australian Parliament. As it has been noted by 
previous studies, the implementation of performance-based initiatives into an MP's 
remunerative package would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. However, the 
reason as to why this is the case needs to be reviewed before the following chapter 
brings this study to its conclusion and makes its overall recommendations. 
The generic, or average, Member of Parliament needs to be found when devising a 
performance management system so that other MPs can be pin-pointed either above 
or below that level. However, the difficult task remains in finding the illusive 
'generic' MP who can act as a standard by which others can be judged. This is 
particularly prevalent in Western Australia for the reasons which will now be 
examined. 
Although there obviously exists varying hierarchical levels between Members and 
Ministers, whether they be administering a major or minor portfolio, there are also 
varying levels of responsibility, or differing weights, between backbenchers alone. 
This is mainly due to the actual geographical size of Western Australia as a state. The 
demographical nature of the state also provides a physical deterrent towards the 
implementation of a performance management system. 
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Members within the metropolitan area of Perth do not suffer the burden of having to 
travel for endless hours to their electorate like other MPs who represent remote and 
distant electorates.' It should be noted that some electorates within Western Australia 
are larger than other states combined. Such MPs, representing metropolitan seats, find 
themselves close to Parliament and their electorate and therefore do not have the 
expense, time or energy spent in travelling away from home, and Parliament, to deal 
with electoral affairs. 
The remote seat of Eyre is approximately three times the size of Victoria and is 
represented by one MLA. Although modem technology does allow for more efficient 
communication between Perth and the seat of Eyre, there would be many occasions 
when an MP would have to be physically present within their electorate for special 
events, openings, functions and so forth. 
However, it could be argued that the Member for Eyre only has approximately 15,000 
constituents that they would need to tend to through representation whereas the 
approximate average of voters per constituency within metropolitan Perth 1s 
approximately 25,000. The question of size and distance versus the number of 
constituents is a poignant note. Some would argue that more voters would mean more 
concerns, issues, events, meetings and ultimately, pressures. This case is still open to 
debate, however, in Western Australian electoral sizes, there exists a malproportioned 
distribution of electors. This is evident through the fact that the Member for the outer 
metropolitan electorate of Wanneroo has approximately 42,000 voters and still 
growing, whereas inner, and more established electorates such as Nedlands and Perth 
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have a very steady constituent population of approximately 23,000. Ultimately, this 
means that the Member for Wanneroo has about 19,000 more constituents than other 
metropolitan seats and approximately 27,000 more constituents than the seat of Eyre. 
Nonetheless, various States around Australia recompense candidates who gain a 
certain percentage of votes; which could be seen as a method of rewarding candidates, 
or already seated, MPs for gaining votes. Such a system may be utilised to a greater 
extent. 
Based upon this geographical and demographical data, determining a performance 
management system based upon the varying workloads of MPs within Western 
Australia would appear to be unreasonable. There is no standard set within the 
electoral boundaries themselves to measure an MPs daily duties as, from what has 
been viewed, the bipolarity between MPs duties is enormous. 
Many MPs are encouraged to visit, and stay, within their electorate in the times when 
they find themselves free of parliamentary or party commitments. However, and given 
the noted data, it would be impossible to measure the MP's performance based upon 
the time spent in their electorates, as this would vary greatly. Similarly, the measure 
of work done within the electorate would also be questionable. 
However, it is not only the geographical and demographical details that make such a 
performance management system within the Western Australian Parliament 
impossible to envisage. There are also the backgrounds of MPs that play a large part 
in the effectiveness with which such duties are carried out. 
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For example, an MP who has the strong backing, both principally and financially, of a 
major political party behind is more likely to have the means behind them to complete 
the daily tasks and meet the required standards. By no means does this intend to imply 
that an Independent Member would not be able to reach the equivalent standard, 
however, it could be argued that it would be harder for an Independent Member to 
achieve such standards. 
Independents play a strong and vital role within most Parliaments around the world, 
likewise, their contribution to the W estem Australian Parliament can also be 
advantageous to the democratic process. However, when implementing a performance 
management system, particularly a system based upon competition, it would be 
difficult for an Independent MP to fit into the set structure of such a system. 
Nonetheless, it could also be argued that party commitments are also burdensome for 
some party-based MPs and only create more tasks which impede their daily duties. 
The 1947 report, mentioned earlier, stated many 'daily duties' of MPs such as 
research, reading, writing, answering telephonic enquires, preparing papers and so 
forth. However, these roles of MPs are simply not measurable. An MP cannot be 
measured for the amount of reading or research that they conduct. Similarly, they 
cannot be measured for the amount of telephonic enquires that they tend to. How the 
satisfaction-level of the caller would be measured is also questionable. 
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Some have argued that MPs could be remunerated through a performance 
management system that measures MPs according to their 'societal performance.' 
Societal performance relates to the major issues that concern all electorates and 
constituents. They are mainly issues such as: Employment and Unemployment, the 
general cost of living, crime rates, number of people incarcerated for such crimes, the 
number of bills introduced into Parliament, the development of public and social 
policy etc. 
However, it is plainly obvious that such figures are not a means for measuring the 
performance of an MP for several reasons. Often, such figures are not generated by 
one particular MP upon their own strength and economic factors often remain at the 
mercy of other, interstate and international, forces. Similarly, it would be impossible 
to measure a Government of individuals on their contribution towards, for example, 
the sale of public transport, as it may not have been in many other people's best 
interests for this to occur. Therefore, it could be safely said, that performance 
management systems are not, and cannot, be tailored in any shape or form towards the 
measurement of such 'global' issues. 
Overall, it would be advantageous in many ways to have figures at hand that show the 
general performance of an MP. Such figures would presumably affect the way in 
which many constituents would vote. It would also be insightful in being able to 
evaluate and compare MPs against one another and assess each MP's efficiency. 
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However, as it has been well illustrated, measurement of any unit requires a standard 
by which an entity can be measured against. MPs, as separate entities, as so distinct in 
their daily, philosophical and practical duties that there is no perpetual standard by 
which a single entity can be measured. In other words, individual MPs are akin to 
individual and varying companies and industries. It would be impossible to combine 
various and differing industries and enterprises into one conglomerate to be judged 
according to one standard as the unit of measure is extremely variant. 
The Hay Group, who allotted points to each category of MP, has graded MPs into 
many varying levels of responsibility. However, within each level, or Band-Level, 
there exist many more levels that have not been quantified through Hay Group's 
study. It is clearly evident that a Whip or Leader of the House has more responsibility, 
and consequently roles, than a Backbencher, however, the Backbenchers roles also 
vary greatly and simply cannot be compared against one another. 
In concluding this Chapter's brief review of performance management systems within 
both the private and public sector, it should be noted that The Quest for a Formula is 
not yet complete as it still remains the intention of this study to determine a method in 
which Parliamentarians may be remunerated. Although the aim of this study was to 
review the validity of implementing a performance management system to remunerate 
MPs, this overarching question has been answered with much fact. 
Ultimately, this study will make its major recommendations on the fashion in which 
MPs should be remunerated in the following Chapter. That is, the methodology and 
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structural ways in which greater transparency and accountability may come to 
fruition. Consequently bringing about a greater awareness of Parliamentary 
Remuneration and its place within the W estem Australian Parliament. 
Performance Management Systems, although currently used in many types of 
organisations, do not appear to have a place within Parliament and the remuneration 
of MPs. Though, not always an accurate reflection of an MP's individual 
performance, the measurement of the performance of an MP ultimately rests with the 
decision carried by the ballot box on Election Day. 
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Chapter Eight: 
Review & Recommendations 
8.1 - Chapters' Review 
8.2 - 10 Recommendations 
-The abolition of the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal 
-Abandonment of the comparative salary methodology 
-Functioning of MP Salaries 
-A new, and independent, Tribunal 
-Experiential MP Salaries 
-Comparative roles of MLA 'sand MLC's 
-Major indicators of MP Salary increments 
-The perceptions of Parliament and its Members 
-Performance Management Systems and MPs 
- "Short Money: " Possible future paths of remuneration 
8.3 - Thesis Conclusion 
- "The Quest fora Formula" 
8.1 Chapters' Review: 
Chapter One (Introduction): 
The first chapter focussed upon the introduction of Parliamentary Remuneration as a 
general issue that had caused much public dissatisfaction over the last one hundred years. 
Various philosophical arguments were put forth concerning the issue of Parliamentary 
Salaries and the semantic meaning of 'remuneration' was visited. 
The major lesson derived from Chapter One's general observations was that 
Parliamentary Remuneration has encountered a long and fettered history which has dealt 
with a considerable amount of public scepticism, comprise and discussion. 
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Chapter Two (Western Australian History of Parliamentary Remuneration): 
Chapter Two dealt with the history of Parliamentary Remuneration in Western Australia 
since its advent in 1900. It also reviewed the creation of the Salaries and Allowances 
Tribunal in 1975 and the momentous determination that occurred in 1990 when the 
Tribunal employed private consultants to review the value of a Western Australian MP. 
The Chapter also focussed upon the various allowances and entitlements that various 
MPs receive. 
Some of the lessons learned from this Chapter were: I) It is quite difficult to ascertain, 
with any degree of accuracy, the monetary value of an MP because their position is so 
variant from any other workplace's position. II) Members of the Western Australian 
Parliament have, over the last seventy years, been receiving financial support to help 
them fulfil their duties, but some of these allowances may have been granted without 
much thought to each individual MP's circumstances. 
Chapter Three (Parliamentary Superannuation): 
Probably the most contentious of all the components of the MP remuneration package, 
Parliamentary Superannuation has always come under the greatest amount of dispute. 
The rates, at which MPs have been superannuated, has not been aligned with community 
standards. However, this has been programmed for change by the next Parliament. It was 
also noted, towards the end of the Chapter, that Federal decisions concerning 
Parliamentary Remuneration, do have an impact upon the remunerative status of the 
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Western Australian MP even though Western Australia has an independent tribunal to 
review such matters. 
One of the major lessons learned from Chapter Three is the fact that Parliamentary 
Superannuation can no longer, in the eyes of most people, stay out of line with the rest of 
the community as the circumstances surrounding the implementation of the 
superannuation scheme have changed greatly. That is, MPs no longer, on the whole, go 
into Parliament in the twilight of their careers. 
Chapter Four (Australian Parliamentary Remuneration): 
The fourth Chapter, which reviewed the history, methodology and structure of Australian 
Federal and State parliamentary remuneration discovered a substantive report by the 
Australian National Audit Office which made some strong recommendations regarding 
the future of Parliamentary Remuneration in Australia. The life-pass, otherwise known as 
the gold-pass which entitles ex-Members and their spouses to free travel Australia-wide, 
came under a great deal of condemnation from the report. 
Similarly, this report stated that expense allowances for MPs should be able to cater for 
each individual MPs circumstances as some were spending much more of their budget in 
some areas rather than others. However all recommendations, except one, were rejected 
by the Department of Finance Administration. 
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Chapter Five (British Parliamentary Remuneration): 
Although the Parliament in Britain is considered to be the Head of all Westminster based 
Parliaments, 'Mother Parliament,' it was discovered, has lagged behind most other 
countries in so far as Parliamentary Remuneration is concerned. This Chapter showed the 
major decisions and determinations that had been made in Britain concerning the issue of 
Parliamentary Salaries, and the various bodies that had been established in an attempt to 
quell the public criticism of such determinations. 
Chapter Six (Canadian Parliamentary Remuneration): 
The fifth Chapter moved on to look at various international comparisons, with Canada 
being the first Westminster based jurisdiction to be given consideration. During this 
Chapter's review of Canadian Parliamentary Remuneration, it was discovered that 
Canadian MPs had long been entitled to a Tax-Free Expense Allowance which paid them 
approximately 20,000 dollars per year. This was seen as a method of paying Members 
without having to tell the public about how much they really earned. It was considered to 
be worth 40,000 dollars because of its 'tax-free' status, however, this was recently 
abolished in 2001. 
The major report, conducted by Sobeco Ernst and Young, stated that a fully independent 
tribunal should be established so that the remunerative process may be made more 
transparent. The Canadian experience also illustrated that Canadian MPs received large 
pension payouts that were not wholly accepted by most of the public, and many of the 
MPs themselves. Chapter Six also illustrated Sobeco Ernst and Young's view that MP 
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Remuneration should be viewed as a 'global package.' Reviewing a parliamentarian's 
global remunerative package allowed the remuneration experts to devise a formidable 
scale of salaries. 
Chapter Seven (Performance Management Systems): 
The Chapter on performance management systems illustrated many varying types of 
performance management that are used by both public and private enterprises. The 
methodology used in implementing and maintaining such systems was also reviewed. 
Some of the roles of MPs were juxtaposed against such systems. It was discovered that 
MPs roles vary considerably from Member to Member as there are always demographic, 
geographical, physical difference between MP's roles. 
It was therefore decided that it would be far too difficult to implement such a system. 
Nonetheless, this Chapter, through literature gained from Hay Group Inc. stated that 
financial counselling of some description could occur for MPs who were willing to learn 
about managing their finances. 
8.2 Recommendations: 
Given the literature and research reviewed throughout this thesis it is contended that it is 
practically impossible to implement a performance management system that could be 
utilised to remunerate Members of the Western Australian Parliament. However, ten 
recommendations are proposed for dealing with the future of parliamentary remuneration 
within Western Australia. Most of the following recommendations would work 
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interchangeably and as a part of the same structure. However, recommendation ten stands 
on its own as a possible 'outside' solution that would be entirely self sufficient. 
Recommendation 1 
The Salaries and Allowances Tribunal of Western Australia should be abolished 
Much of the literature that has been viewed throughout the course of this study points 
towards the abolition of the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal of Western Australia 
(SATWA). Without doubt, SATWA has produced informative documents and has 
provided some interesting analyses upon the issue of Parliamentary Remuneration. 
However, on many occasions, the methodological approach used by SATWA in 
determining the remunerative amount has not always been explicitly mentioned and 
available to the general public. 
Given the evidence that has been gathered through Chapters 1 to 4, the study makes this 
recommendation on the following bases: 
(i) SA TWA is not independent; 
(ii) SA TWA has not met its aims; 
(iii) The jurisdiction of SATW A has been compromised by Parliament and the 
Executive and; 
(iv) MP Remuneration trends seem to have little, or no, difference to the 
federal Remuneration Tribunal's determinations. 
(i) SATWA is not independent: 
SATWA claims to be a tribunal that is independent and that its decisions, therefore, are 
also independent. When the tribunal was established in 1975, it was believed, and 
remains a belief, that the tribunal would be independent. The Minister for Justice, at the 
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time, stated: "The new tribunal will consist of three independent members who will not in 
any way be covered by the provisions of this legislation. Thus, the tribunal will be 
completely divorced and independent."1 However, as was noted in Chapter One, the 
tribunal forms a part of the arm of the Department of Premier and Cabinet. The Tribunal 
may argue that this is a necessary linkage; yet, this may ultimately dampen the public's 
trust in the determination process. Similarly, SATW A, comes under the portfolio of the 
Premier.2 
(ii) SATWA has not met its aims 
In 1975, Premier of Western Australia, Sir Charles Court, stated one of the main reasons 
for the creation of the tribunal: "This measure seeks to establish a tribunal with 
jurisdiction to inquire into and determine - and I emphasise, "and determine"3 However, 
this has not always been so, and will be shortly noted, as the Tribunal's determinations 
have often been rejected by Parliament and the Executive. 
Similarly, SATWA was established to assist the MPs in dealing with the amount of 
public controversy surrounding the issue of Parliamentary Remuneration. However, given 
a glance across any Western Australian newspaper, it could be stated that this aim has not 
been met as a great deal of public criticism still exists. 
1 http://www.sat.wa.gov .au/mphistory/1975 .htm 
2 http://www.boards.dpc.wa.gov.au/index.cfin?fuseaction=bcv .bdetail&bno=389 
3http://www.sat.wa.gov.au/mphistory/1975.htm 
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(iii) The jurisdiction of SATWA has been compromised by Parliament and The 
Executive: 
As noted earlier, SATWA have not been given the opportunity to function as a fully-
independent agency and have been dictated terms by 'outside' bodies. This is an endemic 
problem as SA TWA's determinations, as legislated, are required to be passed by 
Parliament. However, given the hypothetical scenario of where SA TWA recommend a 
large increase for MP's pay, it is doubtful that Parliament will pass such an increase. This 
is mainly due to political reasons. The determination's process and powers need to be 
taken out of the parliamentary sphere so that it becomes a totally independent process that 
cannot be tainted by political interests. 
(iv) MP Remuneration trends seem to have little, or no, difference to the federal 
Remuneration Tribunal's determinations: 
Through the tabulation of the remunerative amounts received by Western Australia 
versus Victorian and Commonwealth MPs, this study notes that there has been little 
difference between the amounts received by all of these MPs, even though they are 
administered by separate independent tribunals. This poses the question as to whether 
SATW A is necessary as Western Australian MP Remuneration could be tied to their 
federal, or state, counterparts. 
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would probably vary greatly from that of a, say, Victorian MP's role. This has become 
evident through SA TWA's treatment of MPs who represent vast, and regional, Western 
Australia. Some electorates in Western Australia are several times larger than the other 
States, let alone their electorates. Similarly, within Western Australia itself, there are 
abnormalities in the varying sizes (populations) of the electorates. For example, the seat 
ofNedlands has 15,489 electors whereas the seat ofWanneroo has 41,213.4 
However, there exists yet another reason as to why such jurisdictions should not be 
compared with one another when analyses are being carried out. Over the last one 
hundred years, most parliaments have often used other counterparts as a means of 
justification for the increasing of their own remuneration. This appears to have had a 
cyclical nature whereby one comparison will lead to a counter-comparison, consequently 
increasing parliamentary salaries without reason. Ultimately, there are other means by 
which determination-inquiries can be carried out; as was seen through SATWA's use of 
private management consultants in the early 1990' s. 
Recommendation 3 
Given the information illustrated in Recommendations 1 and 2, by which means 
should MP Salaries function? 
The abolition of SATW A would leave a vacuum whereby MPs would no longer receive 
any types of future increments in their remuneration. Therefore, this study proposes that a 
new tribunal be established to determine the future of MP Remuneration and MP Salaries 
in particular. Although this study does not propose to outline every single aspect of this 
4 http://www.sat.wa.gov.au/electorate_no's.htm 
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new tribunal, it should be stated from the outset that such a tribunal would have to be 
independent, both in nature and practice, and would have more public input into the 
inquiry-determination process. Appendix 1 illustrates the methods that have been 
employed over the last 100 years whereas Appendix 2 outlines this thesis' 
recommendations on which tools should be used in determining Parliamentary Salaries. 
Recommendation 4 
Particulars of the new tribunal 
Without drawing up a constitution for the proposed new tribunal, it is important to outline 
some particular functions and powers of this tribunal in a recommendation of their own. 
The Tribunal: 
(i) Would meet once an election had been 'called;' 
(ii) Would consist of an uneven number so that a majority could 
be gained; 
(iii) Would publish the findings in The West, once a majority had been gained 
and would explain the amounts to be received by various MPs and why; 
(iv) Would consist of general members of the public, remunerative 'experts,' 
and MPs representing each major political party. 
(v) The Tribunal's only jurisdiction would be over MP Salaries and Entitlements; and 
6. With Constitutional, or legislative, approval the Tribunal would pass their 
determination directly to the Governor for Assent without needing the consent 
of Parliament. 
The Tribunal would meet prior to every election to determine what an MP's position 
would be worth for the up-coming session of Parliament. They would not meet again 
until the following election. The Tribunal, through an independent inquiry process, would 
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new tribunal, it should be stated from the outset that such a tribunal would have to be 
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would be worth for the up-coming session of Parliament. They would not meet again 
until the following election. The Tribunal, through an independent inquiry process, would 
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vote upon various detenninations and such detenninations will be passed to the Governor 
so that Parliament may not influence the detennination process. 
In this sense, the public will feel that they are getting more of a say into the issue of 
Parliamentary Remuneration as they will sit on the Board of the Tribunal. Similarly, such 
an independent body's detennination, which would have public approval, would simply 
come into effect as of Assent. Presiding over the new tribunal could be the Governor who 
would ensure that no illegitimate transactions were made or proposed. This process 
would both simplify and increase the transparency of the remunerative process. 
Recommendation 5 
MPs should receive experiential-based pay 
As noted in Chapter 2, Western Australian MPs come from a highly diverse background 
of employment. For example, there are: Teachers, actors, managers, doctors, academics, 
riggers and many other types of professions within the Western Australian Parliament. To 
pay them all one-level of pay does not seem to adequately address the fact that some MPs 
are more experienced than others. 
However, this study noted whilst researching Perfonnance Management Systems and 
remunerating MPs that it was very difficult to remunerate MPs accordingly. However, 
there seems to be no account taken for MPs who serve more than one tenn of Parliament. 
It could be thought that MPs would become more efficient over time as they would gain 
more experience in fulfilling their duties. As in many professions, there are various levels 
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which are incremented on a yearly basis according to experience. Therefore, this study 
proposes that the issue of paying MPs according to 'bands' which are based on 
experience. For example, an MP serving their first term of Parliament would receive a 
Band 1 base-pay amount whereas an MP serving their second term would receive a Band 
2 base-pay. Various percentiles could separate each band. 
Recommendation 6 
Studying the roles, and demands in a comparative study between Members of the 
Legislative Assembly and Members of the Legislative Council of Western Australia 
In Chapter Four, the study carried out by Sobeco/Ernst & Young on Canadian MP 
Remuneration stated that the demands on MPs varied from House to House. As a 
consequence, the Canadian MPs were remunerated varying rates according to which 
House they were seated. Although this study has not explored the realms of this topic, it 
is a recommendation of this study that there be further investigation into the roles that 
Western Australian MLA's and MLC's carry out so that comparisons can be made. It 
may be found that MLA's work more than MLC's, and therefore, should be remunerated 
fairly. 
Insofar as the roles of all Members of the Western Australian Parliament are concerned, 
this study encourages further private management inquiries into the remunerative rates 
received by MPs. As in both Western Australia with the Cullen/Eagen/Dell studies in the 
early 1990's and the Federal Noble/Lowdnes/Cullen/Eagen/Dell studies, much 
knowledge and expertise was gained. Therefore, these studies and others should be 
carried out more often. 
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Recommendation 7 
Average Weekly Earnings, Consumer Price Index and Gross Domestic Product as 
indicators of remunerative increments 
In many regards, people will argue that politicians hold the major responsibility for the 
state of the Australian economy. Economists may debate this statement as there are many 
other global factors at work. However, MPs are, at least to some extent, responsible for 
the state of the economy which also may effect the levels of: Average Weekly Earnings 
(A WE), Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the Gross Domestic Produce (GDP). 
However, there are two arguments against the use of these figures as indicators of MPs 
performance. Firstly, Western Australian MPs are only partially responsible for such 
figures as the figures themselves are based upon the total-Australian amounts, over which 
Western Australian MPs have no responsibility. Secondly, this study has focussed on the 
Backbencher and base-pay alone, figures such as A WE, CPI and GDP are mostly, if at 
all, influenced by Senior Ministers and it could be argued that Backbenchers decisions 
and directions have little to do with such figures. Therefore, this study suggests, when 
determining a Backbencher's salary, that these figures do not play the vital justification 
for increasing an MP's base pay. 
Recalling Chapter Two's historical review of Parliamentary Salaries, it was noted that 
Western Australian MPs decreased their pay in the 1930's in accordance with salaries 
that were also falling in Australian society. The study's proposal could appear to be a 
contradiction to the historical facts of what has been employed. However, this study 
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states under the new tribunal, that such figures should simply not employ 'outside' 
figures to justify erroneous and unjustifiable determinations. 
Recommendation 8 
Studying and investigating how the public's perception of Parliament, and its 
Members, can be upheld 
Although there has been little formal reference to it throughout the thesis, there has been 
much note regarding the standing of the position of an MP within Australian, and 
international, society. As was noted in Chapter One, Parliamentarians are trusted about as 
much as a maligned oft par used car salesman would be. However, this thesis proposes 
that perception of an MP is not entirely fair. 
As it has been noted, MPs work very long hours, are always 'in the spotlight,' travel 
endless hours, are submitted to constant reading and research to stay in touch with topical 
issues and have to tend to other party or electorate functions. Some may argue that if they 
did not want this lifestyle that they should have chosen another career. Others may agree 
that MPs do work extremely hard, however, it is the feeling of this thesis that said people 
would be in the minority. 
As noted earlier in the thesis, a study by Dr Ken Coghill and Dr Colleen Lewis on the 
perceptions of the public about their MPs was carried out to find more out about public 
perceptions of their representatives. Recommendation 8 of this study proposes that more 
studies akin to the aforementioned be carried out with the intention of raising the general 
esteem of Parliament and its Members. 
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Recommendation 9 
Performance Management Systems and the determinatiOn of MP Salaries and 
Entitlements 
Members of Parliament's salaries should· not be tied to any performance measuring 
system under the current structure of determination. As it was noted within Chapter 
Seven, MPs roles vary from constituency to constituency. It would be virtually 
impossible to manage such a performance system effectively within the current Western 
Australian framework for remunerating MPs. However, stating that MP's 'should' not be 
tied to such current structures may not necessarily mean that they 'could' not be tied to 
new, or unforseen, structures. 
Recommendation 10 
"Short Money:" A Revolution in the Payment of Members of Parliament 
The final recommendation of this thesis proposes a 'global,' or holistic, approach towards 
a new, even 'revolutionary,' method of payment. The nine previous recommendations of 
this study meld into one cohesive philosophical recommendation towards the Western 
Australian problem. However, Recommendation 10 is, in its own right, a 
recommendation which stands alone and does not relate to the previous 
recommendations. In Chapter Four, Parliamentarians stated that they wanted more 
flexibility with their entitlements as expenditure varied from o_ffice to office. However, 
even though the Auditor General's Office thought of it as a useful idea, the Department 
of Finance Administration thought differently. 
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Similarly, the conundrum of paying MPs bonuses for,work that they have achieved has 
also b'een stated as virtually impossi_ble as the current structures would not permit such a 
move. MPs positions have been void of the luxuries of flexibility that many people, at an 
e'quivalent level, would have the opportunity to do. MPs cannot trade-off some of their 
pay for more entitlements or vice versa. Furthermore, MPs cannot trade-off one 
entitlement for another'.' With MP Salaries and Entitlements being so stringently 
administered, for auditory purposes, MPs have very little flexibility in what they do. It 
would be interesting to see how this inflexibility affects their perfonnance. 
Nonetheless, as it was noted in Chapter Five which focussed on the British MP's 
remunerative arrangements, a term entitled "Short Money" was discovered. In the House 
of Commons in 1974-75, Mr Edward Short, instituted a payment of funds to political 
parties who gained a certain amount of votes and a certain amount of seats. Originally, 
MPs were paid $1000AU for every seat that was won and would also receive $2AU for 
every two hundred votes that were gained. 5 Today, after several increases in the "Short 
Money" allocations; the Tory Party received $7,000,000AU for the administering of 
opposition business.6 -This thesis proposes that such a system be· used to a greater extent 
within Western Australia. 
As was noted in Chapter Four, similar systems are in place within other Australian 
jurisdictions. For example, candidates within Victorian State EleCtions who gain more 
than 4 per ,cent of the first preferential vote, gain AU$1.25 for eyery first preference that 
5 http://www,parliament.uk/commonsllib/research/notes/snpc·Ol663.pdf 
6 Ibid. , 
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they receive.7 A similar, if not identical, system was introduced into the Western 
Australian Legislative Assembly in 2003 under the Electoral Amendment Bill 2003 but 
was later withdrawn for unknown reasons. This study proposes that such a system ~ould 
work within Western Australia as that it ':Youi'd fairly represent some form of reward 
towards an individual MP or their Party. Such funds may currently be allocated through 
the use of public funding accounts, however, it may be possible to legitimise the structure 
of eleCioral funding towards the attainment of a democratically viable remunerative 
system of payment that would represent a fairly true value of an MP. 
So that such a system could be used in Western Australia, it would be necessary to 
legislate on the many boundaries that this proposal will embody. Similarly, as this could 
be considered an 'outlandish' recommendation, it may nonetheless remain a contribution 
· - to knowledge and the future directions of Parliamentary Remuneration within Western 
Australia. >{he illustration below will help explain the proposed system: 
IND 
1 http://www.dms.dpc.vic.gov.au/DominofWeb_Notes/LDMS/PubLawToday.nsf?OpenDiltabase 
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The illustration above represents the State of Western Australia and is divided up into 
electorates. The letters inside each of the electorates signify who has won each particular 
seat and each letter corresponds with the name of the political Party. In this setting, there 
is Party A, Party B and an Independent. By means of a complex mathematical formula, 
akin to the one used in "Short Money," the Australian Electoral Commission could 
distribute funds to each of the Parties, or Independents, depending on how many seats 
they won and how many votes were gained. 
For example, the mathematical formula in question would have to value the total cost of 
running an electorate. Included in the running costs would be: Administrative costs, staff 
costs, travel expenses, the MP's Pay and so forth (superannuation would not be included 
as that is considered 'post-parliamentary'). Therefore, if one seat were to be valued at 
$1,000,000AU in total, Party A would gain $3,000,000AU in total, Party B would receive 
$2,000,000 in total and the Independent would receive $1,000,000 in total. When saying 
'in total,' it is the meaning of this study that it includes all expenses including the salary 
of an MP. This system is much like the methodology used by shareholders within the 
Stock Exchange. Each person has varying degrees of interest and investment, and it is up 
to each individual to administer, distribute and allocate their allotted funds in the, 
legislated, way that they see fit. 
For the political Party who gained Office, in this scenario the group being Party A, would 
also receive 'bonuses' for winning Office. This would be on account of having additional 
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responsibilities, positions and work. HrJwever, the mathematical fonnula in question 
could have a derivation for Parties who gain Government. 
From the total allotted funds to Party A, along with their bonuses for winning Office, the 
Party itself, under strict Financial Management guidelines, would administer the funds as 
they saw fit and would have to manage the monies in such a way that planning for future 
trips, expenses and so forth were taken into account for all MPs belonging to that Party. 
Similarly, Party B would aiso have to administer their funds accordingly whereas the 
Independent, as a sole operator, would have to manage their 'electoral' funds as a 'private 
entity.' 
Not only would this make Parties more conscious of their spending, but would also allow 
greater flexibility in the spending of funds. Through strict accounting and auditing 
processes, the Parties would be held both responsible and liable for any misappropriation 
that may occur. However, through this system, Parties may be able to provide 'bonuses' 
of some description to their MPs who have achieved exceptional standards. 
As it was noted, this structure and process would have to work within very strict 
guidelines and there would have to be strict auditing processes in place to ensure monies 
were not being spent for 'political' purposes. Documents would have to be tabled on an 
annual basis allowing the public to see what was being spent. This is apart from the 
Government's annual Appropriation Bill which provides for social services, public sector 
employment and so forth. This system ouly relates to the administrative, day-to-day, 
running of the electorate. 
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8.3-Tbesis ConclusionjThe Quest for a Formula) 
Many parliamentarians from greatly varied positions, backgrounds, jurisdictions and 
experiences have contributed towards this study's completion. Although most of their 
contribution has been through quoted form, derived through Parliamentary Debates, their 
contribution has been acknowledgeable. Similarly, many reports, both governmental and 
independent, have been viewed in trying to solve the problem of Parliamentary 
Remuneration. Many governmental reports from inside, and outside, of Western Australia 
have greatly contributed towards the completion of this study. 
However, without questioning the validity of this study, one question remains 
unanswered for future researchers and students of Parliamentary Remuneration. That is, if 
a fair, fully justifiable and transparent methodology of det..:rmining MP Salaries was 
enacted, would it help quell public vitriol over said amounts and would it increase the 
standing of Parliamentarians in general? The nobility and statesmanship that have been 
intrinsically linked towards MPs in days past does not appear to be present within 
contemporary politics. 
Without much debate: Forest, Barton, Chifley, Curtin and Menzies, just to name a few, 
hold that enviable position that few MPs, if any, posses today. Such highly esteemed 
positions may have been attained through the vantage of both history and hindsight. 
Nonetheless, the concluding thought is that measures of some description need to be 
taken to ensure that the average MP who toils for the 'Good' does not toil needlessly for 
an uninterested mass who are concerned neither with representation nor advancement 
through Parliament. 
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AJmendix A - Methods of Determination 
The table beiOw summarises the last one hundred years of remunerative determinations 
in Western Australia. It illustrmes the year of induction of varying types of methodology. 
1900: 
-The Mean of all Australian States (including New Zealand) 
1931: 
-Reduction in rates according to the state of the economy (The Depression) 
1944: 
-Basic Wage Variations used as an indicator 
1947: 
-Augmented Governmental activities and the quadrupling of State revenue 
-First temporary Salaries Tribunal 
-Review ofMP's duties 
1950-1964 
-Several ad hoc committees review Parliamentary Remuneration 
1965: 
-First permanent Salaries Tribunal established to review salaries at intervals no greater 
than twelve months. 
1975: 
-Establishment of the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal of Western Australia 
-Distance and vastness of electorates taken into consideration 
1990: 
-Use of Private Management Consultants to ascertain the value of an MP's position 
-Work value taken into consideration 
-The market rate of pay for a similar position considered 
-Individual perfonnance examined 
-Parliament's capacity to pay MP's various amounts 
-Some electorates granted greater funds because of augmented population differences 
between other electorates 
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Appendix B: Approved Methods of Determination 
The brief table below exhibits the methods of determining MP Salaries that would be 
considered by thfs siudy as a fair and equitable method of determination. 
-Reduction or increases in MP Salaries according to the state of the Western Australian 
economy as a minor indicator. 
-Basic wage variations as a minor indicator. 
-Location, size and demographics of the electorate should be taken into consideration. 
-Experientially adjustable pay for MPs who seive for longer periods 
-A transparent, publicly managed Salaries Tribunal that remains partially administered by 
governmental ugencies. 
-Instead of reviewing Parliamentary Salaries at intervals no greater than twelve months, 
MP Salaries should be reviewed once each term and advertised before the general 
election. Those wishing to be candidates can then gauge the value of the position for 
themselves and can make the decision as to whether they wish to apply (through 
election). 
~Periodical, yet not infrequent, employment of private management consultants who can 
independently assess and review the value of the MP's position. 
212 
